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Chapter 1
Introduction
As the future is mostly unknown, we primarily make decisions under un-
certainty. We choose how to invest our money, which career to pursue and
how to educate our children without perfect knowledge of the ensuing con-
sequences. Even the results of trivial decisions, like taking or not taking an
umbrella when leaving home, are affected by which one of the many pos-
sible states of nature materializes. Decision theory describes this kind of
problems as a choice between uncertain prospects. Once all the constitu-
tive elements of the prospects are considered, we can select the prospect
that gives us the higher expected utility, that is the largest beneﬁt in expec-
tation. Even if we may seldom ﬁnd ourselves thinking about utilities and
probabilities, we may agree that decision theory provides a quite satisfac-
tory representation of how decisions should be, and in fact are, made.
Introspection however reveals that making a choice is sometimes dif-
ﬁcult: we may be indecisive, for example, because we do not know which
choice object we prefer or because the probability of future events is hard
to quantify. In my ﬁrst chapter I experimentally investigate (with Arno
Riedl) individuals’ choice behavior in situations where uncertainty may lead
to indecisiveness. Our novel design allows observing a so far unexplored
behavioral regularity: approximately half of the decision makers in our ex-
periment avoid several choices between risky and ambiguous prospects by
delegating them to a random chance device. We consider several decision
1
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making theories and test whether they are able to account for the observed
choice behavior. Our data do not only question the predictive power of tradi-
tional decision making models but also appear inconsistent with approaches
that explicitly account for behavioral aspects of decision making, such as
probability weighting and regret aversion. We suggest that the observed
choice anomaly is the consequence of individuals holding incomplete prefer-
ences over ambiguous and risky prospects. More precisely, a decision maker
that has multiple priors over an ambiguous event may entertain as many
representations of the corresponding ambiguous prospect. The existence of
multiple representations may in turn impede the comparison of prospects.
Importantly, our results suggest that indecisiveness stirs people towards op-
tions that allow avoiding active choices. Further, they present a caveat to the
presence of ambiguity averse preferences: rather than being averse to am-
biguity per-se, half of the subjects in our experiment dislike making choices
under uncertainty.
Choosing whether to take or not an umbrella from home is an act that
does not require depriving others of the possibility to ﬁnd shelter from the
rain. However, economics usually deals with scarcity, that is the problem
of humans having needs and wants in a world where resources are limited.
Deﬁning what constitutes a fair allocation of a scarce resource seems partic-
ularly problematic in the presence of uncertainty. For instance, how should
the likelihood of survival, if at all, be taken into account when ranking pa-
tients for organ transplant? What is the appropriate compensation for high
risk jobs as compared to riskless ones? These examples are only a few of the
many where allocations need to be deﬁned in the presence of uncertainty. In
my second chapter I study (together with Arno Riedl) individuals’ norma-
tive fairness judgments in distribution problems where resources have to be
allocated before, or without, knowing the true state of nature that inﬂuences
their ﬁnal distribution.
We ﬁnd that, compared to a situation where uncertainty is absent, people
hold very heterogeneous ideas about fair allocations, which also depend on
their own preferences for uncertainty. In theory, four fairness ideals based
on general distributive justice principles may be endorsed: our data show
that each ideal motivates a signiﬁcant share of the observed allocations. Fur-
2
thermore, the interpretation of distributive principles is context dependent.
Indeed, we observe that it is systematically related to the degree of uncer-
tainty characterizing the distribution problem.
Experiments in economics and in psychology have largely demonstrated
that a considerable fraction of individuals care about others’ outcomes in
a positive way. More recently, authors started investigating the conditions
under which individuals’ generosity diminishes. Giving to others appears
to be particularly under jeopardy in situations where the link between in-
dividuals’ generosity and observable ﬁnal outcomes is blurred. In my third
chapter I investigate (together with Arno Riedl) how generosity is affected
by uncertainty. Participants to the experiment are asked to distribute a
given amount between themselves and an anonymous recipient, their own
ﬁnal position (or the position of the recipient) being uncertain at the moment
of the division. By exploiting the results of our second paper, this study also
allows testing whether uncertainty induces individuals to adopt self-serving
biased deﬁnitions of fairness in order to act more selﬁshly.
We ﬁnd that individuals’ generous behavior is not signiﬁcantly affected by
the presence of uncertainty. However, when accounting for the possible fair-
ness norms that are relevant in the studied distribution problems, we ob-
serve that some individuals adopt a biased fairness view in order to retain
more money. This however happens only when uncertainty affects the out-
come of the decision maker. Not only fairness views seem to be unbiased
when the recipient is instead affected by uncertainty: we also observe that
the more risk averse an individual the more generously he acts towards the
recipient facing uncertainty.
Uncertainty is not only characterizing active decision making: humans are
often directly affected by risky events that can be at best inﬂuenced by their
decisions. In order to decrease their vulnerability to events that would nega-
tively affect their ﬁnancial situation, individuals can create risk sharing ar-
rangements. The size of the insurance industry and of national social secu-
rity systems evidently demonstrates the economic relevance of risk sharing
arrangements. In my fourth chapter I experimentally investigate (with
Franziska Tausch) the determinants of individuals’ willingness to engage in
collective risk sharing. We hypothesize that the more risk exposure is per-
3
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ceived as a deliberate choice the smaller the support for risk sharing. The
role plaid by individuals’ risk preferences and their own and others’ expo-
sure to risks is also investigated. We ﬁnd that, irrespective of their own risk
attitude, individuals are less willing to share risks when the other member
in the pair deliberately exposed himself to a high risk. This result is stronger
the more extreme the potentially bad consequences of risk taking. We also
observe that individuals who are only occasionally taking a high risk tend to
share more risk with individuals who also chose a high exposure.
4
Chapter 2
Revealed Incomplete
Preferences under
Uncertainty
2.1 Introduction
Most decision making models assume that individuals are always able to
pair-wise compare two, or more, available options. In other words, it is as-
sumed that decision makers have complete preferences. However, complete-
ness has long been recognized as a problematic assumption. The following
sentence by Aumann (1962) describes this issue concisely: ‘Of all the axioms
of utility theory, the completeness axiom is perhaps the most questionable.
Like others of the axioms, it is inaccurate as a description of real life; but
unlike them, we ﬁnd it hard to accept even from the normative viewpoint’.
Starting with Aumann (1962) decision theorists have proposed models that
allow a decision maker to be occasionally indecisive. More recently, authors
have linked incomplete preferences with multi-objective (or multi-self) deci-
sion making under risk and certainty (see, for instance, Ok, 2002 and Dubra,
2004). In these models preferences may be incomplete when the decision
maker (from now onwards DM) is characterized by two selfs that pursue
possibly orthogonal objectives. As an example, when choosing a meal an
agent’s ‘healthy’ self may be confronted with her ‘hedonic’ self.
5
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Existing models are also capable of representing situations where prefer-
ences between uncertain prospects are incomplete because of Knightian un-
certainty (Bewley 2002 and Gilboa et al., 2010). Incompleteness is ascribed
to the presence of multiple representations of the same prospect, which orig-
inate from the DM set of priors on the uncertain event. In other words,
incomplete preferences stem from the fact that the DM lacks information
to determine which option is best. Last but not least, the relaxation of the
completeness axiom has been essential for the development of theoretical
models that can account for behavioral anomalies like the status quo bias
(Masatlioglu and Ok, 2005), the endowment effect (Mandler, 2004) and pref-
erence reversal (Eliaz and Ok, 2006).
Albeit important, so far theoretical accomplishments were not paired
with rigorous empirical evidence on the existence of incomplete preferences.
Experiments in economics and psychology document that complex choice sit-
uations may lead decision makers to be indecisive but the observed indeci-
siveness may be attributed to factors other than incompleteness of prefer-
ences. For instance, Shaﬁr and Tversky (1992) show that large choice sets
constituted by similar items induce people to stick to the status quo, even
though each of the available items is preferred to it. This result suggests
that a potentially complete preference relation becomes incomplete in some
circumstances: however, competing explanations exists, like decision costs
that increase in the number of alternatives or regret aversion.1
The major obstacle to obtaining empirical evidence on incompleteness re-
sides in one of the founding blocks of modern economics, the revealed pref-
erences approach. Choices reveal preferences and as a consequence the
incompleteness of a preference relation is difﬁcult to judge from observed
choice behavior. Further, within this approach indecisiveness cannot be dis-
tinguished from indifference, the latter meaning that two options are consid-
ered equally attractive while the former indicating the inability to pair-wise
1Similar experiments were also run by Redelmaier and Shaﬁr (1995) who ﬁnd that the
tendency to stick to the status quo is common among professionals. See also Shaﬁr (1993) and
Simonson (1989) for experiments describing behavior that could be the product of incomplete
preference relations.
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rank options.2
In this paper we experimentally investigate choice behavior in decision
situations where preferences may be incomplete because of uncertainty. The
study is composed of two main experiments. In the ﬁrst experiment subjects
are asked to make a series of choices between a risky two-outcomes prospect
(known probabilities) and an ambiguous two-outcomes prospect (unknown
probabilities). Outcomes are the same in all prospects and the level and
source of ambiguity is kept constant in all decision situations. Instead,
the winning probability of the risky prospect varies in each decision situ-
ation, ranging from certainty to win the high outcome to certainty to loose
it. In each decision situation, we allow subjects to avoid choosing between
prospects. This can be done by selecting a third option which consists of a
chance device that assigns either the ambiguous or the risk prospect to the
DM, with equal probability.
We ﬁnd that half of the subjects in our experiment avoid several choices
between prospects, this evidence representing a so far unexplored behav-
ioral anomaly. Indeed, we show that the observed behavior cannot be recon-
ciled with the most popular models of decision making under uncertainty,
such as Maxmin Expected Utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989), Cumu-
lative Prospect Theory (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and Regret theory
(Loomes and Sugden, 1982).
In the second experiment we test whether subjects’ behavior may be ratio-
nalized by an incomplete preference relation due to uncertainty, as in Gilboa
et al. (2010). To this end we increase the high outcome associated to the am-
biguous prospect, keeping everything else equal to the ﬁrst experiment. If
the observed behavioral anomaly is the product of incomplete preferences,
we should observe that subjects still avoid making choices but in different
decision situations. We ﬁnd that subjects’ choices in the second experiment
are largely consistent with the hypothesis that avoid active choices when
preferences are incomplete.
Our results conﬁrm the importance of relaxing completeness for the formal
2An exception is constituted by Eliaz and Ok, 2006. The authors relax the Weak Axiom of
Revealed Preferences to propose a theory of decision making that allows identifying indeci-
siveness and indifference from observable choice behavior.
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modeling of decision making under uncertainty. In particular, the observed
behavioral anomaly calls attention on the kind of decision rules that individ-
uals may adopt in situations where preferences are potentially incomplete.
The observed choice behavior also implies that subjects are not averse to
ambiguity when they do not have to choose between uncertain prospects.
Ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961) is considered an important violation of
rationality and decades of research in experimental economics show that the
majority of subjects display such aversion (for a review see Camerer and We-
ber, 1992). We show that the possibility to avoid active decision making is
sufﬁcient for ambiguity aversion to disappear. Lastly, we ﬁnd a strong gen-
der effect as female subjects are much more likely to avoid active choice.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes
the design of the ﬁrst experiment and section 2.3 presents and discusses the
results. Section 2.4 presents our second experiment and its results. Section
2.5 describes which individual characteristics are related to indecisiveness.
Conclusions are drawn in section 2.6.
2.2 An experiment on choice under uncertainty
The main purpose of this experiment is to investigate people’s choice be-
havior in decision situations where uncertainty may cause preferences to be
incomplete. To this end, in the ﬁrst part of the experiment subjects face a
series of incentivized choices between risky and ambiguous prospects, with
the option to remain indecisive between them. Being indecisive in a certain
choice situation implies that a fair chance device selects which prospect,
risky or ambiguous, is assigned to the subject in that situation.
It has been shown that accounting for the way people think about prob-
abilities can highly improve the descriptive validity of models of decision
making under risk (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). In the ﬁrst part of
our experiment participants have to make choices between prospects with
known probabilities (risk) and prospects with unknown probability (ambi-
guity). Hence, we are interested in exploring whether subjects’ perception
of probabilities contributes to explaining their choices. The second part of
8
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the experiment consists of a series of incentivized choices between lotteries
and sure amounts which allow us to jointly estimate the parameter values
of subjects’ utility and probability weighting function. Finally, we are inter-
ested in exploring how subjects’ cognitive abilities and thinking styles affect
decision making under uncertainty. The last part of the experiment includes
psychological questionnaires that measure such characteristics.
Note that subjects were not informed about the structure of the experiment:
instructions were administered on the computer screen before the beginning
of each part. In the following the experimental procedures for the three parts
are described in detail.
Choices under uncertainty In the ﬁrst part of the experiment subjects
go through a series of choices between one ambiguous and one risky prospect.
Before that, subjects select a color (red or black) which will be their winning
one in each choice situation. Two urns are used to generate uncertainty. The
risky urn, Urn A, contains 100 balls colored red and black, and its composi-
tion varies in each choice situation. The proportion of colored balls is modi-
ﬁed in steps of 5, starting with 100 red balls and ending with 100 black ones.
Hence, there are 21 choices in total, all displayed on one table.3 Figure 2.1
displays a screen shot of the table. Risky prospects offer increasingly worse
(better) chances to win for subjects betting on red (black). The ambiguous
urn, Urn B, also contains 100 red and black balls but their proportion is un-
known to the subjects as well as to the experimenter. Both urns are visibly
placed in the experimental lab and subjects are informed that they are free
to inspect their content after the experiment is over. A colleague of us com-
posed the ambiguous urn, being free to put as many red and as many black
balls in the urn, provided that the total number had to be 100. The urn was
then sealed and nobody except the composer, who was in no way involved
in the experiment, was aware of its composition. In each of the 21 choice
situations subjects choose whether they want to bet on their winning color
from the urn with known composition or from the ambiguous one. Subjects
can also avoid to actively choose one of the prospects by selecting the middle
3In the empirical literature, tables with paired lotteries are commonly used to elicit risk
attitudes (Holt and Laury, 2002) and less often to elicit attitude to uncertainty (Cohen et al.,
1987).
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option in the decision table. In formulating this option in the experiment we
use the expression “I am indifferent between the two urns”. The word indif-
ferent seems a quite natural choice in this context as in everyday language
it is used to indicate lack of a precise preference. Further other terms, such
as indecisive or insecure, may be more likely to create experimental demand
effects. We did not impose any consistency requirement on subjects’ choices,
such as to allow switching from one type of urn to the other only once.
Incentive compatibility is obtained with the random-lottery method.4
Before making their choices, participants are informed that each of the 21
choice situations is equally likely to be selected for payment. If a winning
ball is drawn from the chosen urn the subject earns AC15, otherwise she/he
earns nothing. If a choice situation where the subject was indecisive is rele-
vant for payment, a fair chance device is used to select one of the two urns.
All the described procedure took place publicly at the end of the experiment
so that subjects could witness how the chance devices were operated.
After making the 21 choices, subjects proceed to a different screen where
they are asked to provide their best estimate of the ambiguous urn’s compo-
sition. Subjects can click on any of 20 check boxes that indicate the number
of red balls in the ambiguous urn in intervals of 5 balls. Note that we explic-
itly mention the possibility to click on more than one check box. This task is
not incentivized.
Probability weighting and utility function The second part of the ex-
periment is designed to jointly estimate the utility and probability weighting
function parameters at the individual level (Fehr-Duda et al., 2006). Sub-
jects’ certainty equivalents are elicited for a series of 33 two outcomes lot-
teries. Table 2.2 shows the outcomes (in Euro) and probabilities employed.
For each lottery subjects are presented with a decision screen that contains
a description of the lottery and a list of 20 equally spaced sure amounts,
ranging from the lottery’s highest to lowest outcome. In order to facilitate
comprehension, the lottery odds are expressed both in percentage points and
with the aid of a pie chart. Figure 2.2 displays a decision screen.
In each row of the decision screen subjects have to make a choice between
4See http://people.few.eur.nl/wakker/miscella/debates/randomlinc.htm for a discussion
on the appropriateness of the random-lottery incentives scheme.
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Figure 2.1: Screen shot of decision table in part 1.
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Figure 2.2: Screen shot of a typical decision screen of part 2.
the lottery and the sure amount. Certainty equivalents are then calculated
as the arithmetic mean of the smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery
and the consecutive sure amount on the list.
At the end of the experiment one decision screen and one row within the
decision screen are randomly selected for payment. The relevant lottery is
then publicly played out and earnings are added to those of the ﬁrst part.
Psychological measures In the last part of the experiment subjects are
asked to answer questions from the Cognitive Reﬂection Test (CRT) by Fred-
erick (2005). The CRT is a 3 items test that measures the ability to reﬂect
on a problem, the ﬁrst answer that comes to ones’ mind being always wrong.
Furthermore, performance in the CRT has been found to be positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated with standard measures of cognitive ability. Subjects
are rewarded with AC0.50 for each correct answer and have a limited time to
provide their answers.
Thereafter, subjects go through the 31 items of the Rational-Experiential
Inventory (REI, Epstein et al., 1996). REI includes 19 items on a 5 points
12
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Table 2.1: Lotteries, p1 indicates the probability of winning x1 Euro.
p1 x1 x2 p1 x1 x2 p1 x1 x2
0.05 10 0 0.35 25 10 0.65 20 5
0.05 20 5 0.45 10 0 0.65 25 10
0.05 25 10 0.45 20 5 0.75 10 0
0.1 5 0 0.45 25 10 0.75 20 5
0.1 10 5 0.5 5 0 0.75 25 10
0.1 25 0 0.5 20 5 0.9 5 0
0.25 10 0 0.5 25 10 0.9 10 5
0.25 20 5 0.55 20 5 0.9 25 0
0.25 25 10 0.55 25 10 0.95 10 0
0.35 10 0 0.55 10 0 0.95 20 5
0.35 20 5 0.65 10 0 0.95 25 10
scale that measure analytical-rational processing and 12 items, also on a
5 points scale, that measure engagement and conﬁdence in one’s intuitive
abilities. Analytical and intuitive modes represent two fundamental ways in
which people process information. In fact, differences in thinking modes can
explain a wide variety of behaviors and possibly also to the way in which peo-
ple make decisions under uncertainty. In the ﬁnal part, subjects are asked
a few socioeconomic questions and then they are privately paid out in cash
and dismissed.
55 students from Maastricht University participated in the computer-
ized experiment which was conducted in March 2009 in the Behavioral and
Experimental Lab (BEElab) at the Maastricht University School of Business
and Economics, using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 90% of the
subjects were enrolled in the Faculty of Economics and Business Adminis-
tration and 58% of them were male. The average age was 23 years. The
experiment lasted on average 90 minutes and the average earnings per sub-
jects were AC32.95.
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2.3 Results
For ease of understanding and for convenience, in what follows subjects’
choices in the ﬁrst part of the experiment are recoded and then analyzed as
if red had been selected as winning color by everybody.5
We ﬁnd that as long as it gives a winning probability of at least 0.5, the
risky urn is the most common choice. However, when the winning probabil-
ity drops to 0.45 the ambiguous urn becomes the most popular option for all
consecutive choice situations. In other words, by varying the winning proba-
bility of the risky prospect between 1 and 0, we observe that the majority of
people prefers the risky prospect to the ambiguous one only in 11 out of 21
choice situations. If in each choice situation we assign half of the indecisive
choices to the risky option and the other half to the ambiguous one, in a given
situation we can use a binomial test to verify whether choices in favor of one
option are signiﬁcantly larger than 50%. It turns out that choices favoring
the risky prospect are signiﬁcantly larger than 50% at the 1% signiﬁcance
level in all choice situations characterized by a winning probability p ≥ 0.5.
On the other hand, choices favoring the ambiguous prospect are signiﬁcantly
larger than 50% at the 1% signiﬁcance level in all choice situations charac-
terized by a winning probability p ≤ 0.4. When the winning probability of
the risky prospect is equal to 0.45 the number of choices favoring the risky
prospect is not signiﬁcantly different than the number of choices favoring
the ambiguous prospect (p=0.14). This evidence suggests that subjects in the
experiment are only moderately averse to ambiguity. Several investigations
have shown that ambiguity aversion is negatively related to the decision
maker’s familiarity with the source of uncertainty (Fox and Tversky, 1995,
Fox and Weber, 2002). In this experiment ambiguity is artiﬁcially generated
in the laboratory using an urn with unknown composition, which is a rather
unfamiliar source of uncertainty. Hence, since subjects have never partici-
pated in similar experiments before, the moderate aversion to ambiguity we
observe cannot be explained by a sense of familiarity with the decision con-
5We exclude from the analysis 1 subject who switched back and forth between the three
options of the ﬁrst task 11 times, thus displaying random behavior. We also exclude 1 subject
who displayed a highly inconsistent behavior in several lotteries of the second part.
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text.
In fact, the most striking feature emerging from our data is that a large
number of subjects do not actively avoid the ambiguous prospects. Subjects
are often indecisive, particularly for choice situations where the winning
probability of the risky prospect is between 0.5 and 0.35. When the win-
ning probability is 0.5, 36% of the subjects choose the fair chance device.
Similarly, 37% of the subjects choose the fair chance device when the win-
ning probability is 0.45 and 36% when the winning probability is 0.4 and
0.35. In all the other choice situations less than 23% of the subjects choose
the device. These ﬁgures already suggest that some subjects chose the fair
chance device more than once. The histogram in Figure 2.3 conﬁrms this by
showing the relative frequency of choices in favor of the chance device.6
Figure 2.3: Relative frequency of indecisive choices.
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Subjective Expected Utility theory (SEU, Savage, 1954) is the equivalent
of Expected Utility theory when probabilities are unknown to the decision
6The histogram does not include decisions made in the ﬁrst and in the last choice situa-
tions, where the choosing the chance device may only be a mistake. In any case, the classiﬁ-
cation of subjects in indecisive and non-indecisive would not change if those choice situations
are also included.
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maker. According to SEU theory subjects would choose the chance device
only when the winning chance of the risky prospect equals their subjective
prior on the ambiguous urn. Stated differently, subjects would choose the de-
vice when they are truly indifferent between the two prospects. The device
is never chosen by only 24.5% of the subjects and 19% choose it exactly once.
Hence, behavior 43.5% of the subjects is in accordance with SEU theory. The
device was chosen exactly two times by 7.5% of the subjects. Even though
this is not consistent with SEU theory, errors deriving from the relatively
small likelihood difference that exists between two consecutive choices in
the table may explain these choices.
The remaining 49% of the subjects choose the device in at least three con-
secutive choice situations. The most common situation is to select the fair
chance device in three consecutive choices (17% of the participants), followed
by four choices (7.5% of the participants). A few subjects even choose the fair
chance device in almost all situations. Note that all subjects that choose the
device exactly three times do this in consecutive situations of the table. Only
15% of the subjects do not display compact intervals.
Result 2.3.1. About half of the subjects are indecisive between risky and
ambiguous prospects at least 3 times, mainly in consecutive choice situations.
In the following we refer to subjects that chose the chance device at most
twice as “decisive" and to subjects who chose the chance device at least three
times as “indecisive". Interestingly, self reported estimates on the composi-
tion of the ambiguous urn reveal that on average decisive subjects believe
that there are 53 winning balls and indecisive subjects 48 winning balls, this
difference being insigniﬁcant (Mann Whitney test p=0.16). Notwithstanding
this similarity in beliefs, SEU theory is clearly not suited to account for inde-
cisive subjects’ choices.7 In the following we show that many other theories
of decision making under uncertainty are also unable to account for repeated
choice of the chance device.
Multiple priors models In these family of models consider, for in-
stance, αMaxmin Expected Utility (α−MEU) theory (Ghirardato, Maccheroni
7Actually, the limits of SEU theory in describing choice under uncertainty are known since
Ellsberg’s seminal two colors example (Ellsberg, 1961).
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and Marinacci, 2004), which is a development of Maxmin Expected Utility
theory (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989) that explicitly accounts for attitude to
ambiguity. In this model the decision maker may hold a set of priors on the
ambiguous event and is characterized by an index α which captures attitude
to ambiguity. Repeatedly choosing the chance device implies that either the
prior on the ambiguous event or ones’ attitude to ambiguity, the index α, are
revised in each choice situation.8 In our view, the assumption of continuous
revision of beliefs and preferences does not appear as a plausible mechanism
underlying choice behavior.
As a next candidate for explaining repeated choice of the chance device
we consider a descriptive model of decision making under uncertainty, Cu-
mulative Prospect Theory (CPT, Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). CPT allows
for the existence of sub-additive decision weights reﬂecting the idea that
people have preferences over sources of uncertainty even when the beliefs
associated with each source are the same (Tversky and Wakker, 1995). In
general, more familiar and intelligible sources of uncertainty receive higher
decision weights than less familiar ones. In our experiment, repeated choice
of the chance device would imply that different probabilities values are all
equally weighted.9 Thus, the more a subject is indecisive, the ﬂatter the sub-
ject’s probability weighting function. In other words, CPT may account for
repeated choice of the chance device only if indecisive subjects are character-
ized by extreme insensitivity to likelihood changes. The existing empirical
literature on probability weighting already suggests that this explanation
can be ruled out because likelihood insensitivity, although widespread, is
usually not too extreme (see, for instance, Abdellaoui, 2000). The second
part of our experiment allows to directly test the descriptive validity of CPT
by estimating the parameters of the value and probability weighting func-
tion at the individual level.
Probability weighting In order to make CPT operational, we have
to assume speciﬁc functional forms for the value function v(x) and for the
probability weighting function w(p). We use the speciﬁcations proposed by
8This can be easily proven, but it requires some tedious algebra. We invite the reader to
refer to the appendix.
9Again, we invite the reader to refer to the appendix for a formal proof.
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Kahneman and Tversky (1992) because they combine goodness of ﬁt with
parsimony. Thus, we assume v(x)= xα, where α= 1 indicates a linear value
function, α> 1 a convex one and 0<α< 1 a concave value function and
w(p)=
pγ
(pγ+ (1− p)γ)1/γ
where γ = 1 indicates linear weighting. For values of γ < 1 the function
has an inverted-s shape and for γ> 1 the function is s-shaped.
Under these parametric assumptions, we estimate the parameter values
of α and γ for each subject by minimizing the sums of squared distances
(Wakker, 2009) that is:
33∑
i=1
(l i− cei)2
where l i is the CPT value of lottery i and cei is the CPT certainty equiv-
alent of lottery i.10 Subjects are free to switch back and forth between the
lottery and the sure amount. Since the calculation of certainty equivalents
requires subjects to switch from the lottery to the sure amount just once,
we can only use decisions screens that meet this condition. However, since
we need estimates of the relevant parameters for each individual we can-
not exclude too many decisions. Thus, the following rule is employed: if a
subject switches back and forth between the lottery and the sure amount in
more than four lotteries, all her decisions are excluded from the experiment.
In fact, only one subject had to be excluded from the analysis. Subjects with
less than four inconsistent decision sheets are considered in the analysis but
the inconsistent decision sheets are dropped.
Recall that the chance device is mostly chosen when the risky prospect has
a winning probability that lies within 0.35 and 0.5. Probabilities in the in-
terval [0.35,0.5] are all differently weighted if γ≥ 0.37. On the other hand,
γ ≤ 0.25 implies that all probabilities in the interval receive equal weight.
Unless stated otherwise, all statistical tests in this paper are two tailed. We
ﬁnd that on average decisive and indecisive subjects are characterized by a
nearly identical value of γ (0.63 and 0.62 respectively) which is not signiﬁ-
10To correct for heteroscedasticity prospects are normalized to uniform length.
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cantly different in the two groups (Mannn Whitney test p = 0.2).11 Among
decisive subjects, only 2 out of 27 are characterized by a γ< 0.37 and nobody
appears to hold a completely ﬂat weighting function in the relevant probabil-
ity interval. Similarly, only 2 out of 26 indecisive subjects are characterized
by a γ < 0.37 and nobody by a γ ≤ 0.25. As a consequence, the hypothesis
that indecisiveness follows from ﬂatness of the probability weighting func-
tion can be ruled out.
Probabilistic choice We now consider the possibility that repeated
choice of the chance device derives from a probabilistic choice process (Har-
rison, 2008). Probabilistic choice models extend traditional theories of de-
cision making by allowing for decision errors. These models assume that
the probability of choosing a prospect is not equal to one when its expected
utility exceeds the expected utility of the alternative prospect. Instead, the
likelihood of choosing a prospect is a function of the expected utility dif-
ference existing between the available prospects. The larger the expected
utility difference, the higher the likelihood of choosing the better prospect.
In our experiment choosing the chance device is equivalent to receiving the
ambiguous or the risky prospect with equal probability. This implies that
the chance device is chosen only when the utility difference between the two
prospects is sufﬁciently small. However, when this is the case, the three
available options (the risky prospect, the ambiguous one and the chance
device) are equally attractive and should be chosen with equal probability.
Given that the chance device is chosen almost exclusively in consecutive
choice situations, our data do not seem consistent with a probabilistic choice
model. In order to make this argument more robust we run an experiment
where subjects had to make a series of choices between risky prospects and
a sure amount. The risky prospects are exactly the same as those in the de-
cision table of part 1, while the sure amount is ﬁxed in every choice situation
and is equal to AC7.50. As in the ﬁrst experiment, in each situation subjects
can have the chance device selecting one of the two options; the experimental
11The estimates of α indicate moderate concavity of the value function, in accord with
the common hypothesis that utility is almost linear for small stakes. The estimated α of
indecisive subjects is slightly higher, but not signiﬁcantly different, than that of decisive
subjects (0.91 and 0.84 respectively, Mann Whitney test p= 0.19).
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procedures and all the other parts of the experiment are the same as in our
ﬁrst experiment. If repeated choice of the chance device has to be ascribed to
a probabilistic choice process, we would expect that subjects also choose the
chance device in a number of decision situations in this experiment. Indeed,
given that the sure amount lies between the two possible outcomes of the
lottery (which are AC0 and AC15), theoretically for each subject there exists at
least one situation where the utility difference between the risky option and
the sure amount is very small. 50 subjects participated in this experiment;
we exclude from the analysis 4 subjects who violated monotonicity. Figure
2.3 shows the relative frequency of choices in favor of the chance device.
Figure 2.4: Relative frequency of indecisive choices under risk.
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It appears that only 6.5% of the subjects choose the chance device more
than twice, in contrast to the 49% share observed in the ﬁrst experiment.
This result clearly indicates that the high number of choices in favor of the
chance device under ambiguity cannot be explained by arguments based on
the existence of a small utility difference between prospects.
Regret aversion At last, we test whether Regret theory (Loomes and
Sugden, 1982) can explain the repeated preference for the chance device.
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Regret theory predicts that between two options a DM chooses the one that
maximizes a modiﬁed utility function which, for each state of nature, com-
pares alternatives in terms of their outcomes and potential regret/rejoice
feelings. Consider, for instance, choosing between two options, A and B,
when only two states of the world are possible. If in a given state option
A yields a more desirable consequence than option B, the individual antic-
ipates that he may feel regret by choosing B: he may reﬂect on how his
position would have been had he chosen option A, and this thought may re-
duce the utility that he derives from the outcome of option B. Conversely, if
in another state of nature option B yields the more desirable consequence,
by choosing B the DM may experience what has been called rejoicing, that
is extra pleasure associated with knowing that the best option has been cho-
sen. The DM will ultimately choose B if its modiﬁed utility, that is B’s utility
plus the anticipated rejoice and minus the anticipated regret, is larger than
A’s modiﬁed utility, which is calculated in the same way.
Several scholars suggested that the chance device may be chosen in order
to avoid regret feelings that can arise when actively choosing between the
ambiguous and the risky prospect. First of all, we would like to point out
that this interpretation may have some explanatory power only if we are
ready to assume that anticipated feelings can exclusively arise when choos-
ing between prospects and not when selecting the chance device. Indeed, if
anticipated feelings would also be experienced when selecting the chance de-
vice, Regret theory would predict that the chance device is chosen only when
the winning probability of the risky prospect is equal to the prior belief on
the ambiguous event.12 The intuition behind this prediction is that all the
three choice options in our experiment are characterized by the same poten-
tial outcomes which implies that only outcomes’ likelihoods matter for deci-
sion making. Second, we need an additional assumption for Regret theory
to be able to explain our data, namely that regret and rejoice are not equally
strong feelings. In the appendix we formally show that if both assumption 1
(only active choices generate anticipated feelings) and assumption 2 (regret
and rejoice are not equally strong feelings) hold then Regret theory may ex-
plain repeated choice of the chance device. In particular, the chance device
12Regret theory does not explicitly model decision making when probabilities are unknown:
here we assume that subjects hold a unique prior belief on the ambiguous event.
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would be chosen more often the stronger the difference between regret and
rejoice feelings. In the appendix we also show that under these assumptions,
Regret theory would predict that the chance device is repeatedly selected
when the choice problem involves comparing a risky prospect to a safe pay-
ment, like in the experiment described in the previous paragraph. However,
Figure 2.3 shows that indecisive choice are hardly observed when subjects
face choices between risky prospects and safe options. We conclude that Re-
gret theory can only explain repeated choice of the chance device when ad
hoc assumptions are made and, more importantly, only if we restrict our
attention to choices between ambiguous and risky prospects.
Result 2.3.2. Several normative and descriptive models of decision making
under uncertainty fail to account for repeated choice of the chance device.
2.3.1 Are preferences of indecisive subjects incomplete?
Our results show that approximately 50% of the subjects appear to be in-
decisive between risky and ambiguous prospects in at least three choice
situations. Repeated choice of the chance device is inconsistent with the
predictions of many decision making models: we have shown that neither
normative models of decision making nor descriptive ones can account for
it. In general, our results suggests that people may not always hold prefer-
ences for one source of uncertainty over another, even when they compare a
familiar source, the risky prospect, with a less familiar one, the ambiguous
prospect. This suggests that subjects repeatedly choosing the chance device
may have incomplete preferences over uncertain prospects. Here we focus
on models that allow preferences between two options to be incomplete when
the DM holds multiple priors about an uncertain event, her utility function
being well deﬁned (Bewley, 2002 and Gilboa et al., 2010).
Consider Gilboa et al. (2010) decision making model. The authors in-
troduce a preference relation that satisﬁes some basic conditions13, plus In-
dependence and C-Completeness. The latter condition veriﬁes that prefer-
ences between risky acts are complete; incompleteness may only arise when
13The basic conditions of the preference relation are reﬂexivity, transitivity, monotonicity,
Archimedean continuity and non triviality.
22
2.3. Results
the DM has multiple prior beliefs about an ambiguous act. The authors
then prove (Theorem 1) that such a preference relation is equivalent to the
following:
x y ⇔ Ep(x)Ep(y) ∀p ∈C (2.1)
That is, an act x is weakly preferred over an act y if and only if the
expected utility of act x is at least as large as the expected utility of act
y for each and every prior belief p belonging to the closed and convex set
of priors C. An act is strictly preferred to the other if it is in expectation
always as good as the other and larger than the other according to at least
one prior belief. Indifference holds when both acts are in expectation equal
according to each and every prior belief. Conversely, a preference relation
is incomplete whenever according to some beliefs x yields a higher expected
utility than y and according to other beliefs y yields a higher utility than x.
In our experiment, the acts x and y represent the choice to bet on the
risky and ambiguous urn respectively. Thus, Ep(y) is the expected utility of
y relative to a certain prior p. Consider, for instance, that one believes that
the probability of drawing a winning ball from the ambiguous urn can take
any value between 0.3 and 0.65, inclusive. In the choice situation where the
winning probability of the risky prospect is 0.3 the ambiguous prospect is in
expectation at least as good as the risky one. Thus, the preference relation
between prospects is complete, the ambiguous prospect being strictly pre-
ferred to the risky one. Consider now the consecutive choice situation which
entails a risky prospect with a winning probability of 0.35. In this case,
the ambiguous prospect is at least as good as the risky prospect according
to all prior beliefs but one, for which the expected utility of the ambiguous
prospect is lower than that of the risky one. It follows that the preference
relation is now incomplete. As a matter of fact, preferences may be incom-
plete in each and every choice situation where the winning probability of the
risky urn lies within one’s interval of prior beliefs.
The idea that repeated choice of the chance device follows from incom-
plete preference relations is a hypothesis that needs to be backed by fur-
ther evidence. A problematic aspect is that subjects have to make choices
in experiments and hence incomplete preferences are never fully observ-
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able. However, psychological and decision making literature suggest that
choosing the chance device may be optimal when preferences are incom-
plete. People like to be able to justify their choices, to themselves and to
others (Simonson, 1989). This need may be explained with several motives,
like anticipation of possible regret feelings (Bell, 1982), cognitive dissonance
(Festinger, 1957) or the anticipation that others will be observing the deci-
sions made (Lerner and Tetlock, 1999). When preferences are incomplete,
there is obviously no good reason to choose one prospect or the other: any
choice would be difﬁcult to justify. Thus, it seems conceivable that the ran-
dom device becomes an appealing option.
In the next paragraph we propose an experiment to test whether the
choice behavior of indecisive subjects is consistent with an incomplete pref-
erence relation.
2.4 An experiment to test the completeness
of preferences
The purpose of our second experiment is to test whether repeated choice of
the chance device is consistent with the potentially incomplete preference
relation described in Gilboa et al. (2010). To this end, we increase the prize
of the ambiguous prospect by a positive amount, while holding everything
else the same as in the ﬁrst experiment. We assume that on average sub-
jects’ prior beliefs on the composition of the ambiguous urn do not differ in
the two experiments.14 Hence, for any belief on the ambiguous urn, the am-
biguous prospect in experiment 2 has a higher expected value compared to
experiment 1. If people choose the chance device when preferences are in-
complete, the situations where the chance device is mostly chosen should be
different in the two experiments. In particular, in experiment 2 such choice
situations should entail risky prospects with higher winning odds compared
to those in experiment 1. In what follows the argument is formally devel-
oped.
Consider the 21 choice situations in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. We
14The elicitation of subjects’ beliefs conﬁrms that on aggregate the distribution of priors is
not signiﬁcantly different in the two experiments (Kolmogorov Smirnov test p= 0.74).
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indicate with pn the winning probability of the risky prospect in choice sit-
uation n where p1 = 1 and p21 = 0 (choices are recoded as if red were to be
the winning color for all subjects). Recall that according to (2.1) a subject
may have incomplete preferences whenever pn lies strictly within her inter-
val of prior beliefs about the winning probability of the ambiguous urn. A
subject’s worst prior for the composition of the ambiguous urn is deﬁned as
w= pl−ε where pl is the lowest pn among the situations where the random
device is chosen and 0 < ε < 0.05. We refer to pl as the lower bound of the
indecisiveness interval. Similarly, b = ph + ε is the subject’s best prior for
the composition of the ambiguous urn, where ph is the highest pn among
the situations where the random device is chosen. We refer to ph as the
upper bound of the indecisiveness interval. The prospects positive outcome
is x1, while the zero outcome is x2. Suppose that we want to induce com-
plete preferences for those choice situations characterized by a pn ∈ [pl ; p˜],
with p˜ ∈ [pl ; ph], the latter being the interval where a subject chooses the
chance device. To induce complete preferences in the interval [pl ; p˜], the
prize increase x that has to be added to the regular prize x1 has to satisfy:
w×U(x1+ x)+ (1−w)×U(x2)≥ p˜×U(x1)+ (1− p˜)×U(x2) (2.2)
That is, the expected utility of the ambiguous prospects according to the
subject’s worst prior should be at least as large as the expected utility of the
risky prospect characterized by a winning probability equal to p˜.
Given the stakes employed in the experiment, we can make the simplifying
assumption that utility is linear, that is U(x)= x. Since x2 = 0 it follows that:
x≥
(p˜−w)
w
x1 (2.3)
In addition, x should be such that choices in favor of the chance device
are not completely crowded out when the winning probability of the risky
urn is larger than p˜. To guarantee this x has to satisfy:
w× (x1+ x)+ (1−w)× x2 < (p˜+ε)× x1+ (1− p˜−ε)× x2 (2.4)
That is, the expected utility of the ambiguous prospects according to
the worst prior, w, should be smaller than the expected utility of the risky
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prospect characterized by a winning probability slightly larger than p˜. This
reduces to:
x<
(p˜−w+ε)
w
x1 (2.5)
From (2.3) and (2.5) it is easy to see that x= ( p˜−w)w x1 satisﬁes both condi-
tions.
In sum, a subject’s preferences shall become complete following an appro-
priate increase in the prize associated to the ambiguous prospect. Notice
that subjects participating in experiment 1 do not take part in experiment
2. Hence, in experiment 2 we set a prize increase x that is equal for all
subjects and is based on the choices of participants in experiment 1. Recall
that in experiment 1 choices in favor of the chance device are most frequent
when pn ∈ [0.35;0.5]. Also recall that x1 =AC15 and x2 =AC0. It follows that
in order to increase the number of subjects having complete preferences in
choice situations characterized by pn ∈ [0.35;0.45], in experiment 2 we have
to increase the AC15 prize by x=AC5.
By setting x =AC5 we can make the following predictions: i) The chance
device is chosen less often in experiment 2 compared to experiment 1 in
all those choice situations where 0.35 ≤ pn ≤ 0.45. On the other hand, the
chance device is chosen more often in experiment 2 than in experiment 1
in the choice situations characterized by 0.50 ≤ pn ≤ 0.65. ii) Subjects in
experiment 2 are characterized by higher values of pl compared to subjects
in experiment 1. iii) Subjects in experiment 2 are characterized by higher
values of ph compared to subjects in experiment 1. iv) Overall, the chance
device is chosen less often in experiment 2 than in experiment 1 because the
prize increase may be sufﬁciently high to make preferences of some subjects,
those with a small interval of priors, always complete.
To summarize, experiment 2 presents subjects with the same series of
21 choice situations as in experiment 1, with the only difference that the
prize attached to the ambiguous prospect is now AC20. All the other aspects
of the experiment are exactly the same as in experiment 1. 53 students from
Maastricht University participated in the experiment which was conducted
in March 2009. 78% of the subjects were enrolled in the Faculty of Economics
and Business Administration and 49% of them were male. The average age
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was 25 years. The experiment lasted on average 90 minutes and the average
earnings per subjects were AC28.7.
2.4.1 Results
The choices of subjects participating in experiment 2 show that results ob-
tained in experiment 1 are robust.15 First of all, the number of choices in
favor of the risky prospect are signiﬁcantly larger than 50% in all choice
situations where pn ≥ 0.55 (binomial test p=0.01). Conversely, choices in fa-
vor of the ambiguous prospect are signiﬁcantly larger than 50% in all choice
situations where pn ≤ 0.45 (binomial test p=0.01). When the winning proba-
bility of the risky prospect equals 50% the number of choices in favor of the
risky urn is not signiﬁcantly different than the number of choices in favor
of the ambiguous urn (binomial test p=0.19). Thus, we can conclude that
subjects in this experiment are moderately averse to ambiguity.
Figure 2.5 shows a histogram of the relative frequency of choices in favor of
the chance device in experiment 2. Notice that a large number of subjects
repeatedly choose the chance device. Indeed, 60% of the subjects fall in the
category of decisive subjects, while the remaining 40% choose the chance de-
vice in at least three choice situations. Hence, this experiment conﬁrms that
repeated choice of the chance device is a robust anomaly.
We now move on to compare the results of the two experiments. Table
2.2 shows data on the comparison of subjects’ choices in the ﬁrst part of the
experiments.
Table 2.2: Intervals of indecisive choices.
experiment 1 experiment 2
mean pl 0.33 0.40
mean ph 0.60 0.54
indecisive choices per subject 3.7 2.5
We ﬁnd that in experiment 2 starting from the situation where pn = 0.45
15We exclude from the analysis 5 subjects who switched back and forth between the three
options more than 4 times, thus displaying too noisy behavior. We also had to exclude 3
subjects that made highly inconsistent choices in the second part of the experiment.
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Figure 2.5: Relative frequency of indecisive choices.
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choices in favor of the chance device are less frequent compared to experi-
ment 1. On the other hand, the relative frequency of choices in favor of the
chance device is higher in experiment 2 for those situations characterized
by 0.5 ≤ pn < 0.65. Choices in favor of the chance device are less frequent
in experiment 2 when pn = 0.65, a results that may be explained by the fact
that fewer indecisive choices are predicted in experiment 2 (see point iv). In
sum, the theoretical predictions in i) hold true.
In order to test the validity of theoretical prediction ii) we look at the lower
bound of the indecisiveness interval. In experiment 1 pl = 0.33 on average,
while in experiment 2 pl = 0.40 on average; a one tailed Mann Whitney
test shows that subjects in experiment 2 are characterized by a signiﬁcantly
higher value of pl (p=0.04).16 The second theoretical prediction ii) relates to
the interval upper bound. In experiment 1 ph = 0.6 on average, while in ex-
periment 2 ph = 0.54 on average; a one tailed Mann Whitney test shows that
values of ph are not signiﬁcantly different in the two experiments (p=0.46).
16If we exclude from both experiments those subjects who do not have connected intervals
results are qualitatively unchanged but statistically insigniﬁcant.
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This result is actually not surprising because, as already mentioned, the
prize increase may have been high enough to make preferences of some
subjects complete. Indeed, the percentage of subjects who never choose the
chance device increases from 24.5% in experiment 1 to 31% in experiment
2. Overall, the chance device is chosen less often in experiment 2 compared
to experiment 1, though this difference is not signiﬁcant (one tailed Mann
Whitney test p= 0.22).
Result 2.4.1. In experiment 2 choices in favor of the chance device are dis-
tributed differently over decision situations compared to experiment 1. The
change in the distribution is consistent with the existence of an incomplete
preference relation between prospects.
Experiment 2 conﬁrms that a large fraction of subjects repeatedly choose
the chance device instead of selecting one prospect. Furthermore, it shows
that choices of these subjects are consistent with the existence of an incom-
plete preference relation due to uncertainty. In the next section we inves-
tigate whether indecisiveness is related to individual characteristics of the
decision maker.
2.5 Individual characteristics
Table 2.3 shows descriptive statistics on the relation between individual
characteristics and indecisiveness for both experiments. First of all note
that the level of experience with laboratory experiments, measured as the
mean number of attended experiments, is not signiﬁcantly different for in-
decisive subjects and decisive ones. The two groups are also not signiﬁcantly
different in terms of their performance in the CRT, measured as the num-
ber of correct answers. The parameters’ values of the utility and probabil-
ity weighting function are also not signiﬁcantly different between indecisive
subjects and decisive ones. These results are particularly interesting when
compared to recent ﬁndings on the relation between cognitive abilities and
risk attitude (Frederick, 2005 and Dohmen et al., 2010). Compared to sub-
jects with low cognitive abilities, subjects with high cognitive abilities have
been found to be less risk averse for small stakes. Our data show that nei-
ther risk attitude nor cognitive ability are systematically related to indeci-
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siveness in choice under uncertainty. One can speculate that smart subjects
may appear more rational in experiments on decision making under risk be-
cause being rational in those experiments requires the ability to deal with
numbers. On the contrary, in most real life situations and in our experi-
ment as well, probabilistic information is not available. In such situations,
cognitive ability may not always help to make decisions consistent with the
axioms of rational choice.
Table 2.3: Individual characteristics, standard deviations in parenthesis.
experiment 1 experiment 2
decisive indecisive decisive indecisive
mean of attended experiments 2.7(1.9) 2.3 (1.87) 2.5 (1.78) 2.2 (1.89)
median α 0.82 (0.19) 0.87(0.2) 0.62 (0.16) 0.68 (0.12)
median γ 0.62 (0.18) 0.52 (0.3) 0.61 (0.11) 0.56 (0.13)
mean CRT score 1.63 (1) 1.57 (0.99) 1.74 (1.1) 1.61 (1.14)
mean NFC 3.88 (0.59) 3.73(0.66) 3.77 (0.52) 3.67(0.73)
mean FI* 3.3 (0.67) 3.61 (0.57) 3.52 (0.41) 3.44 (0.51)
gender** (% of male subjects) 74 42 63 27
Notes. **Signiﬁcance at the 5% level, *Signiﬁcance at the 10% level, Mann Whitney test two sided.
Recall that the Rational-Experiential Inventory consists of two scales:
the Need for Cognition scale (NFC) and the Faith in Intuition scale (FI)
which measure respectively analytical and intuitive processing. After drop-
ping the items that load less than 0.3 on the respective factor, both scales
are constituted of 11 items and are highly reliable (Cronbach’s α = 0.82 for
NFC, and α = 0.79 for FI). Furthermore, NFC and FI are not signiﬁcantly
related to each other (correlation coefﬁcient r = −0.13), which means that
analytical and intuitive processing are two independent constructs. Hence,
for each subject we can compute the NFC and the FI score as the mean of
the answers to the 11 items (recall that answers are on a 5 points scale).
Given that repeated choice of the chance device violates rational choice, we
expect subjects who are prone to it to be more inclined to think in an in-
tuitive manner, rather than in a rational-analytical one. Indeed, indecisive
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subjects score slightly higher on the NFC scale but this difference is not sig-
niﬁcant. Indecisive subjects are also characterized by a lower score on the
FI scale, but this difference is signiﬁcant only in experiment 1. In both ex-
periments we observe that the group of decisive subjects is mainly composed
by male subjects. Indeed, gender appears to be the only variable which is
signiﬁcantly different between indecisive and decisive subjects. Table 2.4
shows the results of a logit regression analysis.
Table 2.4: Explaining indecisiveness, logit regression results.
dependent variable: probability of being indecisive
independent variables coefﬁcient standard error p-value
attended experiments -0.13 0.12 0.27
α 1.85 1.16 0.11
γ 1.43 1.35 0.29
CRT score 0.01 0.22 0.98
NFC score -0.36 0.38 0.35
FI score 0.06 0.42 0.89
male -1.52 0.52 0.03
constant -2.56 2.5 0.9
observations 98
Log likelihood -59.2
likelihood ratio chi-square 16.5
p-value 0.02
The probability of being a indecisive is regressed on subject’s individual
characteristics. Since subjects in the two experiments are not signiﬁcantly
different, we pool data from the two experiments.17 Note that only the coefﬁ-
cient of gender is signiﬁcant and negative, meaning that being male reduces
the probability of being indecisive. Though not signiﬁcantly, a higher need
for cognition negatively affects the probability of being indecisive, whereas
17In fact, subjects in experiment 2 are characterized by a lower value of α. Nevertheless,
aggregation is warranted because the coefﬁcient of the variable interacting a dummy for the
experiment with α is not signiﬁcant.
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a higher faith in intuition increases the probability of choosing the chance
device. Also more experience with laboratory experiments negatively affects
the probability of being indecisive though not signiﬁcantly. Conversely, a
higher value of γ, of α and a higher score in the CRT positively, but not
signiﬁcantly, affect the probability of being indecisive.
2.6 Conclusions
In this paper we experimentally study the behavior of subjects facing a se-
ries of choices between a risky and an ambiguous two-outcomes prospects.
The possible outcomes and the level of ambiguity are the same in each choice
situation, while risky prospects are characterized by different combinations
of probability-outcomes. Our data show that half of the subjects in the exper-
iment often choose a chance device to select between two prospects instead of
actively picking one. The observed choice behavior is not consistent with the
existence of a preference relation of true indifference, but rather indicates
that subjects are indecisive when facing choices under uncertainty. Further-
more, the fact that subjects repeatedly choose the chance device constitutes
a so far unexplored behavioral anomaly in decision making under uncer-
tainty. Indeed, we have shown that both normative and descriptive models
of decision making under uncertainty cannot account for it.
In our experiment, a DM with multiple prior beliefs on the ambiguous event
is necessarily confronted with choice situations where her preferences may
be incomplete. The larger the interval of prior beliefs, the more the choice
situations where a DM may not have complete preferences. The observed be-
havioral anomaly seems consistent with the idea that a DM with incomplete
preferences chooses the fair chance device. We use results from our ﬁrst
experiment to make choice predictions based on the incomplete preferences
relation in Gilboa et al. (2010). Such predictions are then tested in a succes-
sive experiment: data are consistent with the hypothesis that avoidance of
active decision making may follow from incomplete preference relations.
Other anomalies, such as preference reversals (Eliaz and Ok, 2006) and the
status quo bias (Mandler, 2004), have already been accounted by arguments
based on incompleteness. Our results conﬁrm that relaxing completeness
may be a promising avenue in the development of descriptively valid deci-
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sion making models.
The results of our investigation offer as well interesting behavioral insights
on choice behavior under uncertainty. The observed anomaly is in contrast
with uncertainty aversion, which constitutes a well established empirical
regularity. We suggest that uncertainty aversion may emerge in decision
situations where people are “forced" to pick one of the available alterna-
tives. On the other hand, when given a way out to the choice dilemma (the
chance device in our case) many people do not actively select the more famil-
iar risky prospects. Notably, in our experiment the chance device is neither
a default option nor the status quo. Subjects explicitly choose a mechanism
that decides instead of themselves.
In real life decision making is often performed under uncertainty. Financial
investments, medical treatments and career choices for instance, are often
chosen with a limited knowledge about the associated likelihood of success
and failure. Our results suggest that in such decision situations many peo-
ple may prefer not to choose by themselves when given the possibility to
do so. Clearly, this behavior can have important economic consequences if
not choosing comes at a cost for the decision maker; we believe that future
research should be aimed at investigating this aspect.
2.7 Appendix
In the following we consider the discussed models of decision making under
uncertainty and prove that they cannot account for the repeated avoidance
of active choice.
2.7.1 α-maxmin Expected Utility Theory
Consider α− maxmin Expected Utility Theory. The decision maker holds a
set of prior C = [c, c]⊆ [0,1] on the ambiguous event and is characterized by
an index α which captures attitude to ambiguity. The index varies from 0
to 1 and can be viewed as the weight that the decision maker places on the
most pessimistic scenario, given his set of prior C. The utility function U(·)
is the same assumed in expected utility theory. In our experiment, subjects
would evaluate ambiguous prospects as follows:
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α min
q∈[c,c]
[qU(x1)+ (1− q)U(x2)]+ (1−α) max
q∈[c,c]
[qU(x1)+ (1− q)U(x2)]
Where q is the (unknown) winning probability of the ambiguous prospect,
x1 is the monetary prize equal to AC15 and x2 is the AC0 outcome. Since the
subject’s worst prior is c and his best prior is c and U(x2) can be normalized
to 0, the above function can be written as:
αcU(x1)+ (1−α)cU(x1)
If the decision maker chooses to delegate his decision in a given situation n,
the lottery that assigns equal probability to the risky and to the ambiguous
prospect is at least as good as the risky prospect characterized by a winning
probability pn:
1
2
[
αcU(x1)+ (1−α)cU(x1)
]
+
1
2
pnU(x1)≥ pnU(x1)
In addition he deems the lottery to be at least as good as the ambiguous
prospect:
1
2
[
αcU(x1)+ (1−α)cU(x1)
]
+
1
2
pnU(x1)≥αcU(x1)+ (1−α)cU(x1)
The above expressions can be rewritten as:
1
2
[
αcU(x1)+ (1−α)cU(x1)
]
≥
1
2
pnU(x1)
1
2
[
αcU(x1)+ (1−α)cU(x1)
]
≤
1
2
pnU(x1)
It follows that:
pn =αc+ (1−α)c
Which means that α-maxmin Expected Utility theory can account for
indecisiveness only if c, c and α change in each decision situation.
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2.7.2 Cumulative Prospect Theory
In order to apply CPT to choices in the table we need to recall that decision
makers are assumed go through an initial editing phase. In this phase, com-
plex choice problems are simpliﬁed by means of various routines (Starmer
and Sugden, 1991). One of these routines is related to compound lotteries
and leads to the so called isolation effect. If an individual is asked to make a
choice between two lotteries, each of which is contingent on the occurrence of
the same random event, then the choice is made as if that event is certain to
occur. Assume that subjects employ this routine when evaluating prospects.
When an indecisive choice is made the following equality holds:
w+(pn)v(x1)+ (1−w+(pn))v(x2)=W+(A)v(x1)+ (1−W+(A))v(x2)
where v(·) indicates the value function, x1 is the monetary prize equal to AC15
and x2 is the AC0 outcome. The letter A indicates the event “drawing a win-
ning ball from the ambiguous urn” and pn is the winning probability of the
risky prospect in choice situation n. w+ and W+ are the weighting functions
for risk and for uncertainty respectively. Since v(x2) can be normalized to 0,
from the equality above it follows that:
W+(A)=w+(pn)
That is event A has the same decision weight as probability pn. Assume
now that the decision maker delegates his decision between the prospects
in the successive choice situation of the table. It follows that the weight of
pn+1 equals the weight given to event A. Since W+(A) should not change
during the elicitation, the equality above implies that w+(pn) = w+(pn+1).
In general, if choices are delegated in n consecutive decision situations in
the table, it follows that:
w+(pn)=w+(pn+1)= ....,=w+(pN )
which means that probabilities are equally wighted in all the decision
situation where the decision maker appears to be indecisive.
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2.7.3 Regret Aversion
Consider the 21 decisions between the risky and the ambiguous prospects
in the ﬁrst experiment and assume that red is the winning color. In what
follows the possible states of the world are listed, where RR means that a red
ball is extracted from the risky urn, RA means that a red ball is extracted
from the ambiguous urn, etc. LR means that the risky lottery matters for the
payment of indecisive subjects, while LA means that the ambiguous lottery
matters for the indecisive subjects.
S1
RR ,LR ,RA
S2
RR ,LA,RA
S3
BR ,LR ,RA
S4
BR ,LA,RA
S5
BR ,LR ,BA
S6
BR ,LA,BA
S7
RR ,LR ,BA
S8
RR ,LA,BA
We deﬁne: p(Sn): probability of state of the world n
pn: winning probability risky urn in decision situation n
q: winning probability ambiguous urn
x1: high prize, 15 Euro in the experiment
x2: low prize, 0 Euro in the experiment
R(·): regret-rejoice function
Assume that in a given decision situation regret and rejoice can only be
experienced when an active choice between the risky and the ambiguous
prospect is made: choosing the chance device does not generate such feel-
ings. Following Looms and Sugden (1982) the expected utility of the risky
prospect is larger equal than the expected utility of the chance device, that
is EU(risky)≥EU(device), if:
p(S1)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S2)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S3)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+
p(S4)[x2− x1+R(x2− x1)]+ p(S5)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+ p(S6)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+
p(S7)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S8)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
p(S4)[x2− x1+R(x2− x1)]+ p(S8)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
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(1− pn)
1
2
q[x2− x1+R(x2− x1)]+ pn
1
2
(1− q)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
(1− pn)
1
2
q[−x1+R(−x1)]+ pn
1
2
(1− q)[x1+R(x1)]≥ 0
⇔
q[−x1+R(−x1)]− pnq[−x1+R(−x1)]+ pn[x1+R(x1)]− pnq[x1+R(x1)]≥ 0
⇔
q[−x1+R(−x1)− pnR(−x1)− pnR(x1)]≥−pnx1− pnR(x1)
⇔
q[x1−R(−x1)+ pnR(−x1)+ pnR(x1)]≤ pn(x1+R(x1))
⇔
q≤
pn(x1+R(x1))
x1−R(−x1)+ pnR(−x1)+ pnR(x1)
(2.6)
Further, the expected utility of the ambiguous prospect is larger equal
than the expected utility of the chance device, that is EU(ambiguous) ≥
EU(device), if:
p(S1)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S2)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S3)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]+
p(S4)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S5)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+ p(S6)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+
p(S7)[x2− x1+R(x2− x1)]+ p(S8)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
p(S3)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]+ p(S7)[x2− x+R(x2− x1)]≥ 0
⇔
(1− pn)
1
2
q[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]+ pn
1
2
(1− q)[x2− x+R(x2− x1)]≥ 0
⇔
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(1− pn)
1
2
q[x1+R(x1)]+ pn
1
2
(1− q)[−x1+R(−x1)]≥ 0
⇔
q[x1+R(x1)]− pnq[x1+R(x1)]+ pn[−x1+R(−x1)]− pnq[−x1+R(−x1)]≥ 0
⇔
q[x1+R(x1)− pnR(x1)− pnR(−x1)]≥ pnx1− pnR(−x1)
⇔
q[x1+R(x1)− pnR(x1)− pnR(−x1)]≥ pn(x1−R(−x1))
⇔
q≥
pn(x1−R(−x1))
x1+R(x1)− pnR(x1)− pnR(−x1)
(2.7)
If we assume that regret and rejoice are symmetric, that is R(−x) = −R(x),
conditions (2.6) and (2.7) imply that the chance device is chosen if q ≥ pn
and q ≤ pn. That is, the chance device is chosen only in the decision situa-
tion where pn = q.
If we assume instead that regret and rejoice are not equally strong feelings,
for example |R(−x)| >R(x), conditions (2.6) and (2.7) imply that thick indeci-
siveness intervals can be justiﬁed by appropriate assumptions on the values
of R(−x) and R(x). In particular, the stronger the difference between regret
and rejoice feelings the larger the interval of indecisive choices.
We now consider our second experiment and test whether the observed shift
in the indecisiveness interval is consistent with the existence of asymmetric
regret and rejoice feelings.
We deﬁne:
p(Sn): probability of state of the world n
pn: winning probability risky urn in decision situation n
q: winning probability ambiguous urn
x1: high outcome risky prospect, 15 Euro in the experiment
x2: low outcome, 0 Euro in the experiment
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z: high outcome ambiguous prospect, 20 Euro in the experimentIn this
experiment the expected utility of the risky prospect is larger equal than the
expected utility of the chance device, that is EU(risky)≥EU(device), if:
p(S1)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S2)[x1− z+R(x1− z)]+ p(S3)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+
p(S4)[x2− z+R(x2− z)]+ p(S5)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+ p(S6)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+
p(S7)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S8)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
p(S2)[x1− z+R(x1− z)]+ p(S4)[x2− z+R(x2− z)]+ p(S8)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
pn
1
2
q[x1− z+R(x1− z)]+ (1− pn)
1
2
q[x2− z+R(x2− z)]+
pn
1
2
(1− q)[x1− x2+R(x1− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
pn
1
2
q[x1− z+R(x1− z)]+ (1− pn)
1
2
q[−z+R(−z)]+ pn
1
2
(1− q)[x1+R(x1)]≥ 0
⇔
pnq[x1− z+R(x1− z)]+ q[−z+R(−z)]− pnq[−z+R(−z)]+ pn[x1+R(x1)]
−pnq[x1+R(x1)]≥ 0
⇔
qpn[x1− z+R(x1− z)]− z+R(−z)− pn[−z+R(−z)]− pn[x1+R(x1)]≥−pn[x1+R(x1)]
⇔
q≤
pn(x1+R(x1))
pnR(x1− z)− z+R(−z)(1− pn)− pnR(x1)
(2.8)
The expected utility of the ambiguous prospect is larger equal than the ex-
pected utility of the chance device, EU(ambiguous)≥EU(device), if:
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p(S1)[z− x1+R(z− x1)]+ p(S2)[z− z+R(z− z)]+ p(S3)[z− x2+R(z− x2)]+
p(S4)[z− z+R(z− z)]+ p(S5)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+ p(S6)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+
p(S7)[x2− x1+R(x2− x1)]+ p(S8)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]≥ 0
⇔
p(S1)[z− x1+R(z− x1)]+ p(S3)[z− x2+R(z− x2)]+ p(S7)[x2− x1+R(y− x1)]≥ 0
⇔
pn
1
2
q[z− x1+R(z− x1)]+ (1− pn)
1
2
q[z+R(z)]+ pn
1
2
(1− q)[−x1+R(−x1)]≥ 0
⇔
pnq[z− x1+R(z− x1)]+ q[z+R(z)]− pnq[z+R(z)]+ pn[−x1+R(−x1)]
−pnq[−x1+R(−x1)]≥ 0
⇔
qpn[z− x1+R(z− x1)]+ [z+R(z)]− pn[z+R(z)]− pn[−x1+R(−x1)]
≥−pn[−x1+R(−x1)]
⇔
q≥
pn(x1−R(x1))
pnR(z− x1)+ z+R(z)(1− pn)− pnR(−x1)
(2.9)
Conditions (2.8) and (2.9) imply that in a certain decision situation the
chance device is the utility maximizing choice if the DM believes that q takes
a value in the interval of priors identiﬁed by the conditions. In fact, for
an arbitrary value of q the chance device is the optimal choice when the
risky prospect is characterized by a higher winning likelihood as compared
to the one which justiﬁes choosing the chance device in the ﬁrst experiment.
Hence, indecisiveness in our experiments can be explained assuming that
regret and rejoice are not equally strong feelings that are only experienced
when making an active choice.
The validity of an explanation based on anticipated feelings can be fur-
ther tested by considering choice in the experiment described at page 11.
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Subjects made 21 decisions between varying risky lotteries and a ﬁxed sure
payment: the possible states of the world are listed below, where RR (BR)
means that a red (black) ball is extracted from the risky urn. The letter R
indicate that the risky prospect is relevant, while the letter S indicates that
the sure payment is relevant, for the payment of indecisive subjects. As be-
fore, we assume that red is the winning color. Since the high prize of the
risky prospect is 15 Euro and the low prize is 0 Euro, we use the letters x1
and x2 as before. The sure payment always equals 7.5 Euro and we indicate
it with x12 .
S1
RR ,R
S2
RR ,S
S3
BR ,R
S4
BR ,S
The expected utility of the risky prospect is larger equal the expected
utility of chance device, that is EU(risky)≥EU(device), if:
p(S1)[x1− x1+R(x1− x1)]+ p(S2)[x1−
x1
2
+R(x1−
x1
2
)]
+p(S3)[x2− x2+R(x2− x2)]+ p(S4)[x2−
x1
2
+R(x2−
x1
2
)]≥ 0
⇔
pn
1
2
[x1−
x1
2
+R(x1−
x1
2
)]+ (1− pn)
1
2
[−
x1
2
+R(−
x1
2
)]≥ 0
⇔
pn[
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
)+
x1
2
−R(−
x1
2
)]≥
x1
2
−R(−
x1
2
)
⇔
pn[x1+R(
x1
2
)−R(−
x1
2
)]≥
x1
2
−R(−
x1
2
)
⇔
pn ≥
x1
2 −R(−
x1
2 )
x1+R(
x1
2 )−R(−
x1
2 )
(2.10)
The expected utility of the safe payment is larger equal the expected
utility of the chance device, that is EU(saf e)≥EU(device), if:
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p(S1)[
x1
2
− x1+R(
x1
2
− x1)]+ p(S2)[
x1
2
−
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
−
x1
2
)]
+p(S3)[
x1
2
− x2+R(
x1
2
− x2)]+ p(S4)[
x1
2
−
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
−
x1
2
)]≥ 0
⇔
pn
1
2
[
x1
2
− x1+R(
x1
2
− x1)]+ (1− pn)
1
2
[
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
)]≥ 0
⇔
pn[
x1
2
− x1+R(
x1
2
− x1)−
x1
2
−R(
x1
2
)]≥−[
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
)]
⇔
pn[−
x1
2
+R(−
x1
2
)−
x1
2
−R(
x1
2
)]≥−[
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
)]
⇔
pn[−x1+R(−
x1
2
)−R(
x1
2
)]≥−[
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
)]
⇔
pn[x1−R(−
x1
2
)+R(
x1
2
)]≤
x1
2
+R(
x1
2
)
⇔
pn ≤
x1
2 +R(
x1
2 )
x1−R(−
x1
2 )+R(
x1
2 )
(2.11)
Condition (2.10) and (2.11) imply that we should observe large intervals
of indecisive choices in this experiment. However, as this is not the case, we
can at reject the hypothesis that indecisiveness is motivated by anticipated
regret for active choices.
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2.7.4 Instructions of the experiment
We report here the original instructions used in the ﬁrst experiment and
in brackets the parts changing in the experiment investigating delegation
in risky choices. The instructions used in the second experiment are similar
and available upon request. Notice that the instructions were computerized.
Part 1
Shortly you are going to face 21 choice situations (situations 1-21). These
choice situations will involve two urns (i.e. boxes). These urns really ex-
ist and they will play an important role in determining your earnings. You
might have seen them on the table when you entered the lab. At the end of
the experiment you will have the possibility to personally check their con-
tent.
In one urn there are 100 balls colored black and red. The exact number of
black and red balls contained in this urn is always displayed in the deci-
sion table that you will see shortly. For convenience we call this urn Urn
A. The other urn, that we call Urn B, contains 100 balls as well. However,
the exact number of black and red balls in this urn is unknown to
you. In fact, the composition of Urn B is also unknown to us because it was
composed by a colleague of us and sealed thereafter, while we were absent.
Our colleague was free to put any number of red and/or black balls into this
urn provided the total number of balls is 100.
In each choice situation you will be asked to bet on a draw of a ball of a
certain color by selecting one of the two different types of urns. You are ﬁrst
given the possibility to select the color (black or red) that you like to bet on.
The color you select will neither be to your advantage nor to your disadvan-
tage. Also note that you will choose the color once for all choice situations.
[Shortly you are going to face 21 choice situations (situations 1-21). These
choice situations will involve one urn (i.e. a box). This urn really exists and
it will play an important role in determining your earnings. In the urn there
are 100 balls colored black and red. The exact number of black and red
balls contained in the urn changes in each choice situation and is always
displayed in the decision table that you will see shortly. In each choice sit-
uation you will be asked whether you want to bet on a draw of a ball of a
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certain color from the urn or whether you prefer to receive a certain amount
of money. You are ﬁrst given the possibility to select the color (black or red)
that you like to bet on. The color you select will neither be to your advantage
nor to your disadvantage. Also note that you will choose the color once for
all choice situations.]
This is a screen shot of a part of the table you are going to see. Each row of
the table represents one choice situation:
In each row you have to decide between Urn A and Urn B to bet on the
color you have selected. You can also state that you are indifferent between
the two urns.
Recall that Urn B contains an unknown proportion of 100 black and red
balls. Urn A contains 100 balls as well: the proportion of black and red balls
is always displayed in the table.
[ In each row you have to decide whether you want to bet on the color you
have selected or whether you want to receive 7.50 Euro for sure. You can
also state that you are indifferent between these two options.
Determination of earnings
At the end of the experiment one of the choice situations in the table is ran-
domly selected with equal probability to determine your earnings. There-
after, a ball is drawn from the urn you decided to bet on in the choice situa-
tion that was randomly selected.
Suppose, for example, that red is your color and that choice situation 7 is
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randomly selected. Suppose further that you decided to bet on Urn A in that
choice situation. At the end of the experiment, a ball is drawn from Urn
A, which contains 70 red balls and 30 black balls in choice situation 7. You
receive 15 Euro if the ball is red and nothing otherwise.
Similarly, if in choice situation 7 you have decided to bet on Urn B, which
contains 100 balls in unknown color composition, a ball is drawn from it.
You receive 15 Euro if the ball is red and nothing otherwise. In case you
were indifferent between the two urns, one is randomly selected with equal
probability to determine your earnings.
[ At the end of the experiment one of the choice situations in the table is
randomly selected with equal probability to determine your earnings. De-
pending on which choice situation is selected, the experimenter will put the
appropriate number of red and black balls in the urn. For instance, if choice
situation 12 is selected for payment, the experimenter will put 55 red balls
and 45 black balls in the urn. At the end of the experiment you will have the
possibility to personally check the content of the urn.
Suppose, for example, that you selected red and that choice situation 7 is
randomly selected at the end of the experiment. Suppose further that you
chose to bet on the urn in that choice situation. A ball is then drawn from
the urn which contains 70 red balls and 30 black balls in situation 7. You
receive 15 Euro if the ball is red and nothing otherwise.
Differently, the ball drawn from the urn does not inﬂuence your earnings if
in choice situation 7 you decided that you prefer to get 7.50 Euro for sure. In
case you were indifferent between betting on the urn and earning 7.50 Euro
for sure, one of these two options is randomly selected with equal probability
to determine your earnings.
Estimation of the composition of Urn B
Now that you have made your choices, we would like to ask you for your best
estimate of the color composition of Urn B.
The categories below are intervals indicating the number of red balls that
might be contained in Urn B. Please click on the check box that represents
your best estimate. You can also click on more than one box.
Consider the following random examples.
For instance, if you believe that there are between 12 and 34 red balls in
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Urn B, you should click on the 3rd, 4th, 5th 6th and 7th check box from the
left.
For instance, if you believe that there are between 72 and 74 red balls in
Urn B than you should click on the 15th check box form the left.
For instance, if you believe that there are exactly 6 red balls in Urn B than
you should click on the 2nd check box from the left.
If you believe that there between 17 and 24 red balls or between 63 and
69 red balls in Urn B then you should click on the 4th, 5th, 13th and 14th
check box. Notice that this part was not included in the experiment about
delegation under risk.
Part 2
You are now going to make another series of choices. These choices will not
inﬂuence your earnings from the choices you just made, nor will your earlier
choices inﬂuence the earnings from the choices you are going to make. After
you have made the these choices you will be asked to answer some questions.
Thereafter the experiment will be over.
In the following, you will be confronted with a series of 33 decision situ-
ations that will appear in random order on the screen. All these decision
situations are completely independent of each other. A choice you made in
one decision situation does not affect any of the other following decision sit-
uations.
Each decision situation is displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20
rows. You have to decide for every row whether you prefer option A or
option B. Option A is a lottery and is the same for every row in a given de-
cision situation, while the secure option B takes 20 different values, one for
each row. By clicking on NEXT you will see an example screen of a decision
situation.
This is a screen shot of one decision situation you are going to face. You are
not asked to make choices now! Please have a careful look. Determination
of earnings
At the end of the experiment one of the 33 decision situations will be ran-
domly selected with equal probability. Once the decision situation is se-
lected, one of the 20 rows in this decision situation will be randomly selected
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with equal probability.
The choice you have made in this speciﬁc row will determine your earnings.
Consider, for instance, the screen shot that you have just seen.
Option A gives you a 55% chance to earn 10.- Euro and a 45% chance to earn
nothing. Option B is always a sure amount that ranges from 10.- Euro in
the ﬁrst row, to 0.50 Euro in the 20th row. Suppose that the 12th row is
randomly selected. If you would have selected option B, you would receive
4.50 Euro. If, instead, you would have selected option A, the outcome of the
lottery determines your earnings. The lottery will be paid out by publicly
drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards.
Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be the
one that is relevant for your earnings. Therefore, you should view each
decision independently and consider all your choices carefully.
Part 3
Cognitive Reﬂection Test
You have now ﬁnished with the 33 decision situations. In the following
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screens we ask you to answer some questions. Please read the following
questions carefully and type your answer in the boxes. You will earn 0.50
Euro for each correct answer provided.
(1) A bat and a ball cost 1.10 Euro in total. The bat costs 1.00 Euro more
than the ball. How many cents does the ball cost?
(2) If it takes 5 machines 5 minutes to make 5 widgets, how long (in min-
utes) would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets?
(3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads. Every day, the patch doubles
in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how many
days would it take for the patch to cover half of the lake?
(4) Two cars are on a collision course, traveling towards each other in
the same lane. Car A is traveling 70 km an hour. Car B is traveling 80 km
an hour. How far apart are the cars one minute before they collide? Please
answer in km.18
Rational Experiential Inventory
What is your opinion on the following statements?(subjects had to answer
on a 5 point scale, where 1=“completely false"; 5=“completely true")
1. I would rather do something that requires little thought than some-
thing that is sure to challenge my thinking abilities
2. I don’t like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires
a lot of thinking.
3. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
4. I ﬁnd little satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
5. Thinking is not my idea of fun.
6. The notion of thinking abstractly is not appealing to me.
7. I prefer my life to be ﬁlled with puzzles that I must solve.
8. Simply knowing the answer rather than understanding the reasons for
18This question is not part of the original CRT by Shane (2005). We added it to increase
the complexity of the task. However, in the data analysis we do not consider answers to this
question.
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the answer to a problem is ﬁne with me.
9. I don’t reason well under pressure.
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top does not appeal
to me.
11. I prefer to talk about international problems rather than gossip about
celebrities.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.
13. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difﬁcult, and important to one
that is somewhat important but does not require much thought.
14. I generally prefer to accept things as they are rather than to question
them.
15. It is enough for me that something gets the job done, I don’t care how or
why it works.
16. I tend to set goals that can be accomplished only by expending consider-
able mental effort.
17. I have difﬁculty thinking in new and unfamiliar situations.
18. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required
a lot of mental effort.
19. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I
will have to think in depth about something.
20. My initial impressions of people are almost always right.
21. I trust my initial feelings about people.
22. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my “gut feelings."
23. I believe in trusting my hunches.
24. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can’t explain
how I know.
25. I am a very intuitive person.
26. I can typically sense right away when a person is lying.
27. I am quick to form impressions about people.
28. I believe I can judge character pretty well from a person’s appearance.
29. I often have clear visual images of things.
30. I have a very good sense of rhythm.
31. I am good at visualizing things.
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Chapter 3
Fairness and Uncertainty
3.1 Introduction
Resources often have to be (re)allocated without knowledge of the true state
of nature or before the state of nature is known. In such situations the ﬁnal
position of the recipients depends on the allocation as well as on which one
of the several uncertain states of the world materializes. The uncertainty
about how the allocated resources translate into ﬁnal positions complicates
the deﬁnition of what constitutes a fair allocation in these distribution prob-
lems.
Consider, for instance, the income taxation of self employed workers, whose
liabilities are usually calculated on the basis of self-reported income. In
countries where treacherous declarations are difﬁcult to detect or where tax
evasion is frequent, the true redistributive effects of income taxation may
be quite uncertain. The difﬁculty of ﬁnding a shared deﬁnition of fairness is
effectively illustrated by the introduction of a new ﬁscal instrument by the
Italian government in 1993. The instrument substitutes self-declarations of
income with estimates based on the likelihood that each taxpayer belongs
to a series of income groups:1 affected taxpayers strongly opposed the in-
troduction of the new system, arguing that taxation based on probabilistic
estimates is unfair.
Uncertainty about the true state of nature does not solely enter economic
1For detailed information consult http://www.agenziaentrate.gov.it
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problems. One of the main distributive justice criteria for organ transplant,
the maximum beneﬁt criteria, maintains ranking candidates according to
their survival likelihood after the transplant. Opposers of the maximum
beneﬁt criteria argue that medical success is difﬁcult to predict and hence
that equal access should be granted to everybody (Childress, 2001). More
generally, this example shows that people may disagree on what constitutes
a fair allocation even when they do not have stakes in the distribution at
hand.
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to investigate
people’s ideas about fairness in distribution problems where the state of na-
ture is uncertain at the moment of the distribution decision. By uncovering
the sources of people’s disagreement about fairness, our investigation may
help designing policies that are in line with generally shared fairness ideas.
In the experiment participants are randomly divided into groups of three.
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment two group members work on a real effort
task by which they earn money that is deposited in a joint account. The task
is designed to minimize differences in productivity so that subjects can in
principle acquire equal rights in the production phase (on the importance
of earned rights and claims see, for example, Gächter and Riedl, 2005 and
2006). The third group member, the so called Benevolent Dictator (Konow,
2000), is then asked to allocate the money in the joint account between the
two other group members, him/herself having no stakes in the account. This
set up allows inferring people’s distributive principles because it is designed
in a way that the only possible concern for the Benevolent Dictator (BD)
is to treat recipients fairly. Further, it has been shown that distributions
by impartial third parties are much less sensitive to personal characteris-
tics and expectations as compared to distributions decided behind the veil of
ignorance (Aguiar et al., 2010). The BD has to make allocation decisions in
several distribution problems knowing that at the end of the experiment one
is randomly selected for the payment of the recipients. In all problems except
one the ﬁnal earnings of one of the recipients are uncertain and can be larger
or smaller than the allocated amount, depending on the realized state after
the distribution. Further, the level of uncertainty is systematically varied
in the studied distribution problems in a way that the higher the potential
ﬁnal earnings the smaller their likelihood. The other recipient always earns
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exactly what is allocated to him/her. This design allows us investigating sit-
uations where recipients differ in their exposure to uncertainty and where
the ﬁnal distribution of outcomes can be more or less extreme. We only
consider situations where uncertainty is independent from subjects’ charac-
teristics and cannot be inﬂuenced by subjects’ decisions. Theoretically, three
distributive justice principles are relevant: Equality, Utilitarianism and Eq-
uity are applied to our distribution problems in order to derive quantitative
predictions on allocations. Predictions are then contrasted with actual data
on allocations.
Traditionally, to empirically investigate people’s distributive justice ideas
researchers employed surveys and vignette studies (see, for example, Yaari
and Bar-Hillel, 1984 and Kahneman et al., 1986) and only relatively recently
incentivized experiments have been used.2 Konow (2000) ﬁrst introduced
the Benevolent Dictator game; in his experiment the BD was asked to allo-
cate to two anonymous recipients the joint product of their work. The author
ﬁnds that the product is less likely to be allocated in proportion to the indi-
vidual contributions when differences in productivity are randomly assigned
compared to when they result from subjects’ differential efforts. These re-
sults have been replicated by Dickinson and Tiefenhalter (2002) who con-
trast earned rights to non-earned ones in a more complex environment. Cap-
pelen et al. (2007) use allocation data from a standard dictator game to esti-
mate the distribution of three principles of distributive justice in situations
involving production. The authors adopt a random utility model that allows
them disentangling dictators’ allocation decisions into selﬁsh motives and
fairness principles. In another study Cappelen et al. (2011) investigate the
distribution choices of both non-involved subjects and stakeholders in situ-
ations where inequalities in output are determined by risk taking behavior.
The authors ﬁnd that inequalities between risk takers and non-risk takers
are mostly viewed as fair, but that inequalities between lucky and unlucky
risk takers are instead eliminated.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst investigating allocation prob-
lems where a division has to be made before the state of nature is known
and where subjects cannot inﬂuence the level of uncertainty affecting their
2For empirical studies on distributive justice based on vignettes see also Schokkaert and
Overlaet, 1989 and Faravelli, 2007.
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outcomes. Moreover, differently than in the reviewed studies, we do not fo-
cus on issues of merit but rather on fairness in situations where recipients
differ due to factors beyond their direct inﬂuence.
We ﬁnd that Benevolent Dictators agree on the equal split as the fair dis-
tribution, only when the ﬁnal distribution of resources is certain. In con-
trast, when uncertainty is involved Benevolent Dictators differ substantially
in their allocation decisions both within and across distribution problems.
Since the perception of uncertainty is subjective and values often pluralis-
tic, disagreement may stem from the fact that people hold different ideas
about what is fair. Using a weighted distance criteria, we show that 50%
of all the allocations are consistent with the principle of Equality, 17% with
Utilitarianism and 33% with the Equity principle. We also observe that the
interpretation of the Equality principle is context dependent as it is system-
atically related to the level of uncertainty of the distribution problem.
In the following section we discuss theories of distributive justice that
are relevant for the distribution problems at hand and analytically derive
the allocations predicted by these theories. In section 3.3 the experimen-
tal design is described in detail. In section 3.4 results are presented and
discussed. In section 3.5 concluding remarks are drawn. In the Appendix
details on the analytical derivation of allocations are provided.
3.2 Distributive justice when outcomes are uncertain
3.2.1 The general problem
Consider a distribution problem in which a certain amount X of a resource
has to be divided among a number of individuals i in a normatively fair way.
Individuals are equally deserving in the sense that all of them produce the
same level of output under the same working conditions. The ﬁnal distribu-
tion of resources depends on the state of nature which is uncertain at the
moment of the division. After the division, uncertainty is resolved and the
ﬁnal distribution of resources is determined.
We indicate with xi the amount allocated to person i. The expected value
of xi is given by the following expression:
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E(xi)=
n∑
e=1
pe xi ki,e with
n∑
e=1
pe = 1 (3.1)
where 0≤ pe ≤ 1 is the probability of event e occurring and ki,e ∈ R cap-
tures how event e affects allocation xi. For example, ki,e = 1.5 means that if
event e is realized the amount of resources of person i increases by 50%.
For the purpose of experimental implementation, we focus on a limited
number of distribution problems m ∈ {1, ..,7} that are derived by introducing
restrictions on the values of the variables in (3.1). In each studied distribu-
tion problem m a monetary amount X has to be divided between two persons
called R (for exposed to risk) and C (for facing certain outcomes), such that
X = xmR +x
m
C . We assume that only two states are possible, namely that event
e or its complement, e¯, is realized. In order to simplify notation we indicate
kmi,e with k
m
i and k
m
i,e¯ with k
m
i . Furthermore, assumptions on the values of
pme and on k
m
i , k
m
i are made. First, we set k
m
C = k
m
C = 1 ∀m, which implies
that person C’s ﬁnal earnings do not depend on which state is realized and
are thus equal to what is allocated to her in all studied distribution prob-
lems. Second, we choose kmR > 1> k
m
R and p
m
e such that:
pme x
m
R k
m
R + (1− p
m
e ) x
m
R k
m
R = x
m
R ∀ m, k
m
R , k
m
R (3.2)
That is, in expectation person R earns exactly what is allocated to her
in all distribution problems. In other words, a given allocation to R has the
same expected value in all studied distribution problems. Finally, parame-
ters are chosen in a way that distribution problem m second order stochas-
tically dominates distribution problem m+1, that is:
pme f (x
m
R k
m
R )+(1− p
m
e ) f (x
m
R k
m
R )> p
m+1
e f (x
m+1
R k
m+1
R )+(1− p
m+1
e ) f (x
m+1
R k
m+1
R )
(3.3)
for every concave function f (·) (Mas-Colell et al., 1995 page 197). For
convenience, we say that problem m+1 is riskier than problem m if (3.3) is
satisﬁed.
To summarize, we design our distribution problems in a way that en-
sures that in expectation the distribution of X between person R and person
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C is always equal to the amount allocated to them, while the riskiness of
person R’s allocation changes across problems. This setup allows studying
how the riskiness of a situation inﬂuences distributive justice views, ruling
out the possibility that differences in allocations within and across distribu-
tion problems may be motivated by efﬁciency concerns.
The expressions below describe the expected values of the allocations xmR , x
m
C
in any of the m distribution problems:
E(xmR )= p
m
e x
m
R k
m
R + (1− p
m
e ) x
m
R k
m
R = x
m
R , E(x
m
C )= x
m
C (3.4)
In what follows we discuss the distributive justice principles that may
motivate allocations in such distribution problems.
3.2.2 Theoretical discussion
Our analysis proceeds along the three principles that have inspired the de-
velopment of most distributive justice theories (Konow, 2003).
For each principle, we discuss theories that are plausible candidates for mo-
tivating allocations. We then apply the discussed theories to the distribution
problem that satisﬁes (3.4) in order to derive theoretically predicted alloca-
tions. These allocations, the so called fairness ideals (Cappelen et al., 2007),
specify at the individual-level the fair amounts xmR and x
m
C that should be
allocated to person R and person C, respectively.
Equality Theories in this category typically reﬂect a concern for the
well being of those who are least advantaged in society. Within this category,
Egalitarianism (Deutsch, 1985) and Sen’s Weak Equity Axiom (Sen, 1973)
can be applied to make predictions in the context of our distribution prob-
lems.3 Egalitarianism prescribes equality of outcomes. Sen’s weak equity
axiom, in direct opposition to Utilitarianism (discussed below), prescribes to
allocate more to the individual who derives less utility from a given quantity
of the resource.
3Also the contributions of Rawls (1971) and Marx (1958) to distributive justice belong to
this category. However, they do not seem applicable to the distribution problems we consider
because no information on recipients’ needs and initial wealth is available.
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Applying Egalitarianism to the distribution problems we study is not
straightforward, because the state of nature is unknown at the moment of
the division of X . Therefore, there is no allocation which guarantees that
person R and C enjoy equal amounts after uncertainty is resolved. Given
this impossibility, the allocation closest to the egalitarian ideal is the one
that minimizes the expected difference between R’s and C’s ﬁnal allocations.
Formally stated:
min
xmR ,x
m
C
pme
∣∣kmR xmR − xmC ∣∣+ (1− pme )
∣∣∣kmR xmR − xmC
∣∣∣ s.t. xmR + xmC = X
The solution of the above minimization problem yields the following norma-
tively fair allocations:4
xm EglR =
X
kmR +1
, xm EglC =
XkmR
kmR +1
(3.5)
In all distribution problems kmR > 1, therefore the result in (3.5) tells that
the fair allocation to person R, who bears the risk, is smaller than that to
person C, who does not bear any risk. Since such allocations aim at the
smallest possible level of inequality after uncertainty is resolved, we call
this fairness ideal ex-post equality.
The application of Sen’s weak equity axiom to the discussed distribution
problems requires knowledge of the recipients’ utility function for money.
For the sake of parsimony and in accordance with the literature (Wakker,
2010) we assume that both persons are characterized by the same, CRRA,
utility function for money U(x) = xα. Assume now, for example, that 0 <
α < 1, which means that R and C are risk averse. This implies that in any
of the m distribution problems if the same amount is allocated to person R
and person C, this yields the former a lower expected utility than the lat-
ter. Hence, to satisfy Sen’s axiom person R should always be allocated more
than person C. Put differently, person R should be compensated because her
disadvantaged position, namely facing uncertainty, is due to reasons beyond
her personal inﬂuence.
Notice that Sen’s weak equity axiom does not specify the extent to which
4The formal derivation of the normatively fair allocations can be found in the Appendix.
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person R should be compensated. In order to apply the axiom we assume
that compensation is full, meaning that allocations are chosen in a way that
R enjoys in expectation the same utility as C:
E[U(xmR )]=E[U(x
m
C )] s.t. x
m
R + x
m
C = X
The following equation expresses this idea in the context of the discussed
distribution problems:
pme (x
m
R k
m
R )
α
+ (1− pme ) (x
m
R k
m
R )
α
= (xmC )
α
which can be rewritten to obtain the following fair allocations:
xm SenR =
X
e
Z
α +1
, xm SenC =
X e
Z
α
e
Z
α +1
, (3.6)
where Z = ln[pme (k
m
R )
α+ (1− pme )(k
m
R )
α]. From the expression in (3.2) it
follows that Z < 0 ∀ 0 < α < 1 and hence that e
Z
α < 1. Thus, the equations
in (3.6) imply that in all distribution problems characterized by uncertainty
person R should be allocated more than person C. Further, Z is decreasing
in the riskiness of the distribution problem (see the inequality in (3.3)) im-
plying that the fair allocation to R increases.
Note that the allocation in (3.6) is fair also when α> 1, that is when the
recipients are characterized by risk seeking preferences. However, in such
a case, R should be allocated less than C the riskier the division problem.
Clearly, if preferences are risk neutral both recipients should be allocated
the same amount.
As this fairness ideal guarantees that R and C enjoy the same utility in
expectation we call it ex-ante equality.
Utilitarianism According to utilitarianism (Bentham, 1789 and Sen,
1979), one should pursue the greatest aggregate level of utility. This implies
that more of a resource should be allocated to the person that derives the
greater utility from it. As above, we assume that person R and person C are
characterized by a power utility function for money. We also assume for the
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moment that preferences are risk averse. As a consequence in all distribu-
tion problems the same amount yields a lower expected utility to person R
as compared to person C. Evidently, utilitarianism would then prescribe to
allocate to person R a smaller share of X . The below maximization problems
formalizes this intuition:
max
xmR ,x
m
C
E[U(xmR )+U(x
m
C )] s.t. x
m
R + x
m
C = X
which for the discussed distribution problems becomes:
max
xmR ,x
m
C
pme (x
m
R k
m
R )
α
+ (1− pme ) (x
m
R k
m
R )
α
+ (xmC )
α s.t. xmR + x
m
C = X
The solution of the maximization problem leads to the following optimal
allocations:
xm UtilR =
X
e−
Z
1−α +1
, xm UtilC =
X e−
Z
1−α
e−
Z
1−α +1
(3.7)
where Z = ln[pme (k
m
R )
α+ (1− pme )(k
m
R )
α]. Since e−
Z
1−α > 1 ∀ 0 < α < 1 (see
the previous section) the expressions in (3.7) imply that R is allocated less
than C. Further, the higher the riskiness of R’s ﬁnal earnings the less R is
allocated.
If α> 1, that is recipients are characterized by risk seeking preferences, the
maximization of total welfare implies that the total amount of resources X
is allocated to R. We call this fairness ideal utilitarian.
Equity This principle inspires theories that establish a dependence of
normatively fair allocations on individual actions. The accountability prin-
ciple (Konow, 1996) represents a generalization of Equity. In redistributing
the output of a joint effort, allocations should be proportional to the inputs
people control (like effort) but should not be related to those exogenous fac-
tors that people cannot inﬂuence but that nevertheless affect the output (like
physical handicap or random events). The application of the accountability
principle to our problems disregards the fact that the state of nature is un-
certain at the moment of the division. Indeed, the total amount of resources
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to be divided solely depends on the productivity of person R and C which is
assumed to be equal. It follows that the prescribed distribution is the equal
split of X in every distribution problem. Formally,
xm EqR = x
m Eq
C =
X
2
(3.8)
We call this fairness ideal equity. Lastly, notice that all discussed fair-
ness ideals prescribe an equal split of the joint account when the ﬁnal out-
comes of both person R and C are independent of which event is realized
and thus equal to their allocations. This can be easily seen by substituting
kmR = k
m
R = 1 into the above equations.Table 4.3 summarizes the distribu-
tional implications of the four fairness ideals.5
Table 3.1: Fairness ideals.
allocation to R Relation of xmR to x
m
C Relation of x
m
R to riskiness
ex-post equality xmR =
X
kmR+1
< non-monotonic
ex-ante equality xmR =
X
e
Z
α +1
> increasing
utilitarian xmR =
X
e−
Z
1−α +1
< decreasing
equity xmR =
X
2 ≡ constant
Note: The relations described above hold for 0<α< 1.
3.3 The Benevolent Dictator experiment
The main purpose of this experiment is to investigate people’s ideas about
fairness in distribution problems where uncertainty affects the ﬁnal distri-
bution of rewards. The experiment consists of three parts. In the ﬁrst part
of the experiment subjects having the role of receivers work on a real effort
task. The money earned by each subject is then deposited in a group account.
5Some of the relations in the second and third columns of the table only hold under the
assumption that 0 < α < 1. More speciﬁcally, for α > 1 Sen’s weak equity axiom prescribes
that xR < xC and that xR decreases with the riskiness of the situation. Further, if α > 1
Utilitarianism assigns the total amount of resources to R in all distribution problems.
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In the second part of the experiment a subject, the Benevolent Dictator, is
asked to split the money in the account between the two recipients, himself
having no stakes in the amount to divide (Konow, 2000). In the third and
last part, subjects face a series of incentivized choices that allow estimating
participants’ preferences over uncertain prospects and beliefs about others’
preferences. In what follows the experiment is described in detail.
Part 1: production After every participant takes a seat at the designated
computer station, instructions for the ﬁrst and second part of the experiment
are distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. Participants are then
randomly matched in groups of three; one group member is randomly as-
signed the role of BD, the other two persons are the recipients, which we
call R and C.6 In the ﬁrst part of the experiment R and C subjects work in-
dividually on a real effort task (Gill and Prowse, 2009) while the BD is idle.
The real effort task consists of a single screen displaying 32 sliders on
horizontal bars. Each slider can be moved at any point of the bar for an
unlimited number of times and the actual position of a slider is displayed
to the right of it. A slider is correctly positioned when the number 50 pops
up at the right of the bar, that is when the slider is exactly at the middle of
the bar. The subject’s “score" in the task, interpreted as productivity, is the
number of sliders positioned at 50 in 6 minutes time. The current score and
the amount of time remaining are displayed on the top of the screen.
We chose the slider task because it is simple to communicate and to under-
stand, it is identical across repetitions and it has no scope for guessing, so
the number of correctly positioned sliders corresponds closely to the effort
exerted by the subject. Effort in the slider task is incentivized: for each cor-
rectly positioned slider AC0.25 are credited, so that subjects can credit up to
AC8 each. After the time for the task has expired, the BD, R and C subjects
in the same group view the effort provided by R and C. The total amount of
money generated by such effort is deposited in a group account; members of
the same group are then informed about the amount of money in their ac-
count. We chose the number of sliders on the screen and the available time
6In the experiment subjects are assigned the more neutral labels A, B and C.
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to complete the task in a way that maximum effort is easily achievable, as
we intended that R and C subjects in the same group do not differ in terms
of productivity and are thus equally deserving.
Part 2: allocation decisions In the second part of the experiment the
BD has to divide the amount in the group account between R and C, who are
not active in this phase. The fact that R and C exerted effort and are thus
not mere money recipients should increase BD’s motivation to make a fair
division. The BD does not have stakes in the division: her payment for this
task is randomly and publicly determined at the end of the experiment and
is not related in any way to the amount in the group account. More precisely,
the BD can earn 4, 6, 10 or 12 Euro with equal chance, which means that
she earns AC8 in expectation. Given that AC8 is probably the equal split of
most group accounts, we avoided including 8 among the possible earnings as
it may become a focal point for BD’s allocation decisions.
The BD has to make a division in m = 7 problems. We consider distri-
bution problems characterized by risk (pme is a known value) as well as by
ambiguity (pme is unknown). The latter form of uncertainty is more common
in real life as people hardly know the objective probability of most events.
On the other hand, experimental data about the former are easier to inter-
pret and organize with the tools of microeconomic theory.
Table 3.2 shows the characteristics of each distribution problem. In the
ﬁrst distribution problem, Certainty, R’s and C’s ﬁnal earnings are respec-
tively equal to the amount x1R and x
1
C assigned to them by the BD. This is
different in the division problems involving uncertainty. For instance, in di-
vision problem 4-Risk, p4e = 0.5 and k
4
R = 2, k
4
R = 0. This means that R earns
twice her allocation with 50% chance and earns nothing with 50% chance. In
division problem 6-Ambiguity p6e is unknown, k
6
R = 1.5, k
6
R = 0.5. Differently
stated, R’s ﬁnal earnings may be equal to 1.5 times or to 0.5 times her al-
location, but likelihoods are unknown. Notice that for all division problems
m< 6, problem m second order stochastically dominates problem m+1.7
7Distribution problems 6 and 7 are characterized by ambiguity and therefore cannot be
ranked according to second order stochastic dominance.
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Table 3.2: Distribution problems.
distribution problem ﬁnal earnings of R ﬁnal earnings of C
1-Certainty x1R x
1
C
2-Risk (0.5 : x2R ×1.5, x
2
R ×0.5) x
2
C
3-Risk (0.8 : x3R ×1.25, x
3
R ×0) x
3
C
4-Risk (0.5 : x4R ×2, x
4
R ×0) x
4
C
5-Risk (0.2 : x5R ×5, x
5
R ×0) x
5
C
6-Ambiguity (p : x6R ×1.5, x
6
R ×0.5) x
6
C
7-Ambiguity (p : x7R ×2, x
7
R ×0) x
7
C
Note: The numbers in parenthesis refer to a prospect as follows:
(pme : x
m
R ×k
m
R , x
m
R ×k
m
R ).
Distribution problems appear on the screen one at a time and the order
of appearance is randomized at the group level.
At the end of the experiment only one problem is randomly selected to be rel-
evant for the payment of R and C. A stack of cards numbered form 1 to 100
is used to determine R’s earnings in risky decision problems. For instance, if
R faces a 50% chance of doubling her allocation, her allocation is eventually
doubled only if a card with a number smaller than 51 is drawn. In order to
operationalize ambiguity, a stack of 100 cards colored black and red is used.
Neither the participants nor the experimenter knows the exact color com-
position of the stack, and each participant is free to choose his/her winning
color at the beginning of the experiment. This procedure is described in the
instructions that are distributed before the start of the experiment. The de-
termination of earnings took place publicly at the end of the experiment so
that subjects could witness how the chance devices were operated.
Part 3: Individual characteristics In the last part of the experiment
we gather data on individual characteristics that may be related to BD’s
allocations decisions.
First of all, we measure subjects’ risk preferences. Participants’ certainty
equivalents are elicited for 6 two outcomes lotteries. Table 4.2 shows the
outcomes and the probabilities employed. For each lottery subjects see a
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screen on the computer that contains a description of the lottery and a list of
20 equally spaced sure amounts, ranging from the lottery’s highest to lowest
outcome. In order to facilitate comprehension, probabilities are expressed
both in percentage points and with the aid of a pie chart. In each row of
the decision screen subjects have to make a choice between the lottery and
the sure amount. Subjects are not allowed to switch back and forth between
the sure amount and the lottery.8 In other words, a unique switching point
is elicited for each lottery. Certainty equivalents are then calculated as the
arithmetic mean of the smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery and
the consecutive sure amount on the list.
Table 3.3: Lotteries for risk preferences elicitation.
Lottery p y z
1 0.20 40 0
2 0.50 16 0
3 0.80 10 0
4 0.50 12 4
5 0.25 16 4
6 0.33 12 0
Note: The lottery outcome
is ACy with probability p, ACz
with probability 1− p.
We chose the above lotteries in order to measure risk preferences for the
range of outcomes that are relevant in the distribution problems of the ﬁrst
part. In particular, note that the ﬁrst 4 lotteries in the table all have an
expected value of AC8 and are characterized by the same probability values
that appear in the risky distribution problems. Lottery 5 and 6 provide ad-
ditional information on risk preferences in the range of outcomes relevant to
our experiment.
As two distribution problems are characterized by ambiguity, we also
8Consistency is enforced as it is crucial for the elicitation of beliefs about others’ prefer-
ences.
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elicit subjects’ attitude to it. To this end, subjects face 6 decision screens
where they make choices between an ambiguous lottery and several risky
ones. Both the ambiguous and the risky lotteries in a given decision screen
are characterized by the same outcomes pair, which are those in table 3.3.
In each screen subjects see a description of the ambiguous lottery and a list
of 20 risky lotteries. The ﬁrst and the last risky lotteries on the list are both
degenerate, and guarantee respectively the high and the low outcome of the
lottery. In every row of the list the likelihood of the high outcome decreases
by 5%, while the likelihood of the low outcome increases by 5%. In each de-
cision screen, subjects can switch only once from the risky to the ambiguous
lottery. As in the ﬁrst part of the experiment, ambiguity is generated with a
deck of red and black cards in unknown color composition. Thus, the switch-
ing point provides an interval for a subject’s belief about the likelihood that
a winning card is drawn.
At the end of the experiment one out of the 12 decision screens (ambiguous
and risky) and one row within the selected decision screen are randomly
selected for payment. The relevant lottery is then publicly played out and
earnings are added to those of the ﬁrst part.
Lastly, we investigate subjects’ beliefs about others’ risk and ambigu-
ity preferences. In order to do so, we ask subjects to estimate the choices
made by a randomly matched group member in 4 risky and 2 ambiguous
decision screens. Rather than eliciting a point belief, we decided to elicit an
interval: for a certain decision screen, each participant is asked to indicate
what he/she thinks is the minimum and the maximum switching point of the
matched group member. The belief elicitation is incentivized using the inter-
val scoring rule (Schlag and Van der Weele, 2009). The rule works as follows:
if the true switching point of the matched member lies within the minimum
and maximum of the indicated interval, the subject earns an amount that is
inversely related to the length of the indicated interval, which could also be
a point. If the true switching point of the matched member lays outside the
indicated interval, the subject earns nothing.
The interval scoring rule has two advantages compared to scoring rules that
elicit point beliefs. First, it is less time consuming and cognitively demand-
ing for the subjects because to know the support of the beliefs’ distribution
the experimenter does not need to elicit probabilities over all possible events.
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Second, the interval scoring rule allows inferences that are valid under any
degree of subjects’ risk aversion and not only when subjects are risk neutral
(Schlag and Van der Weele, 2009).
Before being privately payed out in cash and dismissed, subjects are
asked a few socioeconomic questions. Furthermore, they are asked to com-
plete a debrieﬁng questionnaire on the ﬁrst part of the experiment. More
precisely, for each distribution problem subjects in the same group are re-
minded of the allocations made by the BD. The BD is then asked to explain
how he/she made the allocation decisions, while R and C subjects are asked
if they deem the division fair or unfair, and why.
90 students from Maastricht University participated in the computer-
ized experiment which was conducted in January 2010 in the Behavioral and
Experimental Lab (BEElab) at the Maastricht University School of Business
and Economics, using the Z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). 82% of the
subjects were enrolled in the School of Business and Economics and the re-
maining 18% were enrolled in other faculties, such as law, medicine and
arts. 47% of the subjects were male. The average age was 23.5 years. The
experiment lasted approximately 80 minutes and the average earnings per
subject were AC17.
3.4 Results
We begin with presenting descriptive statistics on production, allocation de-
cisions and individual characteristics.
Production and allocation decisions Our design of the production phase
successfully induced maximum performance, which was achieved by both R
and C in 28 out of 30 groups. In the following analysis we exclude the 2
groups where performance was not maximal by one, or both, group members
because we want to rule out any effects such differences may have on the
BD’s allocation decisions. Consequently, for all analyzed groups the group
account equals AC16.
Consider now the ﬁrst distribution problem which is characterized by
the fact that both R’s and C’s ﬁnal earnings are equal to the amount allo-
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cated to them. As shown in Section 3.2 this is the only problem where all
the applicable theories of justice prescribe an equal split of the group ac-
count. Therefore, allocations in this problem provide a test of whether our
approach is successful in eliciting people’s fairness ideals. The histogram
in Figure 3.1 clearly shows that, with the exception of only two outliers,
Benevolent Dictators indeed split the amount in the group account equally
between R and C. This result demonstrates that equally deserving individ-
uals are treated equally when the earnings’ distribution does not depend on
the state of nature.
Figure 3.1: Distribution problem 1-Certainty.
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Allocation behavior changes dramatically in distribution problems char-
acterized by uncertainty. The histograms in Figure 3.2 depict allocations to
R in these six distribution problems.
They clearly show that within each distribution problem allocations are
highly heterogeneous and that allocations substantially differ also across
the distribution problems.
Table 3.4 provides descriptive statistics and statistical tests on alloca-
tions to R subjects; all statistical tests employed in the analysis are two-
sided. In the last but one column of the table we report the results of a
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Figure 3.2: Distribution problems characterized by uncertainty.
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Wilcoxon test, which is used to test whether allocations to R are signiﬁ-
cantly different from the equal split of AC8. We ﬁnd that the median allo-
cation to R is signiﬁcantly smaller than the equal split only in distribution
problem 5-Risk.9 However, given that the median allocation to R is almost
always AC8, results of the Wilcoxon test only provide limited information
about the existing heterogeneity within distribution problems. Therefore,
for each risky problem we also compare the distribution of allocations to the
hypothetical distribution where an equal split is uniformly chosen, using
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (henceforth K-S test). We ﬁnd that in all risky
distribution problems the distribution of allocations is signiﬁcantly different
from an equal-split distribution (p-value at least 0.07).
The results for the two distribution problems characterized by ambiguity
are similar. The median allocation to B is not signiﬁcantly different from
the equal split in both distribution problems. However standard deviations
9When using a one-sample t-test we ﬁnd that the mean allocation to R is signiﬁcantly
smaller than 8 in 4-Risk and signiﬁcantly higher than 8 in 2-Risk.
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are quite high and a K-S test conﬁrms that distributions signiﬁcantly differ
from the equal-split distribution.
Table 3.4: Allocations to R in all distribution problems.
allocation to R
distribution problem max min mean median s. deviation Wilcoxon test K-S test
1-Certainty 16 8 8.39 8 1.59 z=1.41 p=1.00
(p=0.16)
2-Risk 12 6 8.50 8 1.43 z=1.40 p=0.07
(p=0.16)
3-Risk 12 5 8.13 8 1.69 z=-0.13 p=0.006
(p=0.90)
4-Risk 11 0 7.33 8 2.10 z=-1.57 p=0.015
(p=0.12)
5-Risk 10 0 5.10 4.50 2.84 z=-3.86 p=0.00
(p=0.0001)
6-Ambiguity 12 4 8.36 8 1.75 z=0.99 p=0.03
(p=0.32)
7-Ambiguity 16 4 7.73 8 2.39 z=-1.24 p=0.03
(p=0.21)
Note: The null hypothesis of the Wilcoxon test is that the median allocation to R is equal to 8. The
null hypothesis in the K-S test is that the distribution of allocations to R is equal to the distribution
where the equal split has density 1.
Result 3.4.1. The amount in the joint account is almost always split equally
in the distribution problem where uncertainty is absent. In all distribution
problems characterized by uncertainty the distribution of allocations is sig-
niﬁcantly different from the equal split.
As pointed out earlier, the histograms in Figure 3.2 show that Benev-
olent Dictators differentiated their allocations decisions according to the
characteristics of the distribution problem. We now proceed by comparing
all distribution problems pair-wise. Table 3.5 summarizes the differences
between decision situations, where we correct for multiple comparisons us-
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ing the “false discovery rate” method (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995). The
most striking fact emerging from Table 3.5 is that allocations in 5-Risk are
highly and signiﬁcantly different from allocations in all other distribution
problems. Furthermore, when ignoring the distribution problem character-
ized by the lowest level of riskiness, 2-Risk, signiﬁcant differences are ob-
served between allocations in 1-Certainty and allocations in problems char-
acterized by risk. Interestingly, we do not observe signiﬁcant differences
between 2-Risk and 6-Ambiguity and 4-Risk and 7-Ambiguity respectively.
Given that these pairs of prospects are characterized by the same potential
outcomes this result indicates that Benevolent Dictators treat ambiguity no
differently than a 50-50 prospect.
Table 3.5: Pair-wise comparisons of distribution problems.
2-Risk 3-Risk 4-Risk 5-Risk 6-Ambiguity 7-Ambiguity
1-Certainty x[x] x[***] x[***] ***[***] x[x] x[x]
2-Risk x[x] x[x] ***[***] x[x] x[x]
3-Risk x[x] ***[***] x[x] x[x]
4-Risk ***[***] x[x] x[x]
5-Risk ***[***] ***[***]
6-Ambiguity x[x]
Note: Wilcoxon test and K-S test (the latter in brackets). An x indicates that there are
no statistically signiﬁcant differences. *** indicates signiﬁcance at the 1% level, ** at
the 5% level. All results are corrected using the “false discovery rate” method.
The statistics in Table 3.4 also show that although a given allocation
xmR has the same expected value across all distribution problems, the aver-
age allocation to R is negatively related to the distribution problems when
ranked according to second order stochastic dominance. Furthermore, the
standard deviation of allocations to R is negatively related to such ranking,
suggesting that ideas about fair distributions are more dispersed in division
problems with a high level of riskiness. For each BD we calculate the Spear-
man correlation coefﬁcient between the allocations to R and the rank of the
risky problems according to second order stochastic dominance. We ﬁnd that
the average Spearman correlation coefﬁcient is −0.42 and is negative for 18
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of the 28 Benevolent Dictators.10 A Wilcoxon test rejects the hypothesis that
the correlation coefﬁcient is equal to 0 (p=0.001).
Result 3.4.2. Across distribution problems statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ences in allocations’ medians and distributions are observed. In particular, R
is allocated on average signiﬁcantly less the higher the riskiness of her ﬁnal
earnings. No signiﬁcant difference is found between risky and ambiguous
distribution problems which share the same possible outcomes for a given
allocation.
To summarize, our results so far show that allocations are highly het-
erogeneous within and across distribution problems. Furthermore, in the
aggregate Benevolent Dictators signiﬁcantly decrease their allocation to R
with increasing riskiness of the distribution problem. In the following we
zoom into the individual data and explore the relation between BD’s own
preferences, beliefs about other’s preferences, and allocations.
Individual characteristics In the third part of the experiment partic-
ipants make several decisions that allow estimating their attitude to risk
and ambiguity.
First, we calculate subjects’ certainty equivalent for each of the employed
risky lotteries and assume a CRRA utility function for money U(x) = xα,
where 0 < α < 1 indicates risk aversion, α = 1 indicates risk neutrality and
α> 1 risk seeking preferences. Under these parametric assumptions, we es-
timate the parameter value of α for each subject by minimizing the sum of
squared distances (Wakker, 2008 and 2010). That is;
min
α
6∑
i=1
[(pi yαi + (1− pi)z
α
i )
1
α − cei]2
where the ﬁrst term in brackets indicates the theoretically predicted cer-
tainty equivalent for lottery i and cei is the elicited certainty equivalent of
lottery i. To correct for heteroscedasticity prospects are normalized to uni-
form length.
We ﬁnd that the average BD is characterized by α = 0.77, (s.d = 0.24, me-
dian α= 0.79), which is in accordance with earlier ﬁndings (see, for instance,
10The Pearson correlation coefﬁcient is −0.44.
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Holt and Laury, 2002).11
Second, we elicit subjects’ ambiguity attitude by using their choices be-
tween ambiguous and risky lotteries. Assuming Subjective Expected Utility
theory (Savage, 1954), such choices reveal the bounds of the probability in-
terval containing a subject’s prior belief on the ambiguous event.12 As the
ambiguous event is the same in all the decision screens, subjects should
consistently reveal the same prior belief in all decisions. When pair-wise
comparing the elicited prior beliefs in all six decision screens we ﬁnd that
subjects indeed hold consistent beliefs (the p-value of the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test is at least 0.22). For each subject we construct a variable called
“prior-belief” deﬁned as the average of the prior beliefs elicited in the six
decision screens. The mean prior-belief of Benevolent Dictators is equal to
0.46 (s.d.=0.08, median prior belief=0.48). Hence, the average BD believes
that the probability of the ambiguous event is very close to 50%, a probabil-
ity value which indicates only a slight aversion to ambiguity.13 Notice that
the standard deviation of prior-belief is very small, indicating a large degree
of consistency among Benevolent Dictators.
Before the end of the experiment subjects are asked to provide their best
estimate of the choices made by a randomly matched group member in 4
risky and 2 ambiguous decision screens. We use their estimates to construct
a synthetic measure of their beliefs about others’ risk and ambiguity prefer-
ences. First, taking the midpoint of the interval indicated by a subject, we
calculate the beliefs about others’ certainty equivalents for risky lotteries
and others’ prior beliefs on the ambiguous event. Using these measures we
employ the same method as for the estimation of Benevolent Dictators’ risk
preferences to estimate what Benevolent Dictators believe to be the coefﬁ-
cient of relative risk aversion, α, of other subjects. We use the average of the
two elicited believed prior beliefs to get a measure of Benevolent Dictators’
11Pair-wise comparisons of BD’s, R’s and C’s risk attitude reveal no statistically signiﬁcant
difference (p≥ 0.14, Mann-Whitney test).
12We take the midpoint of the interval to be the subjects’ prior belief. As the length of the
interval is always equal to 0.05 taking the midpoint cannot result in a large bias.
13Pair-wise comparisons of BD’s, R’s and C’s prior beliefs reveal no statistically signiﬁcant
difference, p≥ 0.69 Mann-Whitney test.
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belief about others’ ambiguity attitude, where ambiguity is disliked more
the smaller the prior belief on the ambiguous event.
We ﬁnd that Benevolent Dictators’ beliefs about others’ preferences are
highly, though imperfectly, correlated with their own risk and ambiguity
preferences (Spearman’s rho=0.61, p=0.0006 for risk preferences, Spearman’s
rho =0.50, p=0.009 for ambiguity preferences, Pearson correlation coefﬁ-
cients are 0.48 for risk preferences and 0.61 for ambiguity preferences).14
The estimation of preferences and beliefs allows investigating whether there
exists a relation between these measures and allocation decisions. To test
this we regress allocations to R in distribution problems characterized by
uncertainty on BD’s risk preferences, beliefs about others’ risk preferences,
prior beliefs on the ambiguous event and beliefs about others’ attitude to am-
biguity (the last two variables are interacted with a variable that takes the
value 1 only in decision situation 6 and 7). We also include dummy variables
for gender (the variable takes the value 0 for males and 1 for females) and
for the ability to calculate expected values (the variable takes the value 1 if
the subject could correctly calculate the expected value of a simple lottery;
54% of Benevolent Dictators answered correctly).15
Table 3.6 shows the regression results. We ﬁnd that beliefs about others’
risk preferences, prior beliefs on the ambiguous event, beliefs about others’
priors, gender and the ability to calculate expected values are not signif-
icantly related to allocation decisions. However, allocations to R are nega-
tively and marginally signiﬁcantly related to BD’s own measure of risk aver-
sion α. Hence the more risk averse a BD the more he/she gives to R in risky
distribution problems. We note that the coefﬁcient associated to BD’s risk
attitude remains signiﬁcant when the variable describing beliefs about oth-
ers’ risk preferences is excluded from the regression. Further, when the own
risk preference variable is excluded and the beliefs variable is included, the
14Two outliers believing that others’ priors on the ambiguous event were below 0.12, and
thus extreme, are excluded when calculating correlations for ambiguity preferences. When
they are included both the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient and the Spearman’s rho are equal
to 0.27, p=0.16.
15The following, non-incentivized, question was administered at the end of the experiment:
“We would like to ask you to calculate the expected value of the following lottery: with 50%
chance you earn 20 Euro and with 50% you earn 10 Euro. Please type your answer in the
box below.”
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latter remains insigniﬁcant. We also note that, since own risk preferences
and beliefs about others’ risk preferences are highly correlated, regression
coefﬁcients are only informative regarding the direction and signiﬁcance,
but not the magnitude, of these relations.
Table 3.6: Allocations to R in uncertain distribution problems, OLS
regression.
dependent variable: allocations to R
independent variables coefﬁcient standard error p-value
α -2.21 1.21 0.08
believed α 0.84 0.86 0.34
prior beliefs 0.53 2.23 0.81
believed prior beliefs -0.84 1.56 0.6
female 0.19 0.35 0.58
correct EV 0.59 0.38 0.13
constant 9.81 1.28 0.00
R-squared 0.3
Prob>F 0.001
N 156
Note: Distribution problem dummies included and jointly signiﬁcant. Stan-
dard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered on subjects.
Two subjects that acted randomly are excluded.
Result 3.4.3. BD’s allocations to R in risky distribution problems are posi-
tively and signiﬁcantly related only to BD’s own risk aversion.
To summarize, data from the third part of the experiment reveal the
existence of a signiﬁcant and positive relation between BD’s risk aversion
and her allocations to R in distribution problems characterized by risk.
3.4.1 Fairness ideals
In Section 2 we discussed theories of distributive justice in relation to the in-
vestigated distribution problems and analytically derived four fairness ide-
als. Here we use the derived expressions to compute the four fairness ideals
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at the individual level for each uncertain distribution problem. Finally, we
estimate the distribution of these fairness ideals in our sample.
Consider the two fairness ideals inspired by the principle of Equality.
First, the ex-post equality ideal speciﬁes allocations that minimize the ex-
pected inequality between R’s and C’s ﬁnal earnings. Second, the ex-ante
equality ideal, based on Sen’s weak equity axiom, prescribes that more money
is allocated to the person that derives in expectation less utility from a given
allocation. The expressions for the ex-ante fairness ideal are derived from
the equalization of R’s and C’s expected utilities under the assumption that
these are known. Since Benevolent Dictators in the experiment do not have
information on recipients’ preferences over uncertainty, we need to make
assumptions on the value of α in equation (3.6). We assume that Benevo-
lent Dictators evaluate the nature of R’s position from their own viewpoint.
Alternatively we could assume that Benevolent Dictators use their beliefs
about others’ preferences over uncertainty to compute the fair values of xmR
and xmC . However, our assumption seems reasonable as we observe that BD’s
own risk preferences and beliefs about others’ risk preferences are not signif-
icantly different. Further, we also ﬁnd that only BD’s own risk preferences
explain allocation decisions (see Result 3). Therefore, we proceed by substi-
tuting Benevolent Dictators’ own α in the expression of the ex-ante equality
ideal.
The third fairness ideal is the utilitarian one, which speciﬁes allocations
that maximize total welfare. This fairness ideal is subject to the same is-
sues regarding preferences over uncertainty discussed above. We again pro-
ceed by assuming that the BD is acting in accordance with her own pref-
erences. Fourth, the equity fairness ideal selects allocations that are pro-
portional to the effort exerted in the creation of a joint output. As we only
consider groups where productivity was highest by both R and C, this fair-
ness ideal prescribes an equal split in all distribution problems. Finally,
in order to compute fairness ideals for ambiguous distribution problems we
assume that p6e = p
7
e = 0.5. This assumption is justiﬁed by invoking the prin-
ciple of insufﬁcient reason (Keynes, 1921), which states that if the possible
states of the world are indistinguishable by the decision maker, equal prob-
ability should be assigned to each of them. BD’s allocations in ambiguous
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distribution problems suggest that such an assumption is also empirically
supported. As pointed out earlier (Result 4) allocations are indeed not re-
lated to BD’s elicited prior-beliefs on the ambiguous event. Further, the
mean and median prior-belief are both very close to 0.5 (see the paragraph
on Individual characteristics). Table 3.7 shows the predicted allocations for
all four fairness ideals calculated for the average coefﬁcient of risk aversion
α= 0.77.
Table 3.7: Prescribed allocations to R, α= 0.77.
allocation to R under different fairness ideals
distribution problem ex-post ex-ante utilitarian equity
1-Certainty 8 8 8 8
2-Risk 6.40 8.10 7.60 8
3-Risk 7.10 8.30 7.10 8
4-Risk 5.30 8.90 5.30 8
5-Risk 2.70 10 2.70 8
6-Ambiguity 6.40 8.10 7.60 8
7-Ambiguity 5.30 8.90 5.30 8
The second column of the Table shows that the ex-post ideal requires to
allocate less money to R than to C in all distribution problems; however, the
prescribed allocation to R is not monotonically related to the riskiness of the
distribution problem. Instead, the ex-ante ideal establishes an increasing
relation between R’s compensation and the situations’ riskiness; the values
in column 3 would be even more distant from each other for higher values
of α. Column 4 shows that the utilitarian ideal prescribes monotonically
decreasing allocations to R. Note that for distribution problems 3 to 5 utili-
tarian fairness ideals are equal to ex-post ideals: this is due to the fact that
the experiment parameters are chosen to keep the expected value of an allo-
cation constant across distribution problems and equal between R and C, as
76
3.4. Results
explained in section 3.2.16
This feature is fundamental for the comparability of distribution prob-
lems and to interpret allocations decisions within a speciﬁc problem. Indeed,
if expected values were not constant, allocations could be motivated by ef-
ﬁciency reasons, which we would not be able to separate from distributive
justice considerations in the data.
After computing all the four fairness ideals at the individual level, we
estimate the proportion of allocations consistent with each ideal. To this
end, we assume that:
ymi = x
jm
i +
m
i 
m
i ∼N(0,1) (3.9)
Where ymi is the amount allocated by BD i to R in problem m and x
jm
i
is the amount R should receive in problem m according to fairness ideal j.
Under these assumptions, for each i and for j =Egl, Sen, Util, Eq we cal-
culate the density of ymi assuming a normal distribution with mean x
jm
i .
We then proceed by rescaling the density values at the individual level to
obtain a relative weighted ranking of the ideals. The associated weights
are larger the closets the ideal to the observed allocation and the sum of
all four weights is always equal to 100. All weights are then averaged at
the fairness ideal level: the obtained values can be interpreted as the rel-
ative weight, or importance, of each fairness ideal at the population level.
We choose this procedure because the alternative minimization of squared
residuals neglects the relative distance of ideals to allocations and only al-
lows identifying the best ﬁtting ideal for each allocation decision. In any
case, we ﬁnd very similar results when the fairness ideals are ﬁtted to data
by minimizing squared residuals: results are reported later on in the paper.
Distribution problem 1-Certainty is not included in the estimation of the dis-
tribution of fairness ideals because all four ideals prescribe an equal split of
16When 0<α< 1, we have that xEglR = x
Util
R because:
X
kR +1
=
X
e−
Z
1−α +1
⇔ kR = e
−
Z
1−α ⇔ lnkR = ln e
ln pekαR
α−1 ⇔
(α−1)lnkR = ln pe+ lnk
α
R ⇔ (α−1)lnkR = ln1/kR +α lnkR
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the group account in this problem.
Result 3.4.4. In distribution problems characterized by uncertainty, 21% of
the allocations are consistent with ex-post equality, 29% with ex-ante equality,
17% with utilitarian fairness and 33% with equity.
This result shows that each of the four fairness ideals motivates a sig-
niﬁcant share of allocations.17 18 19 Though one-third of the allocations is
motivated by the equity ideal, which neglects effect of uncertainty on ﬁnal
earnings, the majority of allocations is consistent with fairness ideals that
account for the presence of uncertainty. In order to understand how well the
theoretically speciﬁed ideals ﬁt our data, we calculate for each allocation the
error mi associated to the best ﬁtting fairness ideal.
We ﬁnd that the mean error is very close to 0, namely AC−0.32, the me-
dian error is 0 and 74% of allocations differ from the best ﬁtting ideal by at
most AC1. Hence, we are conﬁdent that a large majority of the observed allo-
cations is very well represented by at least one of the four ideals.20 We also
ﬁnd support for the identiﬁed fairness ideals in the debrieﬁng questionnaire
administered at the end of the experiment. In the appendix we report some
answers Benevolent Dictators gave to the question of how they made their
allocation decisions.
Since mean allocations and allocations’ distributions are related to the
problems’ riskiness, it is an interesting question whether the endorsement of
17When minimizing the sum of squared residuals 23% of the allocations are consistent
with ex-post equality, 25% with ex-ante equality, 12% with utilitarian fairness and 40% with
equity.
18Results change only slightly if we exclude distribution problems characterized by ambi-
guity: 22% of the allocations are consistent with ex-post equality, 28% with ex-ante equality,
18% with utilitarian fairness and 32% with equity.
19The estimated shares only change by few percentage points if different assumptions on
the standard deviation of mi are introduced (for instance, s.d.=2). Importantly, the relative
ranking of fairness ideals is unchanged.
20We also estimate the best ﬁtting ideal at the subject level, that is the ideal that minimizes
the sum of squared residuals over the 6 distribution problems characterized by uncertainty.
We ﬁnd that the allocation choices of 15.4% of the subjects are best represented by the ex-
ante ideal, 15.4% by the ex-post ideal, 26.9% by the utilitarian ideal and the remaining 42.3%
by equity. Two subjects who acted randomly are excluded from the estimation. The mean
residual is AC2.9.
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fairness ideals is also related to the riskiness of the distribution problems.
Figure3.3 shows the relative weight of each fairness ideal at the distribu-
tion problem level. Clearly, the weigh of the ex-post and the ex-ante ideals
changes in a quasi-monotonic and opposite way over the distribution prob-
lems.
Figure 3.3: Relative weight of fairness ideals by distribution problem.
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In particular, when uncertainty is highest, in 5-Risk, on average the eq-
uity ideal together with the ex-post fairness is characterized by the largest
weight (both 34%). Conversely, when uncertainty is relatively low, as in 2-
Risk, the ex-ante ideal gets the largest weight (37%).
Using the Spearman correlation coefﬁcient, for each BD we calculate whether
the weights of a given fairness ideal in the different distribution problems
are correlated to the riskiness of the distribution problems. We ﬁnd that
Benevolent Dictators’ endorsement of ex-post fairness is positively, but in-
signiﬁcantly, correlated with the riskiness of the distribution problem (the
mean correlation coefﬁcient is 0.13, a Wilcoxon test does not allow to reject
the hypothesis that the correlation coefﬁcient is equal to 0, p=0.2) while the
endorsement of ex-ante fairness is negatively and signiﬁcantly related to
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the riskiness of the distribution problem (the mean correlation coefﬁcient is
-0.43, Wilcoxon test p=0.01). Correlation coefﬁcients are negatively but not
signiﬁcantly different than 0 for the utilitarian and the equity ideal (corre-
lation utilitarian ideal -0.18, Wilcoxon test p=0.16, correlation equity ideal
-0.15 Wilcoxon test p=0.21). 21
Result 3.4.5. Subjects’ endorsement of ex-post equality is positively, although
not signiﬁcantly, related to the riskiness of the distribution problem, while
support for ex-ante equality signiﬁcantly decreases with it. Support for the
utilitarian and the equity ideal are not signiﬁcantly related to the riskiness
of the distribution problem.
This implies that the principle of Equality, which is the inspiration for
both the ex-post and the ex-ante equality fairness ideals, is interpreted dif-
ferently depending on the riskiness of the distribution problem. In particu-
lar, when subjects’ ﬁnal positions are moderately risky the largest weight is
on the compensation of the disadvantaged, while concerns for ex-post fair-
ness weigh more when risk can potentially lead to very unequal distribu-
tions. This ﬁnding support the idea that contextual elements inﬂuence jus-
tice ideas (Konow, 2003). Theories of justice are based on general principles
but their actual application requires accounting for the speciﬁcs of the distri-
bution problem at hand, which are subjects’ chances and potential outcomes
in our investigation.
3.5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have used a controlled laboratory experiment to investigate
the allocations of non-involved individuals in distribution problems with and
without uncertainty. We observe that allocations in distribution problems
characterized by uncertainty are highly dispersed compared to a situation
where there is no uncertainty on the ﬁnal distribution of resources. Four
fairness ideals are theoretically endorsed: ex-ante and ex-post equality, util-
itarianism and equity. We ﬁnd that each of the four ideals ﬁts a signiﬁcant
21Results are similar, but more signiﬁcant, when the Pearson correlation coefﬁcient is em-
ployed: the mean correlation coefﬁcient is 0.19, p=0.06, for ex-post fairness, -0.4, p=0.01, for
ex-ante fairness, -0.14, p=0.26, for utilitarianism and -0.05, p=0.54, for equity.
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share of the observed allocations. More than half of the allocations are mo-
tivated by the two fairness ideals inspired by the principle of equality, one
third of the allocations are consistent with the equity principle and 15% with
utilitarianism. In accordance with previous ﬁndings (see Konow, 2000 and
Cappelen, 2011) we observe that Equality is the principle that inspires most
allocations. However, we also observe that its interpretation is related to
the riskiness of the distribution problem. In particular, we ﬁnd that ex-post
equality concerns are more important than ex-ante equality concerns the
higher the riskiness of the distribution problem. Hence, people not only hold
different ideas about fairness, but these ideas also depend on the character-
istics of the situation. We also ﬁnd that individuals believe that others have
similar risk preferences as their own ones and that such preferences inﬂu-
ence allocation decisions. In particular, the higher one’s aversion to risk the
more money is allocated to the subject exposed to uncertainty.
Risk and ambiguity are often found to elicit quite different behavior in in-
dividual choice problems. We do not observe any signiﬁcant effect of these
forms of uncertainty on Benevolent Dictators allocation decisions. We sug-
gest two explanations: ﬁrst, the possible outcomes of the ambiguous distri-
bution problems in our experiment are the same as the outcomes that have
a 50% chance in some of the risky problems we employ. This feature of our
experimental design may have induced subjects to think of the ambiguous
event as a 50-50 prospect. Secondly, when people make decision from an
external viewpoint they act in a normative way and hence treat ambiguity
according to the principle of insufﬁcient reason. This latter interpretation
is supported by the fact that altogether allocation behavior is largely consis-
tent with normative ideas of fairness derived from the theory of distributive
justice. More research is however needed to conﬁrm this interpretation.
The observed heterogeneity of fairness ideals helps explaining why con-
troversies are common in many allocation problems where uncertainty af-
fects people’s ﬁnal outcomes. Disagreement may stem from a normatively
different perspective, that opposes, for instance, utilitarian objectives to a
compensation of the weaker principle. More importantly, our results show
that even though the majority of people is motivated by the ideal of treat-
ing equally deserving people in the same way, the presence of uncertainty
leads to different interpretations of the concept that are taken up in a con-
81
Chapter 3. Fairness and Uncertainty
text dependent way. Some empirical studies show that when people have
stakes in a distribution problem they tend to interpret fairness in a way
that is most beneﬁcial to their own selﬁsh ends (see Babcock et al. 1996,
Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997 and Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido,
2011). Further, self-serving biases seem to emerge especially when informa-
tion on the relation between actions and outcomes can be selectively chosen
or interpreted (see, for instance, Dana et al., 2007). Thus, a natural and
interesting continuation of our study would be to investigate stakeholders’
fairness views and allocation behavior in distribution problems of the type
exposed in this paper. Our results provide a necessary preliminary step in
this direction.
3.6 Appendix
3.6.1 Fairness ideals: analytical derivation
Egalitarianism
min
xmR ,x
m
C
pe
∣∣kRxmR − xmC ∣∣+ (1− pe)
∣∣∣kRxmR − xmC
∣∣∣ s.t. xmR + xmC = X
In order to simplify notation we omit the superscript m which indicates the
decision problem. Substituting the constraint into the equation to minimize
we obtain:
min
xR
pe |kRxR − (X − xR)|+ (1− pe)
∣∣∣kRxR − (X − xR)
∣∣∣
min
xR
pe |xR(kR +1)−X )|+ (1− pe)
∣∣∣xR(kR +1)−X
∣∣∣
case 1 xR ≥ XkR+1
(⇒ xR ≥ XkR+1 )
min
xR
pe[xR(kR +1)−X )]+ (1− pe)[xR(kR +1)−X ]
∂
∂xR
= pe(kR +1)+ (1− pe)(kR +1)> 0⇒
x1R =
X
kR +1
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case 2 xR ≤ XkR+1 (⇒ xR ≤
X
kR+1
)
min
xR
pe[X − xR(kR +1))]+ (1− pe)[X − xR(kR +1)]
∂
∂xR
=−pe(kR +1)− (1− pe)(kR +1)< 0⇒
x2R =
X
kR +1
case 3 XkR+1 ≤ xR ≤
X
kR+1
min
xR
pe[xR(kR +1)−X ]+ (1− pe)[X − xR(kR +1)]
∂
∂xR
= pe(kR +1)− (1− pe)(kR +1)
given that
pe
1− pe
>
kR +1
kR +1
∀pe,kR ,kR ⇒
∂
∂xR
> 0
x3R =
X
kR +1
Since the function to minimize is continuous in xR , increasing for xR ≥
X
kR+1
and decreasing for xR ≤ XkR+1 , it follows that the global minimum is:
xEglR =
X
kR +1
xEglC =
XkR
kR +1
(3.10)
Sen’s weak equity axiom
E[U(xR)]=E[U(xC)] s.t. xR + xC = X
Assuming that U(x)= xα we can rewrite the previous equations as:
pe (xR kR)α+ (1− pe) (xR kR)α = (xC)
α
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pex
α
R k
α
R + (1− pe) x
α
R k
α
R = (X − xR)
α
xαR(pek
α
R + (1− pe)k
α
R)= (X − xR)
α
lnxαR + ln(pek
α
R + (1− pe)k
α
R)= ln(X − xR)
α
By setting ln[pekαR+(1−pe)k
α
R]= Z we can rewrite the previous equation as:
α lnxR +Z =α ln(X − xR)
α(lnxR − ln(X − xR))=−Z
α ln
xR
X − xR
=−Z
xR
X − xR
= e
−Z
α
X
xR
−1= e
Z
α
Hence, the fair allocations to R and C are:
xSenR =
X
e
Z
α +1
xSenC =
X e
Z
α
e
Z
α +1
Utilitarianism
max
xR ,xC
E[U(xR)+U(xC)] s.t. xR + xC = X
Assuming that U(x)= xα we can rewrite the previous equations as:
max
xR
pe(xRkR)α+ (1− pe)(xRkR)α+ (X − xR)α
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Consider the case where 0<α< 1. The ﬁrst order condition is then:
∂
∂xR
= αpekR(xRkR)α−1+ (1− pe)αkR(xRkR)α−1−α(X − xR)α−1 = 0
xα−1R (pek
α
R + (1− pe)k
α
R)= (X − xR)
α−1
lnxα−1R + ln(pek
α
R + (1− pe)k
α
R)= ln(X − xR)
α−1
By setting ln[pekαR+(1−pe)k
α
R]= Z we can rewrite the previous equation as:
lnxα−1R +Z = ln(X − xR)
α−1
(α−1)lnxR +Z = (α−1)ln(X − xR)
ln
X − xR
xR
=
Z
α−1
X
xR
−1= e
Z
α−1
The solution of the maximization problem leads to the following fair al-
locations:
xUtilR =
X
e
Z
α−1 +1
xUtilC =
X e
Z
α−1
e
Z
α−1 +1
Consider now the case where α> 1. The function to maximize is convex
and thus the solution to the maximization problem is:
xUtilR = X x
Util
C = 0
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3.6.2 Answers in the debrieﬁng questionnaire
In the following we provide some examples of the answers provided by Benev-
olent Dictators in the debrieﬁng questionnaire, where they were asked to
shortly explain their allocation decisions. Answers are grouped into four
categories that correspond to the theoretically identiﬁed fairness ideals.
Examples of answers related to ex-ante equality:
“tried to give B a bit more as he has the risk.”
“compensate B with a higher amount to compensate the risk of
him getting 0”
“Since B takes a higher risk, he/she deserves a higher payout to
remedy the risk he/she takes“
Examples of answers related to ex-post equality:
“Since it would be either 5 times the amount or nothing I wanted
to let the amount that B could earn be equal that of C. So I
gave 3 points to B (so that this person could earn 15 Euro) and
the remaining 13 to C. This way the least amount of points was
’wasted’ and could lead to an equal distribution.”
“in case B is rewarded with money, the amount will be multi-
plied by 5. I chose this distribution in order for everyone to have
almost the same outcome”
“My aim was that if B wins, B wont earn much more than C.”
Examples of answers related to utilitarianism:
“Since B has greater possibilities to get 0. I allocate more to C”
“The chance was low for B to win, therefore more money to C.”
Examples of answers related to equity:
“I wanted to give B and C what they earned in their assignment,
so 8 per person. 50% chance of 16 Euro and 50% chance of 0 Euro
will also lead to a average earning of 8 (when repeating it very
often)”
“Both scored the same amount of money. I did not want to punish
C for being selected as C “
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“I always allocated 8 because I thought this was most fair for C
who always got the amount allocated. C earned 8 so I thought it
was good to always grant him that amount. B had some random
events that also inﬂuenced his earnings but since I could not
inﬂuence those, I didn’t take it into account”
3.6.3 Instructions of the experiment
Introduction speech
In this experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. Your
earnings may also depend on chance events and the decisions of other partic-
ipants. At the end of the experiment you will be paid out in cash individually
and conﬁdentially. In order to ensure the highest level of anonymity and con-
ﬁdentiality, the payment will be carried out by a person that is not involved
in this research project. The experimenters cannot link your earnings and
decisions to your identity in any way. During the experiment you are not al-
lowed to communicate in any other way than described in the instructions.
If you have any questions please raise your hand. An experimenter will then
come to you and answer your questions in private. The experiment consists
of 3 parts. You will receive the instructions of a part only after the previous
part has ended.
Part 1
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment you will be randomly matched into groups
of three participants, which will be labeled with the letters A, B and C. In
this part of the experiment the B and C members of a group are asked to
independently perform a task that involves correctly positioning sliders on
a bar. Below you can see the representation of a slider in the initial position
a) and in the correct position b), which is always in the middle of the bar.
The slider is positioned correctly if the number that shows up to the right of
the slider equals 50.
For each correctly positioned slider 0.25 Euro are credited. There are a
total of 32 sliders to be positioned in 6 minutes time, so that B and C can be
credited up to 8 Euro each. After the 6 minutes are over, the credit accumu-
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Figure 3.4: a) initial position of the slider
Figure 3.5: b) correct position of the slider
lated by B and C, who are in the same group, is deposited in a joint group
account. Each member of a group (A, B and C) is then informed about the
total amount in the joint account of their group. A also receives information
about how many sliders were correctly positioned by B and C members in
her or his group.
The task of A and earnings determination for A, B, and C: Person A
earns money for performing a task, which is described below. At the end of
the experiment, the earnings of A will be publicly and randomly determined
by drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards. The earnings of A can be
4.-, 6.-, 10.- or 12.- Euro and each of these earnings are equally likely. Notice
that the earnings of A only depend on chance. In particular, the earnings
of A do in no way depend on the decisions taken by A. Also notice that the
earnings of A are not taken from the joint account.
The task of A is to divide the amount of money in the joint account between
B and C. A is asked to make a division in 7 different decision situations.
At the end of the experiment one out of the 7 decisions will be randomly
selected to determine B and C earnings. Each decision situation is inde-
pendent and equally likely to be the one that determines the earnings of B
and C. Therefore, person A should carefully consider each decision and make
each decision in isolation.
The 7 decision situations differ in the way the amount of money assigned to
B and C translates into earnings for B and C. The table below summarizes
the 7 decision situations and shows how the earnings of B and C are deter-
mined in each decision situation. Notice that during the experiment the 7
decision situations will appear in random order. Please have a look at it.
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Earnings of B Earnings of C
1 allocation to B allocation to C
2 20% chance 5 times allocation to B, 80% times 0 allocation to C
3 50% chance 2 times allocation to B, 50% times 0 allocation to C
4 80% chance 1.25 times allocation to B, 20% times 0 allocation to C
5 50% chance 1.5 times allocation to B, 50% times 0.5 times allocation to B allocation to C
6 unknown chance 2 times allocation to B, unknown chance 0 allocation to C
7 unknown chance 1.5 times allocation to B, unknown chance 0.5 times allocation to B allocation to C
We will now explain each decision situation in detail.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 1 is selected to matter
for payment then the earnings of B are equal to the allocation to B and the
earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 2 is selected to matter
for payment the ﬁnal earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated
to B and on a chance event. The chance event will be the public drawing of
a card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a
number from 1 to 20 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 5 times the
money allocated to B (i.e., 500% of the allocation to B). If a number from 21
to 100 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words,
with 20% chance the earnings of B will be 5 times the allocation to B and
with 80% chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are
equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 3 is selected to matter
for payment the ﬁnal earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated
to B and on a chance event. The chance event will the public drawing of a
card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a
number from 1 to 50 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 2 times the
allocation to B (i.e. 200% of the allocation to B). If a number from 51 to 100
will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with
50% chance the earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation to B and with
50% chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are equal to
the allocation to C.
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If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 4 is selected to matter
for payment the ﬁnal earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated
to B and on a chance event. The chance event will the public drawing of a
card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a
number from 1 to 80 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.25 times
the allocation to B (i.e. 125% of the allocation to B). If a number from 81 to
100 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with
80% chance the earnings of B will be 1.25 times the allocation to B and with
20% chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are equal to
the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 5 is selected to matter
for payment the ﬁnal earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated
to B and on a chance event. The chance event will the public drawing of a
card from a stack of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a
number from 1 to 50 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.5 times
the allocation to B (i.e. 150% of the allocation to B). If a number from 51
to 100 will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation
to B (i.e. 50% of the allocation to B). In other words, with 50% chance the
earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B and with 50% chance the
earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B. The earnings of C are
equal to the allocation to C.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 6 is selected to matter
for payment the ﬁnal earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated
to B and on a chance event. The experimenters will ﬁrst randomly select
black or red to be the winning color. The chance event will then be the
public drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red.
The total number of red and black cards sums up to 100, but neither A nor
B nor C nor the experimenters know how many red cards and how many
black cards are in the stack. If a card with the winning color is drawn the
earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation to B (i.e. 200% of the allocation
to B). If a card with the losing color is drawn then the earnings of B will be
0 Euro. In other words, with an unknown chance the earnings of B will be
2 times the allocation to B and with an unknown chance the earnings of B
will be 0 Euro. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
90
3.6. Appendix
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 7 is selected to matter
for payment the ﬁnal earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated
to B and on a chance event. The experimenters will ﬁrst randomly select
black or red to be the winning color. The chance event will then be the public
drawing of a card from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red. The total
number of red and black cards sums up to 100, but neither A nor B nor C
nor the experimenters know how many red cards and how many black cards
are in the stack. If a card with the winning color is drawn the earnings of
B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 150% of the allocation to B). If a
card with the losing color is drawn then the earnings of B will be 0.5 times
the allocation to B (i.e. 50% of the allocation to B). In other words, with an
unknown chance the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B and
with an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation
to B. The earnings of C are equal to the allocation to C.
If you have any question please raise your hand and an experimenter will
come to answer your question in private. In the following you are asked a
few questions that will help us assessing your understanding of the decision
situations described above. Please ﬁll in the missing ﬁgures. Note, that in
these questions we are not interested in the actual numbers you ﬁll in but
only if you ﬁll them in correctly. During the experiment you will have the
possibility to use a calculator by clicking on the icon in the bottom right
corner of the screen. When you are ready please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come to you to check your answers. Once you are ready
please wait quietly.
Consider decision situation 3 and assume that the total in the joint ac-
count is 16 Euro. If A assigns . . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means
that with. . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with . . .% chance . . . Euro. C
earns . . . Euro.
Consider decision situation 5 and assume that the total in the joint ac-
count is 15 Euro. If A assigns . . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means
that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with . . .% chance . . . Euro. C
earns . . . Euro.
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Consider decision situation 7 and assume that the total in the joint ac-
count is 12 Euro. If A assigns . . . Euro to C and . . . Euro to B, then this means
that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with . . .%chance . . . Euro. C
earns . . . Euro.
Part 2
You are now going to make a series of decisions. These decisions will not
inﬂuence your earnings from the ﬁrst part of the experiment, nor will the
decisions you made in the ﬁrst part of the experiment inﬂuence the earnings
from this part. Furthermore, the decisions you are going to make will only
inﬂuence your own earnings.
You will be confronted with 12 decision situations. All these decision situ-
ations are completely independent of each other. A choice you made in one
decision situation does not affect any of the other following decision situa-
tions.
Each decision situation is displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20
rows. You have to decide for every row whether you prefer option A or option
B. Option A is the same for every row in a given decision situation, while
option B takes 20 different values, one for each row. Note that within a de-
cision situation you can only switch once from option B to option A: if you
switch more than once a warning message will appear on the screen and you
will be asked to change your decisions. By clicking on NEXT you will see
some examples screens of decision situations.
This is a screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to
face. You are not asked to make choices now! Please have a careful look.
Thereafter click on NEXT to proceed.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 1 HERE]
This is another screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are
going to face. If you want to review the previous example click on BACK,
otherwise click on NEXT to proceed.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 2 HERE]
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Determination of earnings At the end of the experiment one of the 12
decision situations will be randomly selected with equal probability. Once
the decision situation is selected, one of the 20 rows in this decision situa-
tion will be randomly selected with equal probability. The choice you have
made in this speciﬁc row will determine your earnings.
Consider, for instance, the ﬁrst screen shot that you have seen. Option A
gives you a 25% chance to earn 16.- Euro and a 75% chance to earn 4.- Euro.
Option B is always a sure amount that ranges from 16.- Euro in the ﬁrst row,
to 4.60 Euro in the 20th row. Suppose that the 12th row is randomly selected.
If you would have selected option B, you would receive 9.40 Euro. If, instead,
you would have selected option A, the outcome of the lottery determines your
earnings. At the end of the experiment the lottery outcome will be publicly
determined by randomly drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards.
Consider now the second screen shot that you have seen. Option A gives you
an unknown chance to earn 12.- Euro and an unknown chance to earn 4.-
Euro. Option B is always a lottery that gives you different chances to earn
12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. Suppose that the 10th row is randomly selected. If you
would have selected option B, you would receive 12.- Euro with 55% chance
and 4.- Euro with 45% chance. If, instead, you would have selected option A,
a stack of red and black cards would be used at the end of the experiment to
determine whether you earn 12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. This stack of cards will
be the same that has been described in part 1: recall that the exact number
of black cards and the exact number of red cards in the stack are unknown
to you and to us as well. You would earn 12.- Euro if a card of the winning
color is drawn and 4.- Euro otherwise.
Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be the one
that is relevant for your earnings. Therefore, you should view each decision
independently and consider all your choices carefully. If you like to, you can
review the examples screens once more by clicking on BACK. If you have
any questions please raise your hand. When you are ready, please press the
BEGIN button below.
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Part 3
In the following you are asked to estimate the choices made by one of your
group members in 6 decision situations of the second part of the experiment.
After having made these estimates you will answer a questionnaire and then
the experiment will be over.
You are going to be randomly matched to one of your group members. For a
certain decision situation you are asked to indicate which is the last row
where you believe your matched group member chooses option B before
switching to option A. You earn 1 Euro if you correctly indicate the switching
point of your matched group member in a certain decision situation. There-
fore, you can earn up to 6 Euro in total. If the true switching point of your
matched group member is different from the point you indicated you earn
nothing.
If you do not want to indicate a single switching point you can indicate a
range of values where you think the switching point of your matched group
member lies. If the true switching point lies in this range of values you will
earn a positive amount smaller than 1 Euro. The exact amount you earn is
calculated according to a formula. The formula captures the idea that earn-
ings are inversely related to the length of the interval you indicate. This
means that the larger the interval you indicate the smaller your potential
earnings are. This formula also guarantees that your earnings are maxi-
mized if you truthfully indicate your estimate. If the true switching point
of your counterpart lies outside the interval you indicate you earn nothing.
Please click on NEXT to view an example.
This is a screen shot of a typical screen that you are going to see. Assume,
for instance, that you believe that your matched group member chooses op-
tion B for the last time when option B is equal to 6.- Euro. In such a case,
you would type the number 6 in both boxes at the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member may switch
from option B to option A when option B takes any value between 8.- Euro
and 4.50 Euro. In such a case, you would type the number 8 in the ﬁrst box
and the number 4.50 in the second box. Notice that you earn nothing if you
type in two values that cover all possible switching points, in this case if you
type in 10 and 0.50.
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If you have any question please raise your hand. Otherwise click on NEXT
to proceed.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 3 HERE]
This is another screen shot of a typical screen that you are going to face.
Assume, for instance, that you believe that your matched group member
chooses option B for the last time when option B gives a chance of 40% to
win 12.- Euro. In such a case, you would type the number 40 in both boxes
at the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member switches
from option B to option A when the winning chance of option B is between
70% and 25%. In such a case, you would type the number 70 in the ﬁrst box
and the number 25 in the second box. Notice that you earn nothing if you
type in two values that cover all possible switching points, that is if you type
in 100 and 5.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 4 HERE]
If you have any question please raise your hand. If you want to review
the previous examples once more click on BACK. Otherwise, click on BEGIN
to start the third part of the experiment.
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Chapter 4
Generosity in the Face of
Uncertainty
4.1 Introduction
Experimental research has demonstrated that the actions of a large part
of the population are inconsistent with the classical assumption of materi-
alistic, self-interested agents (Camerer, 2003). This evidence has been of-
ten interpreted as a concern for the well being of others and consequently
economists started including sentiments like reciprocity, altruism and in-
equality aversion into utility analysis. Notwithstanding the fact that ex-
pressions like ‘social preferences’ are by now part of the economic jargon,
the robustness of such type of preferences has been recently put into ques-
tion. Indeed, a few experimental studies have shown that subjects’ behavior
is sensitive to variations in the environment in a way that is not predicted
by interdependent utility models.
For instance, Dana, Cain, and Dawes (2006) demonstrate that roughly one
third of individuals prefer to receive $9 instead of playing a dictator game
over $10 with an anonymous recipient. Similarly, Broberg, Ellingsen and Jo-
hannesson (2007) elicit reservation prices for exiting the dictator game and
ﬁnd that roughly two-thirds of the subjects are willing to accept less than
100 percent of the dictator endowment in order to opt out. In a variant of
the dictator game Dana, Weber and Kuang (2007) show that many dictators
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avoid costless information about the consequences that their decision has on
the recipient’s payoff and as a result, act more selﬁshly when compared to
the baseline game. Lastly, Haisley and Weber (2010) implement two treat-
ment variations of the dictator game where the recipients’ ﬁnal outcomes
could be either subject to risk or ambiguity. They ﬁnd that otherwise ambi-
guity averse dictators adopt favorable views of ambiguity and retain on av-
erage larger amounts of money than in the risky treatment, even though the
objective distribution of outcomes is the same in the risky and in the ambigu-
ous treatment. Altogether these studies suggest that generosity decreases in
environments where relevant information can be avoided or interpreted in a
self-serving manner. As a consequence, giving behavior in standard dictator-
game experiments may not be the expression of, for instance, a preference
for equality. Rather, giving may be the product of internalized sharing norms
that constrain people’s real goal of pursuing their own material interest (Ra-
bin, 1995). A couple of theoretical papers formally introduce this intuition in
decision making models. In Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) giving depends
on observability: assuming that in the dictator game the generosity norm is
the equal split, the model predicts that the greater the dictator’s anonymity
the more she can behave selﬁshly. Konow (2000) develops a model where
deviations from a fairness norm are possible through costly self deception.
As a consequence, it is predicted that in dictator games individuals act more
selﬁshly the more the experimental set-up allows searching for arguments
to support unfair allocations.
In this paper we report the results of an experiment designed to investi-
gate people’s generous behavior in situations where the ﬁnal distribution
of outcomes largely depends on events that are uncertain at the time when
resources are allocated. In particular, we focus on how people’s willingness
to sacriﬁce their own material payoffs to achieve more equitable outcomes
depends on their and others’ different exposure to uncertainty. The exper-
imental design we employ reproduces the characteristics of many decision
situations in the real world. For instance, most of our choices have conse-
quences that span into the future, which is inherently uncertain. Further,
although we may know our and others’ risk exposure, we cannot know which
state out of many risky ones will materialize. Some of the reviewed litera-
ture suggests that uncertainty may encourage self-serving interpretations
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of fairness and thereby weaken individuals’ willingness to share resources.
However, in order to test the self-serving bias hypothesis, we need to account
for the fact that in non-standard situations, like the ones we study, norms
different than the equal split may apply. If people hold different fairness
norms, interpreting giving behavior without taking this heterogeneity into
account may not be informative regarding individuals’ self-serving tenden-
cies. To address this issue, we exploit the results of the experiment described
in Chapter 3 where non-involved subjects had to make allocations in distri-
bution problems with the same characteristics as those employed in this
study. The experiment allowed us to identify a set of fairness norms and to
estimate their distribution in the population. The existence of self-serving
biases is then tested by comparing the distribution of fairness norms among
non-involved individuals to the one estimated among involved dictators.1
At the beginning of our experiment participants are matched in pairs;
one participant is assigned the role of dictator (D), the other the role of re-
cipient (R). Thereafter, both D and R individually work on a real effort task
by which they earn money that is deposited in a pair-joint account. D is
then asked to allocate the money in the joint account between himself and
R in several distribution problems characterized by different forms of un-
certainty, knowing that one will be selected for payment at the end of the
experiment. Two treatments are implemented: in the ﬁrst treatment D al-
ways earns exactly what he allocates to himself, while the ﬁnal earnings of
R are uncertain and can be larger or smaller than his allocation, depending
on which state is realized after the division. From now onwards we refer to
this treatment as to TUR, that stands for Treatment-Uncertain-Recipient.
The converse happens in the second treatment. There, D’s ﬁnal earnings are
uncertain while R earns exactly what is allocated to him by D. Hence, we re-
fer to this treatment as TUD, Treatment-Uncertain-Dictator. The degree of
uncertainty affecting D’s or R’s ﬁnal earnings is varied across distribution
problems but the expected value of a given allocation stays constant. In the
last part of the experiment data on participants’ attitude to uncertainty and
1The importance of accounting for heterogeneous distribution norms to understand giving
behavior has been highlighted by some recent papers. See, for example, Cappelen, Sorensen
and Tungodden (2007), Cappelen, Konow, Sorensen and Tungodden (2011) and Krupka and
Weber (2008).
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beliefs about others’ attitudes are collected.
We observe that dictators’ generosity is independent of whether the dictator
himself or the recipient faces earnings’ uncertainty. Further, in both treat-
ments dictators are least generous when uncertainty is highest. We ﬁnd
evidence of self-serving biased giving behavior when uncertainty affects dic-
tators’ earnings but not when the recipient’s earnings are uncertain. More-
over, in the latter case we observe that dictators’ generosity increases with
their own aversion to risk.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. In the following section
4.2 the experimental design is described in detail. In section 4.3 results on
dictators’ allocation behavior are presented. In section 4.4 fairness norms
are discussed and their distribution is estimated. In section 4.5 conclud-
ing remarks are drawn. The experiment’s instructions are provided in the
Appendix.
4.2 The experiment
The experiment consists of three parts. In the ﬁrst part of the experiment
subjects are divided in pairs and are randomly assigned the role of Dictator
(D) or Recipient (R). Thereafter all subjects work on a real effort task and
the money earned by each pair of subjects is deposited in a joint account.
In the second part of the experiment every Dictator is asked to split the
money in the joint account between himself and the Recipient. In the third
and last part, all subjects face a series of incentivized choices that allow
us to estimate their preferences for uncertainty and beliefs about others’
preferences. In what follows the experiment is described in detail.
Part 1: the real effort task After everyone takes a seat at the designated
computer station, participants are informed that the experiment consists of
three parts. Thereafter, the instructions for the ﬁrst and second part are
distributed and read aloud by the experimenter. Participants are then ran-
domly matched in groups of two: one group member is assigned the role
of Dictator, the other the role of Recipient2. In the ﬁrst part of the experi-
2In the experiment subjects are assigned the more neutral labels A and B.
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ment all subjects work individually on a real effort task. The real effort task
consists of a single screen displaying 32 sliders on horizontal bars (Gill and
Prowse, 2011). Each slider can be moved at any point of the bar for an un-
limited number of times and the actual position of a slider is displayed to the
right of the bar. A slider is correctly positioned when the number 50 pops
up at the right of the bar, that is when the slider is exactly at the middle
of it. Each subject’s “score" in the task is the number of sliders positioned
at 50 in 6 minutes time. During the task subjects view their current score
and the amount of time remaining on the top of the screen. We chose the
slider task because it is easy to explain and to understand, identical across
repetitions and has no scope for guessing. Performance in the slider task
is incentivized. For each correctly positioned slider AC0.25 are credited, so
that subjects can credit up to AC8 each. After the time for the task has ex-
pired, D and R view the performance of the other subject in the pair and the
total amount of money generated by such performance. The total amount
of money, X , is deposited in a pair-joint account. We chose the number of
sliders on the screen and the available time to complete the task such that
maximum performance is easily achievable. In this way, dictators and recip-
ients in the same group would only differ in their exposure to uncertainty,
thereby excluding the possibility that productivity differences affect D’s gen-
erosity.
Part 2: allocation decisions In the second part of the experiment D has
to divide the amount in the group account between himself and R, who is not
active in this phase. D has to make a division in n= 7 distribution problems.
Distribution problem 1-Certainty is the same in both treatments: D’s and
R’s ﬁnal earnings correspond to the distribution of the money in the joint
account made by D. Hence, this distribution problem differs from a standard
dictator game only by the fact that the amount to divide is the product of D’s
and R’s efforts in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. In the following we refer
to 1-Certainty also as the baseline distribution problem.
Treatments are different with respect to how uncertainty affects D’s and
R’s earnings. In TUR D’s ﬁnal earnings are equal to the share of X that
D allocates to himself, while the ﬁnal earnings of R depend both on the
share allocated to him as well as on the realization of one of two possible
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uncertain events. Conversely, in TUD D’s ﬁnal earnings are subject to un-
certainty, while R earns exactly what has been allocated to him by D. In
distribution problems characterized by uncertainty we distinguish between
uncertain events whose probability is known, that is risky events, and un-
certain events whose likelihood is unknown, that is ambiguous events. We
set the parameters such that in all distribution problems the expected value
of a given allocation is constant. However, in TUR (TUD) in all distribution
problems n< 6 the earnings of R (D) are riskier in distribution problem n+1
than in distribution problem n. Hence, this set up allows studying the effect
of different degrees of uncertainty on dictators’ generosity without the con-
founding effects that differences in the expected value of an allocation would
introduce. Table 4.1 shows the characteristics of each distribution problem.
Consider, for instance, distribution problem 4-Risk. In TUR (TUD) the ﬁnal
earnings of R (D) are twice his share of X with 50% chance and are zero with
50% chance. Distribution problem 7-Ambiguity offers the same possible out-
comes: in TUR (TUD) the ﬁnal earnings of D (R) may be doubled or may be
zero, but this time likelihoods are unknown.
Table 4.1: Distribution problems.
TUR TUD
Problem D’s earnings R’s earnings D’s earnings R’s earnings
1-Certainty y1 X − y1 y1 X − y1
2-Risk y2 0.5 : (X − y2)1.5, (X − y2)0.5 0.5 : y21.5, y20.5 X − y2
3-Risk y3 0.8 : (X − y3)1.25, (X − y3)0 0.8 : y31.25, y30 X − y3
4-Risk y4 0.5 : (X − y4)2, (X − y4)0 0.5 : y42, y40 X − y4
5-Risk y5 0.2 : (X − y5)5, (X − y5)0 0.2 : y55, y50 X − y5
6-Ambiguity y6 p : (X − y6)1.5, (X − y6)0.5 p : y61.5, y60.5 X − y6
7-Ambiguity y7 p : (X − y7)2, (X − y7)0 p : y72, y70 X − y7
Note: yn indicates the amount D keeps for himself, X − yn the amount allocated to R
In the experiment distribution problems appear on the computer screen
one at a time. The order of appearance is randomized in each pair level.
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At the end of the experiment one problem is randomly selected to be rele-
vant for payment. For that a stack of cards numbered from 1 to 100 is used
to determine earnings in risky distribution problems. For instance, if R or
D faces a 50% chance of doubling his allocation, his allocation is eventually
doubled only if a card with a number smaller than 51 is drawn. In order
to operationalize ambiguity, a stack of 100 cards colored black and red is
used. Neither the participants nor the experimenter knows the exact color
composition of the stack, and each participant is free to choose his/her win-
ning color at the beginning of the experiment. This procedure is described
in details in the instructions that are distributed before the start of the ex-
periment. The determination of earnings took place publicly at the end of
the experiment so that subjects could witness how the chance devices were
operated.
Part 3: Elicitation of individual characteristics In the last part of the
experiment we gather data on individual characteristics that may be related
to dictators’ allocation decisions.
First of all, we measure risk preferences. Participants’ certainty equiva-
lents are elicited for 6 two outcomes lotteries. Table 4.2 shows the outcomes
and the probabilities employed. For each lottery subjects see a screen on the
computer that contains a description of the lottery and a list of 20 equally
spaced sure amounts, ranging from the lottery’s highest to lowest outcome.
In order to facilitate comprehension, likelihoods are expressed both in per-
centage points and with a pie chart. In each row of the decision screen sub-
jects have to make a choice between the lottery and the sure amount. Sub-
jects are not allowed to switch back and forth between the sure amount and
the lottery, which guarantees a unique switching point. Certainty equiva-
lents are then calculated as the arithmetic mean of the smallest sure amount
preferred to the lottery and the next higher sure amount on the list.
We chose the above lotteries in order to measure risk preferences for the
range of outcomes that are relevant in the distribution problems of the ﬁrst
part. In particular, note that all the ﬁrst 4 lotteries in the table have an
expected value of AC8 and are characterized by the same probability values
that appear in the risky distribution problems. Lottery 5 and 6 provide ad-
ditional information on risk preferences in the relevant range of outcomes.
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Table 4.2: Lotteries for risk preferences elicitation.
Lottery p1 x1 x2
1 0.20 40 0
2 0.50 16 0
3 0.80 10 0
4 0.50 12 4
5 0.25 16 4
6 0.33 12 0
Note: p1 is the probability of
winning ACx1.
As two distribution problems are characterized by ambiguity, we also elicit
subjects’ attitude to it. To this end, subjects face 6 decision screens where
they make choices between an ambiguous and a series of 20 risky lotteries
(see Figure 4.1). All risky lotteries on a decision screen are characterized
by the same outcomes pair x1 and x2, which are those in Table 4.2. The
ﬁrst risky lottery on the list is degenerate and guarantees the high outcome:
moving down the list the likelihood of the lottery’s high outcome decreases
by 5%, while the likelihood of the low outcome increases by 5%. In each
decision screen, subjects can switch only once from the risky to the ambigu-
ous lottery. Thus, the switching point provides an interval for a subject’s
belief about the likelihood of the ambiguous event. As in the ﬁrst part of the
experiment, ambiguity is generated with a deck of red and black cards in
unknown color composition.
At the end of the experiment one of the 12 decision screens (6 for the elic-
itation of risk preferences, 6 for the elicitation of ambiguity attitude) and one
row within the selected decision screen are randomly selected for payment.
The relevant lottery is then publicly played out and earnings are added to
those of the ﬁrst part.
Lastly, we investigate subjects’ beliefs about others’ risk and ambiguity pref-
erences. In order to do so, we ask subjects to estimate the choices made by
the other person in the pair in 4 risky and 2 ambiguous decision screens.
Rather than eliciting a point belief, for each of the 6 decision screens a par-
ticipant is asked to estimate the interval that contains the switching point of
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Figure 4.1: Screen shot of the ambiguity attitude elicitation task.
the other person. A unique switching point can be indicated as well. The be-
lief elicitation is incentivized using the interval scoring rule (Schlag and Van
der Weele, 2009). The rule works as follows: if the true switching point of the
other person in the pair lies within the indicated interval, the subject earns
an amount that is inversely related to the length of the indicated interval.
If the true switching point lies outside the indicated interval, the subject
earns nothing. The interval scoring rule has two advantages compared to
other scoring rules that either elicit point beliefs or the whole distribution.
First, it is less time consuming and cognitively demanding for subjects than,
for example, the quadratic scoring rule. Second, it allows inferences that are
valid under any degree of subjects’ risk aversion and not only when subjects
are risk neutral (Schlag and Van der Weele, 2009). After the incentivized
tasks subjects are asked a few basic background questions. Thereafter, sub-
jects are paid out conﬁdentially in cash and dismissed.
In total 158 students from Maastricht University participated in the com-
puterized experiment which was conducted in February 2010 and in June
2011 in the Behavioral and Experimental Lab (BEElab) at the Maastricht
University School of Business and Economics, using the Z-Tree software
(Fischbacher, 2007). 80% of the subjects were enrolled in the School of Busi-
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ness and Economics and the remaining 20% were enrolled in other faculties,
such as law, medicine and arts. 48% of the subjects were male. The average
age was 24 years. The experiment lasted approximately 75 minutes and the
average earnings per subject were AC22.
4.3 Results
The real effort task and D’s allocation behavior We exclude 6 sub-
jects who revealed in the debrieﬁng questionnaire that they made mistakes
in the allocation decisions.3 In the production phase, the performance of
both D and R was maximally in 64 of 71 pairs in TUR and in 67 of 72 pairs
in TUD. In the following analysis we focus on those pairs with maximum
performance because we want to rule out the effects that differences in pro-
duction may have on D’s allocation decisions. In consequence, in all the
analyzed pairs the amount in the joint account is equal to AC16.
The histograms in Figure 4.2 show the distribution of the Euro amount D
keeps for him/herself in problem 1-Certainty. The vertical thin line indicates
the average amount D keeps. As suggested by the histograms, the amount
kept by D is not signiﬁcantly different between TUR and TUD (Mann-Whitney
test p=0.81). This is an expected result given that this distribution problem
has the same characteristics in both treatments. The histograms also show
that our results are in line with what is usually observed in standard dicta-
tor games: dictators never keep less than the equal split, a substantial share
of dictators choose the equal split and more than 30% of the dictators keep
all the amount in the joint account.
The histograms in Figure 4.3 show the distribution of the amount D
keeps for himself in the 4 distribution problems characterized by risk. In
both treatments the mean allocation does not change much with the distri-
bution problems. Indeed, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences when pair-wise
comparing all distribution problems within a treatment using the Wilcoxon
test and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.4 However in TUR the median amount
3These subjects allocated more money to the recipient than to themselves in all, or almost
all, distribution problems.
4The results of all statistical test can be found in the Appendix. We correct for multiple
comparisons with the “false discovery rate” method (Benjamini and Hochberg, 1995).
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Figure 4.2: Distribution problem 1-Certainty.
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D keeps for himself increases with the riskiness of R’s ﬁnal earnings. The
higher the risk the less frequent equal splits are and the more frequently
dictators take all the money in the joint account. In TUD D’s allocation
behavior is not clearly related to the riskiness of the distribution problem.
However notice that selﬁsh behavior increases in the distribution problem
where D’s earnings are subject to the highest risk, that is in 5-Risk. Also
notice that differently than in 1-Certainty, in distribution problems charac-
terized by risk some dictators keep less than AC8, the equal split amount.
To further investigate individuals’ allocation behavior, we calculate for
each D the Spearman-correlation coefﬁcient between the amount he/she keeps
and the rank of the risky problems according to second order stochastic
dominance. Figure 4.4 shows how the Spearman-correlation coefﬁcients are
distributed in the two treatments.5 In TUR the average correlation coefﬁ-
cient is positive (0.24) and signiﬁcantly different from zero (Wilcoxon test
p=0.001). Differently stated, in TUR the dictator is less generous the higher
the uncertainty of the recipient’s ﬁnal earnings. In TUD the average cor-
relation coefﬁcient is −0.02, which is not signiﬁcantly different from zero
5The high percentage of zeros in both treatments is mainly due to the fact that some
dictators keep the whole amount in the joint account in all distribution problems.
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Figure 4.3: Distribution problems characterized by uncertainty.
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according to the Wilcoxon test.
Result 4.3.1. When recipients’ earnings are risky, individuals’ generosity is
on average inversely related to the earnings’ risk. No clear trend is observed
when the earnings of the giver are risky. In both type of situations, selﬁsh
behavior is most frequent when earnings’ risk is highest.
A last observation concerns distribution problems characterized by am-
biguity. For a given allocation, 6-Ambiguity and 7-Ambiguity potentially
yield the same outcomes as 2-Risk and 4-Risk, respectively. However, the
outcomes’ likelihoods are known only for the risky problems. Hence, in light
of the abundant literature on ambiguity aversion (see Camerer and Weber,
1994) and on the results in Haisley and Weber (2004) reviewed in the In-
troduction, we hypothesized that dictators would act more selﬁshly in the
ambiguous distribution problems as compared to their risky counterparts.
However, in both treatments we observe no statistically signiﬁcant differ-
ences between allocations in ambiguous and risky distribution problems.
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Figure 4.4: Spearman-correlation of D’s allocations and distribution problems.
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The p-value of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test is at least 0.12.
Individual characteristics In the third part of the experiment partic-
ipants make several decisions that allow estimating their attitude to risk
and ambiguity. As we are interested in investigating possible relations be-
tween dictators’ preferences for uncertainty and their generous behavior, in
the following we exclusively focus on dictators.
First, recall the six decision screens where subjects choose between a risky
lottery and a list of varying sure amounts. Using subjects’switching points
we calculate dictators’ certainty equivalent for each lottery and assume a
CRRA utility function for money U(x) = xα, where 0 < α < 1 indicates risk
averse, α = 1 indicates risk neutral and α > 1 risk seeking preferences. We
then estimate the parameter value of α for each D by minimizing the sum of
squared distances (Wakker, 2008 and Wakker, 2010). That is;
min
α
6∑
i=1
(l i− cei)2
where l i is the expected utility value of lottery i and cei is the expected util-
ity value of the certainty equivalent of lottery i. To correct for heteroscedas-
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ticity prospects are normalized to uniform length. We ﬁnd that the average
D is characterized by α = 0.79, (s.d(α) = 0.30, median α = 0.82), which indi-
cates a moderate aversion to risk.
Second, recall the 6 decision screens where subjects have to make choices
between an ambiguous lottery and several risky ones. Assuming Subjective
Expected Utility theory (Savage, 1954) choices in these decision screens al-
low eliciting an interval containing D’s prior belief on the ambiguous event.
We take the midpoint of this interval to be D’s prior belief. As the ambigu-
ous event is always the same in all the decision screens, subjects should
consistently reveal the same prior belief in all screens. Pair-wise compar-
isons of elicited prior beliefs show that subjects indeed hold quite consistent
beliefs.6 For each D we construct a variable called ‘prior-belief ’ that is the
average of the prior beliefs elicited in the six decision screens. Dictators’
mean prior-belief is equal to 0.44 (s.d.=0.1, median prior-belief=0.45). That
is, on average D believes that the probability of the ambiguous event is very
close to 45%. Since ambiguity aversion can be described as a pessimisti-
cally biased belief about the ambiguous event, we conclude that on average
D is only slightly averse to ambiguity. In the last part of the experiment
subjects are asked to provide their best estimate of the choices made by
the other person in the pair in 4 risky and 2 ambiguous decision screens.
Taking the midpoint of the interval indicated by a subject we calculate the
believed certainty equivalents for risky lotteries and the believed prior be-
liefs on the ambiguous event. We ﬁnd that these beliefs measures are highly
and signiﬁcantly correlated with individuals’ own preferences (Spearman’s
rho ≥ 0.45, p-value< 0.001 for all beliefs measures). In order to investigate
whether dictators’ allocation decisions are related to individuals’ observable
characteristics we run a regression analysis. As explanatory variables we
include distribution problem dummies, a gender dummy and the variables
that measure individuals’ risk preferences and attitude to ambiguity (the
last variable is interacted with a dummy that takes value 1 in ambiguous
distribution problems). We also include a dummy variable for the ability to
calculate expected values (the variable takes the value 1 if the subject could
correctly calculate the expected value of a simple lottery: 73% of Dictators
6Only two of the ﬁfteen pair-wise comparisons reveal signiﬁcant differences according to
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test.
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answered correctly).7 Variables measuring individuals’ beliefs about others’
preferences are not included as they are highly correlated with measured
preferences. We consider each treatment separately because risk prefer-
ences may differently inﬂuence dictators’ generosity in the two treatments.
We ﬁnd that in TUR the amount D keeps for himself is positively and signiﬁ-
cantly related to D’s own α. One interpretation of this result is that dictators
in TUR show some empathy for R’s condition. The higher a dictator’s own
aversion to risk the more he is generous to R, who faces risk. We also observe
that the amount kept by dictators in TUR increases with their ability to cor-
rectly calculate the expected value of a lottery. Generosity is thus weaker
when the conditions affecting R’s earnings are correctly understood. The re-
gressions coefﬁcients associated to the remaining explanatory variables are
all insigniﬁcant. Dictators’ generosity in TUD is not related to any of the
considered explanatory variables. All regression results are reported in the
Appendix.
Result 4.3.2. When recipients are exposed to risk, individuals’ generosity
increases with their aversion to risk and decreases with their ability to com-
prehend expected values. Individuals’ generosity appears to be unaffected by
observable characteristics when their own earnings are uncertain.
4.4 Fairness norms
In this section we present the different fairness norms that dictators may en-
dorse when making distribution decisions. The section is based on Chapter
3, where we theoretically and experimentally investigated fairness norms
in distribution problems characterized by uncertainty. In the experiment a
subject, the so called benevolent dictator (Konow, 2000), was asked to di-
vide a certain amount of money between two equally deserving recipients,
himself having no stakes in the amount to be divided. The same type of
distribution problems as in this experiment were employed. In all prob-
lems, the ﬁnal earnings of one of the recipients were uncertain while the
7The following, non-incentivized, question was administered at the end of the experiment:
“We would like to ask you to calculate the expected value of the following lottery: with 50%
chance you earn 20 Euro and with 50% you earn 10 Euro. Please type your answer in the
box below.”
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ﬁnal earnings of the other were safe. In order to understand which fairness
norms motivate allocations, we ﬁrst selected theories of distributive justice
that can be applied to the studied distribution problems. We identiﬁed four
theoretical fairness norms: ex-post equality, ex-ante equality, equity and
utilitarianism. The ex-post equality fairness norm is based on the idea of
minimizing outcome inequalities after uncertainty has been resolved. The
implication of this norm for our experiment is that the share allocated to in-
dividuals facing earnings uncertainty should always be smaller than that of
individuals whose earnings are safe. The fairness norm of ex-ante equality
reﬂects the idea that individuals should enjoy the same utility in expecta-
tion, that is before the uncertainty affecting ﬁnal earnings is resolved. More
precisely, under the assumption of risk averse (seeking) preferences, the ex-
ante fairness norm prescribes to compensate individuals facing uncertain
(sure) earnings. The utilitarian fairness norm delivers allocations that max-
imize total welfare. Hence, this norm prescribes to allocate a larger share of
the total to the individual whose earnings are certain (uncertain) depending
on weather the fairness norm is interpreted by risk averse (seeking) individ-
uals. Lastly, the fairness norm inspired by equity prescribes that the total is
equally split, irrespective of the uncertainty affecting a recipient’s earnings.
Each fairness norm produces individual-level predictions on allocations.8
We indicate with yR the fair allocation of the individual facing earnings’
uncertainty and with yC the fair allocation of the individual whose earn-
ings are certain. Table 4.3 shows the relation between yR and yC and how
allocations depend on the riskiness of the distribution problem. Note that
each fairness norm prescribes the equal split, X2 , in the baseline distribution
problem 1-Certainty.
In Chapter 3 we estimated for each benevolent dictator (BD) which of the
four fairness norms represents his allocation behavior best by minimizing
the distance between predicted and observed allocations. We found that
15.5% of benevolent dictators are best represented by the ex-post and the ex-
ante fairness norm respectively, 27% are best represented by the utilitarian
fairness norm and the remaining 42% by the equity norm. In the following
section we estimate the distribution of fairness norm types among dictators
8The details on the analytical derivation of the fairness norms can be found in Chapter 3.
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Table 4.3: Fairness Norms.
relation of yR to yC relation of yR to riskiness
ex-post equality yR < X2 < yC non-monotonic
ex-ante equality yR > X2 > yC increasing
utilitarian yR < X2 < yC decreasing
equity yR = X2 = yC constant
Note: the above relations hold assuming risk aversion.
in TUR and TUD. The distribution of fairness types in the two treatments is
then compared to the one in the Benevolent Dictator game to investigate if
the endorsement of a certain fairness norm depends on whether the decision
maker has stakes in the distribution problem.
4.4.1 Decision making model and estimation
Cappelen et al. (2007) propose that a dictator is motivated by the desire to
act fairly but also wants to maximize his own material payoff. We follow
this approach and assume that the utility function of a dictator in a given
distribution problem is characterized by:9
U(y; ·)= γy−
β(y−k j)2
2X
(4.1)
where y is the amount the dictator keeps for himself, γ > 0 is a parameter
indicating how much importance D gives to material payoffs, β≥ 0 indicates
how much weight is given to fairness considerations and k j is the fairness
9Drawing on some existing models of social preferences, Cappelen et al. (2011) have pro-
posed two alternative formulations of the utility function in (4.1). The ﬁrst, an extension
of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), delivers extreme
predictions: a dictator keeps either everything or an amount exactly equal to his fair share.
Given that in distribution problem 1-Certainty the allocation behavior of approximately 40%
of dictators does not meet these predictions, we do not test this approach any further. The
second formulation is a variation of the Bolton-Ockenfels utility function (Bolton and Ock-
enfels, 2000) and only differs from the one in (4.1) in that it assumes that dictators keep
more the larger the total amount to be divided, X . Since we focus on situations where X
is the same in all dictator-recipient pairs, this formulation does not add to the prediction
formulated above.
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norm endorsed by D. The maximization of the function in (4.1) yields the
following interior solution:
y∗ = k j+ (γ/β)X (β≥ 0) (4.2)
Equation (4.2) indicates that a dictator takes at least what she considers to
be the fairness norm, k j, in the situation and possibly an additional amount
that depends on how much weight she attributes to fairness concerns rela-
tive to selﬁsh ends. A dictator characterized by a β = 0 ﬁnds it optimal to
always keep the entire amount X . For future estimation purposes, we intro-
duce a variable θ : γ/β. The more self-interested a dictator, the higher the
value of θ. We, therefore, refer to θ as the selﬁshness parameter. Introduc-
ing risk preferences in the utility function proposed in 4.1 is not straightfor-
ward. We do this by allowing k j to depend on the dictator’s own risk attitude
(see the derivation of fairness norms in Chapter 3) but, for tractability rea-
sons, we assume that utility is linearly increasing in the amount kept by the
dictator.10
4.4.2 Estimates of the decision making model
In what follows we seek to estimate, for each dictator, which of the four dis-
cussed fairness norms represents his/her allocation decisions best. Knowing
the distributions of fairness norms in TUR and TUD and comparing them to
the one estimated for Benevolent Dictators, we will be able to test whether
dictators adopt fairness norms in a self serving way.
We assume that dictators choose allocations in order to maximize their util-
ity but allow dictators to make mistakes in their decisions. Therefore, we
estimate:
yi n = k
j
i n+θi X +i n (4.3)
where yi n is the amount dictator i keeps for himself in distribution prob-
lem n, k ji n is the fair share of i in problem n according to the fairness norm j
and θi is the individual selﬁshness parameter. The last term in the equation
10Other formulations, for example assuming a CRRA utility function for money, would
largely complicate our estimation exercise without adding much realism to the utility repre-
sentation.
118
4.4. Fairness norms
captures the idea that dictators may make mistakes when choosing alloca-
tions, where we assume in ∼N(0,σ2).
Recall that in distribution problem 1-Certainty k j = X /2 ∀ j, that is each fair-
ness norm predicts an equal split of the joint account. Hence, we can use dic-
tators’ allocations in this distribution problem to infer the value of θi at the
individual level. The derivation of θi is a preliminary step in the estimation
of the fairness norms’ distribution, which is derived under the assumption
that individuals’ selﬁshness is constant across distribution problems. We as-
sume that θi can be measured without error. As a matter of fact, In Chapter
3 we show that 93% of Benevolent Dictators choose precisely the equal split
and this suggests that decision errors are rather uncommon in the baseline
problem.
We ﬁnd that the average θ is equal to 0.29 in TUR and to 0.27 in TUD
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test p=0.81), meaning that on average dictators take
approximately 30% of the total amount on top of what they consider their
fair share.
Keeping the elicited individual θi ﬁxed, for each dictator we search for the
fairness norm that minimizes the sum of the squared distances between the
predicted and the observed allocations in distribution problems character-
ized by uncertainty.11 That is;
min
k j
6∑
n=1
(
yi n−θi X −k
j
i n
)2
, j = 1, ..,4. (4.4)
The ﬁrst two columns of Table 4.4 show the estimated distribution of fairness
types in the two treatments.12 In the third column we report the distribution
of fairness types estimated in the Benevolent Dictator experiment.
When comparing the distribution of fairness types we ﬁnd no statisti-
cally signiﬁcant difference between TUR and TUD (Fischer exact test p=0.22).
However, as suggested by the ﬁgures in the table, the distribution of fairness
11In order to calculate fairness norms in ambiguous distribution problems we assume that
the probability of the ambiguous event is 50%, consistently with the principle of insufﬁcient
reason.
1228 Dictators (15 in TUR and 13 in TUD) that keep the whole sum in the joint account
in all distribution problems, including the Certainty-1, are excluded from the analysis. We
interpret the behavior of these subjects as being completely self-interested: β= 0 in 4.1 and
thus y∗ = X .
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Table 4.4: Fairness types
TUR TUD BD
ex-post 21% 24% 15.5%
ex-ante 16% 31% 15.5%
utilitarian 10% 6% 27%
equity 53% 39% 42%
N 49 54 28
types differs more markedly when comparing situations where the decision
maker has (TUR and TUD) or has not (BD) stakes in the amount to be di-
vided. We ﬁnd that distribution in TUR is not, and that in the TUD is,
signiﬁcantly different than in the BD experiment (Fischer exact test p=0.14
and p=0.01 respectively). In the following we investigate whether these dif-
ferences can be attributed to the presence in TUR and TUD of self-serving
biased types. In order to do so, we ﬁrst rank the fairness ideals by the extent
to which they allow a dictator to keep money controlling for risk averse and
risk seeking preferences. Table 4.5 shows the ranking.
Table 4.5: Self-serving ranking of fairness norms.
TUR TUD
risk averse risk seeking risk averse risk seeking
1. utilitarian ex-post ex-ante utilitarian
2. ex-post ex-ante equity equity
3. equity equity ex-post ex-ante
4. ex-ante utilitarian utilitarian ex-post
In TUR, risk averse dictators beneﬁt the most by adopting the utilitar-
ian view, which allows them to keep more than the equal split in all decision
situations. The least advantageous fairness ideal is ex-ante equality, which
prescribes compensation of the recipient for his/her exposure to uncertainty.
Risk seeking dictators can keep most money for themselves when endorsing
the ex-post equality fairness ideal and the least when adopting a utilitarian
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view. In TUD earnings uncertainty lies on the dictator side. Therefore, the
ranking of ideals is precisely opposite to the ranking in TUD. We proceed
by comparing the frequency of each fairness types in TUR and TUD to that
in the BD experiment, using the one-sided Fischer exact test. In all exper-
iments, we separate individuals into risk averse and risk seeking by using
the estimated CRRA, α. Table 4.6 shows the results. If, compared to the
BD experiment, the distribution of fairness types in TUR and TUD is biased
in favor of fairness norms that favor dictators’ own material interests, we
would conclude that fairness views are adopted in a self-serving way.
Table 4.6: Fairness types by risk attitude.
risk averse risk seeking
TUR TUD BD TUR TUD BD
ex-post 16.3% 21% 4% 50% 31% 60%
ex-ante 16.3% 34% 9% 16.7% 25% 40%
utilitarian 9.3% 5% 39% 16.7% 6% 0%
equity 58% 40% 48% 16.7% 38% 0%
N 43 38 23 6 16 5
For risk averse individuals, we ﬁnd that the frequency of utilitarian
types is signiﬁcantly smaller in TUR than in the Benevolent Dictator ex-
periment (p=0.01), while the frequency of all other types is not signiﬁcantly
different in the two experiments (p≥ 0.15). This result is counter to the self-
serving hypothesis: the endorsement of the most favorable fairness norm is
less common among involved dictators than among non-involved individu-
als.
In TUD the frequency of utilitarian risk averse types is statistically signiﬁ-
cantly smaller, and that of ex-ante equality fairness types larger, than in the
Benevolent Dictator experiment (p=0.001 and p=0.02 respectively). Given
that utilitarianism is the least, and ex-ante fairness the most, favorable
fairness ideal for a risk averse dictator, these results indicate the presence
of self-serving biased dictators in TUD.
Result 4.4.1. Risk averse individuals are likely to adopt a self-serving inter-
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pretation of fairness when uncertainty affects their own earnings. However,
if uncertainty affects the earnings of others, individuals’ endorsement of fair-
ness norms is not biased by self-interest.
For risk seeking individuals, we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant difference
between TUR, TUD and the Benevolent Dictator experiment. However, this
is mainly attributable to the very limited number of risk seeking subjects in
all experiments.
4.5 Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated individuals’ generosity when its ﬁnal con-
sequences are uncertain. Our design allowed comparing situations where
the decision maker himself is affected by uncertainty to situations where
uncertainty only affects the recipient. Furthermore, we varied the degree
of uncertainty such that distribution problems differed by the potential in-
equality in ﬁnal earnings.
We ﬁnd that on average individuals’ behavior is largely independent of whether
uncertainty affects their own or others’ outcomes. However, when uncer-
tainty is high, and outcomes potentially extreme, individuals tend to act
much selﬁshly. The apparent unresponsiveness of generosity to uncertainty
is called into question once we control for the fairness norms that apply to
the studied distribution problems. Assuming that one’s inclination to act
selﬁshly is constant and measurable at the individual level, we were able to
estimate which of four fairness norms best represents an individual’s behav-
ior across distribution problems. Since fairness norms differ in the extent to
which they entitle individuals to retain money, we could test the the pres-
ence of self-serving biased dictators by comparing the distribution of fairness
norms among non-involved individuals to that among dictators. We observe
that the endorsement of advantageous fairness norms is signiﬁcantly higher
when uncertainty affects one’s own earnings. On the other hand, when the
earnings of the recipient are uncertain, giving does not seem to be affected
by self-serving considerations.
Our results demonstrate the importance of accounting for individuals’ un-
biased fairness norms when analyzing generous behavior. We ﬁnd that in-
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dividuals tend to exploit uncertainty in a self-serving way when they are
personally affected by it. Perhaps surprisingly, individuals do not seem to
exploit others’ exposure to uncertainty in a self-serving way. A possible ex-
planation relates to the fact that individuals are on average uncertainty
averse: empathy with the recipient’s condition may then reduce the room
for biased interpretations of fairness.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Tables
Table 4.7: Euro kept by D, all distribution problems.
TUR TUD treatments’ comparison
mean median s.d. mean median s.d. M-W test K-S test
1-Certainty 12.6 14 3.3 12.4 13 3.5 z=0.24 p=1
(p=0.81)
2-Risk 12.2 12 3.2 12.4 12 3.2 z=-0.41 p=1
(p=0.68)
3-Risk 11.8 12 3.6 12.36 12 3.2 z=-0.8 p=0.78
(p=0.42)
4-Risk 12.6 13 2.9 11.8 12 3.7 z=1.1 p=0.96
(p=0.26)
5-Risk 13.3 14 2.8 12.5 14 3.6 z=0.65 p=0.57
(p=0.51)
6-Ambiguity 12.5 13 3.3 12.8 14 3.3 z=-0.67 p=1
(p=0.5)
7-Ambiguity 12.5 13 2.9 12.1 12 3.7 z=0.37 p=0.97
(p=0.71)
Notes. The null hypothesis of the M-W test is that the median amount kept by D is the same in both
treatments. The null hypothesis in the K-S test is that the amount kept by D has the same distribution
in both treatments.
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Table 4.8: Euro amount kept by D, tobit regression results TUR.
dependent variable: Euro amount kept by D.
independent variables coefﬁcient standard error p-value
α 3.37 1.48 0.02
prior beliefs -3.84 3.96 0.33
female 0.29 0.99 0.77
correct EV 2.25 1.03 0.03
constant 9.09 1.85 0.00
pseudo R-squared 0.025
Prob>F 0.0003
N 448
Distribution problem dummies included and signiﬁcant.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered on subjects.
Table 4.9: Euro amount kept by D, tobit regression results TUD.
dependent variable: Euro amount kept by D.
independent variables coefﬁcient standard error p-value
α -0.23 1.57 0.88
prior beliefs 3.84 5.29 0.47
female -0.63 0.99 0.52
correct EV -0.06 0.96 0.95
constant 14.06 1.55 0.00
pseudo R-squared 0.0023
Prob>F 0.74
N 469
Distribution problem dummies included and signiﬁcant.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and are clustered on subjects.
4.6.2 Instructions of the experiment
We report the instructions for the TUD treatment, the instructions for the
TUR treatment only differ in Part 1.
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Introduction speech
In this experiment you can earn money with the decisions you make. Your
earnings may also depend on chance events and the decisions of other partic-
ipants. At the end of the experiment you will be paid out in cash individually
and conﬁdentially. In order to ensure the highest level of anonymity and con-
ﬁdentiality, the payment will be carried out by a person that is not involved
in this research project. The experimenters cannot link your earnings and
decisions to your identity in any way. During the experiment you are not al-
lowed to communicate in any other way than described in the instructions.
If you have any questions please raise your hand. An experimenter will then
come to you and answer your questions in private. The experiment consists
of 3 parts. You will receive the instructions of a part only after the previous
part has ended.
Part 1
In the ﬁrst part of the experiment you will be randomly matched into groups
of two participants, which will be labeled with the letters A and B. The slider
task In this part of the experiment every participant is asked to perform a
task that involves correctly positioning sliders on a bar. Below you can see
the representation of a slider in the initial position a) and in the correct
position b), which is always in the middle of the bar. The slider is positioned
correctly if the number that shows up to the right of the slider equals 50.
Figure 4.5: a) initial position of the slider
Figure 4.6: b) correct position of the slider
For each correctly positioned slider 0.25 Euro are credited. There are a
total of 32 sliders to be positioned in 6 minutes time, so every participant
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can credit up to 8 Euro. After the 6 minutes are over, the credit accumulated
by A and B, who are in the same group, is deposited in a joint group account.
Each member of a group (A and B) is then informed about how much she/he
and the other member in the group contributed to the joint account. Deter-
mination of earnings The task of A is to divide the amount of money in the
joint account between him/herself and B. A is asked to make a division in
7 different decision situations. At the end of the experiment one out of the
7 decisions will be randomly selected to determine the earnings of A and B.
Each decision situation is equally likely to be the one that determines the
earnings of A and B. Therefore, person A should carefully consider each de-
cision and make each decision in isolation. The 7 decision situations differ
in the way the amount of money assigned to A and B translates into earn-
ings for A and B. The table below summarizes the 7 decision situations and
shows how the earnings of A and B are determined in each decision situa-
tion. Notice that during the experiment the 7 decision situations will appear
in random order. Please have a look at it.
Earnings of A Earnings of B
1 allocation to A allocation to B
2 20% chance 5 times allocation to A, 80% times 0 allocation to B
3 50% chance 2 times allocation to A, 50% times 0 allocation to B
4 80% chance 1.25 times allocation to A, 20% times 0 allocation to B
5 50% chance 1.5 times allocation to A, 50% times 0.5 times allocation to A allocation to B
6 unknown chance 2 times allocation to A, unknown chance 0 allocation to B
7 unknown chance 1.5 times allocation to A, unknown chance 0.5 times allocation to A allocation to B
We will now explain each decision situation in detail. If, at the end of
the experiment, decision situation 1 is selected to matter for payment then
the earnings of A are equal to the amount A allocated to him/herself and the
earnings of B are equal to the allocation to B.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 2 is selected to matter
for payment the earnings of A are equal to the allocation to A. The ﬁnal
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance
event. The chance event will be the public drawing of a card from a stack
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of 100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number from 1 to 20
will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 5 times the money allocated to
B (i.e., 500% of the allocation to B). If a number from 21 to 100 will be drawn
then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with 20% chance the
earnings of B will be 5 times the allocation to B and with 80% chance the
earnings of B will be 0 Euro.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 3 is selected to matter
for payment the earnings of A are equal to the allocation to A. The ﬁnal
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance
event. The chance event will the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100
cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number from 1 to 50 will be
drawn then the earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation to B (i.e. 200%
of the allocation to B). If a number from 51 to 100 will be drawn then the
earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with 50% chance the earnings
of B will be 2 times the allocation to B and with 50% chance the earnings of
B will be 0 Euro.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 4 is selected to matter
for payment the earnings of A are equal to the allocation to A. The ﬁnal
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance
event. The chance event will the public drawing of a card from a stack of
100 cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number from 1 to 80
will be drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.25 times the allocation to B
(i.e. 125% of the allocation to B). If a number from 81 to 100 will be drawn
then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with 80% chance the
earnings of B will be 1.25 times the allocation to B and with 20% chance the
earnings of B will be 0 Euro.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 5 is selected to matter
for payment the earnings of A are equal to the allocation to A. The ﬁnal
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance
event. The chance event will the public drawing of a card from a stack of 100
cards numbered from 1 to 100. If a card with a number from 1 to 50 will be
drawn then the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 150%
of the allocation to B). If a number from 51 to 100 will be drawn then the
earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B (i.e. 50% of the allocation
to B). In other words, with 50% chance the earnings of B will be 1.5 times
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the allocation to B and with 50% chance the earnings of B will be 0.5 times
the allocation to B.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 6 is selected to matter
for payment the earnings of A are equal to the allocation to A. The ﬁnal
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance
event. The experimenters will ﬁrst randomly select black or red to be the
winning color. The chance event will then be the public drawing of a card
from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red. The total number of red
and black cards sums up to 100, but neither A nor B nor the experimenters
know how many red cards and how many black cards are in the stack. If a
card with the winning color is drawn the earnings of B will be 2 times the
allocation to B (i.e. 200% of the allocation to B). If a card with the losing
color is drawn then the earnings of B will be 0 Euro. In other words, with
an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 2 times the allocation to B and
with an unknown chance the earnings of B will be 0 Euro.
If, at the end of the experiment, decision situation 7 is selected to matter
for payment the earnings of A are equal to the allocation to A. The ﬁnal
earnings of B depend on the amount of Euro allocated to B and on a chance
event. The experimenters will ﬁrst randomly select black or red to be the
winning color. The chance event will then be the public drawing of a card
from a stack of 100 cards which are black or red. The total number of red
and black cards sums up to 100, but neither A nor B nor the experimenters
know how many red cards and how many black cards are in the stack. If
a card with the winning color is drawn the earnings of B will be 1.5 times
the allocation to B (i.e. 150% of the allocation to B). If a card with the losing
color is drawn then the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B
(i.e. 50% of the allocation to B). In other words, with an unknown chance
the earnings of B will be 1.5 times the allocation to B and with an unknown
chance the earnings of B will be 0.5 times the allocation to B.
If you have any question please raise your hand and an experimenter will
come to answer your question in private. In the following you are asked a
few questions that will help us assessing your understanding of the decision
situations described above. Please ﬁll in the missing ﬁgures. Note, that in
these questions we are not interested in the actual numbers you ﬁll in but
only if you ﬁll them in correctly. During the experiment you will have the
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possibility to use a calculator by clicking on the icon in the bottom right
corner of the screen. When you are ready please raise your hand and an
experimenter will come to you to check your answers. Once you are ready
please wait quietly.
Consider decision situation 3 and assume that the total in the joint ac-
count is 16 Euro. If A assigns. . . Euro to him/herself and . . . Euro to B, then
this means that with. . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with. . .% chance
. . . Euro. A earns . . . Euro.
Consider decision situation 5 and assume that the total in the joint ac-
count is 15 Euro. If A assigns . . . Euro to him/herself and. . . Euro to B, then
this means that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with. . .% chance
. . . Euro. A earns . . . Euro.
Consider decision situation 7 and assume that the total in the joint ac-
count is 12 Euro. If A assigns . . . Euro to him/herself and . . . Euro to B, then
this means that with . . .% chance B earns . . . Euro and with . . .% chance
. . . Euro. A earns. . . Euro.
Part 2
You are now going to make a series of decisions. These decisions will not
inﬂuence your earnings from the ﬁrst part of the experiment, nor will the
decisions you made in the ﬁrst part of the experiment inﬂuence the earnings
from this part. Furthermore, the decisions you are going to make will only
inﬂuence your own earnings.
You will be confronted with 12 decision situations. All these decision situ-
ations are completely independent of each other. A choice you made in one
decision situation does not affect any of the other following decision situa-
tions.
Each decision situation is displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20
rows. You have to decide for every row whether you prefer option A or option
B. Option A is the same for every row in a given decision situation, while
option B takes 20 different values, one for each row. Note that within a de-
cision situation you can only switch once from option B to option A: if you
switch more than once a warning message will appear on the screen and you
will be asked to change your decisions. By clicking on NEXT you will see
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some examples screens of decision situations.
This is a screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to
face. You are not asked to make choices now! Please have a careful look.
Thereafter click on NEXT to proceed.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 1 HERE]
This is another screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are
going to face. If you want to review the previous example click on BACK,
otherwise click on NEXT to proceed.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 2 HERE]
Determination of earnings At the end of the experiment one of the 12
decision situations will be randomly selected with equal probability. Once
the decision situation is selected, one of the 20 rows in this decision situation
will be randomly selected with equal probability. The choice you have made
in this speciﬁc row will determine your earnings.
Consider, for instance, the ﬁrst screen shot that you have seen. Option A
gives you a 25% chance to earn 16.- Euro and a 75% chance to earn 4.- Euro.
Option B is always a sure amount that ranges from 16.- Euro in the ﬁrst row,
to 4.60 Euro in the 20th row. Suppose that the 12th row is randomly selected.
If you would have selected option B, you would receive 9.40 Euro. If, instead,
you would have selected option A, the outcome of the lottery determines your
earnings. At the end of the experiment the lottery outcome will be publicly
determined by randomly drawing a card from a stack of numbered cards.
Consider now the second screen shot that you have seen. Option A gives you
an unknown chance to earn 12.- Euro and an unknown chance to earn 4.-
Euro. Option B is always a lottery that gives you different chances to earn
12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. Suppose that the 10th row is randomly selected. If you
would have selected option B, you would receive 12.- Euro with 55% chance
and 4.- Euro with 45% chance. If, instead, you would have selected option A,
a stack of red and black cards would be used at the end of the experiment to
determine whether you earn 12.- Euro or 4.- Euro. This stack of cards will
be the same that has been described in part 1: recall that the exact number
of black cards and the exact number of red cards in the stack are unknown
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to you and to us as well. You would earn 12.- Euro if a card of the winning
color is drawn and 4.- Euro otherwise.
Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be
the one that is relevant for your earnings. Therefore, you should view each
decision independently and consider all your choices carefully. If you like
to, you can review the examples screens once more by clicking on BACK. If
you have any questions please raise your hand. When you are ready, please
press the BEGIN button below.
Part 3
In the following you are asked to estimate the choices made by one of your
group members in 6 decision situations of the second part of the experiment.
After having made these estimates you will answer a questionnaire and then
the experiment will be over.
You are going to be randomly matched to one of your group members. For a
certain decision situation you are asked to indicate which is the last row
where you believe your matched group member chooses option B before
switching to option A. You earn 1 Euro if you correctly indicate the switching
point of your matched group member in a certain decision situation. There-
fore, you can earn up to 6 Euro in total. If the true switching point of your
matched group member is different from the point you indicated you earn
nothing.
If you do not want to indicate a single switching point you can indicate a
range of values where you think the switching point of your matched group
member lies. If the true switching point lies in this range of values you will
earn a positive amount smaller than 1 Euro. The exact amount you earn is
calculated according to a formula. The formula captures the idea that earn-
ings are inversely related to the length of the interval you indicate. This
means that the larger the interval you indicate the smaller your potential
earnings are. This formula also guarantees that your earnings are maxi-
mized if you truthfully indicate your estimate. If the true switching point
of your counterpart lies outside the interval you indicate you earn nothing.
Please click on NEXT to view an example.
This is a screen shot of a typical screen that you are going to see. Assume,
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for instance, that you believe that your matched group member chooses op-
tion B for the last time when option B is equal to 6.- Euro. In such a case,
you would type the number 6 in both boxes at the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member may switch
from option B to option A when option B takes any value between 8.- Euro
and 4.50 Euro. In such a case, you would type the number 8 in the ﬁrst box
and the number 4.50 in the second box. Notice that you earn nothing if you
type in two values that cover all possible switching points, in this case if you
type in 10 and 0.50.
If you have any question please raise your hand. Otherwise click on NEXT
to proceed.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 3 HERE]
This is another screen shot of a typical screen that you are going to face.
Assume, for instance, that you believe that your matched group member
chooses option B for the last time when option B gives a chance of 40% to
win 12.- Euro. In such a case, you would type the number 40 in both boxes
at the bottom of the screen.
Assume now that you believe that your matched group member switches
from option B to option A when the winning chance of option B is between
70% and 25%. In such a case, you would type the number 70 in the ﬁrst box
and the number 25 in the second box. Notice that you earn nothing if you
type in two values that cover all possible switching points, that is if you type
in 100 and 5.
[INSERT SCREENSHOT 4 HERE]
If you have any question please raise your hand. If you want to review
the previous examples once more click on BACK. Otherwise, click on BEGIN
to start the third part of the experiment.
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Chapter 5
Risk Taking and Risk
Sharing - Does
Accountability Matter?
5.1 Introduction
Risk sharing is the essential feature of any kind of insurance system. In-
dividual risks are pooled in order to avoid severe income losses in case an
undesirable event occurs. Examples of risk sharing arrangements are the
social security system that covers major risks like unemployment, disabil-
ity, old age or illness, as well as voluntary sharing arrangements like ﬁre
insurance or car insurance. Crucial for the support of such an arrangement
is individuals’ awareness of their current risk exposure and the uncertainty
regarding the event of a loss. Joining a risk sharing arrangement can be
especially desirable for a risk averse individual as it allows reducing one’s
exposure to risks. Furthermore, the sharing of risk has redistributive conse-
quences in the sense that individuals that are unlucky are eventually sup-
ported by those that are lucky. Thus, the more risk is shared, the more
inequalities are reduced ex-post.
An important distinction has to be made between risks that cannot be inﬂu-
enced by individuals’ behavior, such as their genetic predisposition to a cer-
tain disease, and those risks that can at least partly be inﬂuenced by their
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behavior. A high proportion of health care costs, for example, are directly
caused by factors that are within patients’ control like e.g., smoking, a lack
of exercise, overeating, consumption of addictive substances or unsafe sex
practices (see Cawley and Ruhm, 2011). Individuals exhibiting one of these
habits face an increased probability of getting certain illnesses or exacerbate
their consequences. Thus, they often represent an above average burden for
health care providers. The awareness of this relation inspired the idea of
using differential insurance rates for different risk types: the practical con-
sequence would be that individuals with observable high risk exposure, like
smokers or obese individuals, are charged a higher premium in line with
their expected medical expenses. The controversial nature of this proposal
is reﬂected in the large number of (recent) related articles in newspapers
and news blogs.1 Critics argue that not all conditions are the results of fully
deliberate choices but can be associated to factors beyond people’s control. A
recent health poll that covers more than 100.000 US households reveals that
the majority of people, especially non-smokers, would favor higher health in-
surance payments for smokers. At the same time, however, the majority is
not in favor of imposing higher insurance payments on obese individuals
(see Thomas Reuters-NPR Health Poll, 2011). In sum, it seems that support
for collective risk sharing is related to individuals’ own risk taking behavior.
Moreover, support for risk sharing seems to be related to perceived responsi-
bility for high risk taking, as suggested by the fact that respondents’ answers
depend on whether higher insurance payments are targeted at smokers or
obese people.
We conduct a laboratory experiment in order to systematically investigate
how responsibility for risk exposure affects the support for risk sharing ar-
rangements. Furthermore, our design allows to investigate how the support
for risk sharing depends on individuals’ risk preferences, their own risk ex-
posure, as well as others’ risk exposure. Understanding under which condi-
tions people are most willing to share risks is of fundamental importance to
adjust risk sharing systems in a way that their viability is ensured.
Existing experimental studies have investigated the support for income re-
1See, for instance New York Times (Nov, 2011), CNN (Oct, 2011), The Washington Post
(Jan, 2012).
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distribution in contexts where individuals’ outcomes are the product of de-
cisions made under risk. Cappelen et al. (2010) ﬁnd that impartial spec-
tators equalize the earnings of lucky and unlucky risk takers more often
than the earnings of individuals that chose a different risk exposure. In par-
ticular, willingness to reduce inequalities is lowest among individuals who
chose a safe payment and are matched to an unlucky risk taker. Thral and
Rademacher (2009) implement the solidarity game of Selten and Ockenfels
(1998) and compare it to a treatment where individuals choose between a
safe payment and a risky lottery. The authors show that individuals that
chose the safe payment are less willing to reduce inequalities when matched
with individuals that chose the lottery and became needy, as compared to
individuals that became needy by pure chance. To summarize, it appears
that high risk taking is negatively perceived by low risk takers and thus re-
duces their willingness to reduce inequalities. Both studies cover situations
in which redistribution decisions are made at a point when individuals’ out-
comes are already known. However, the peculiar feature of insurance deci-
sions is that they are taken before outcomes are realized. Hence, we test
whether an accountability effect also emerges ex-ante: low risk takers may
be less willing to share risks with high risk takers even if eventual outcomes
are not yet known. Recent studies additionally show, that income inequal-
ities seem to be more acceptable when they can be traced back to factors
within people’s control, but not if they are the result of unswayable factors.
For instance, survey data reveal that support for redistribution is higher
among people that think that wealth results from unjust motives, like luck
or immoral behavior, as opposed to hard work, effort and skills (Alesina and
Glaeser, 2004, Alesina and La Ferrara 2004, and Fong, 2011). Also experi-
mental studies conﬁrm the importance of the income generating process for
redistribution preferences. Durante and Putterman (2009) ﬁnd that subjects
tend to favor less redistribution when pre-tax earnings are determined based
on skill or knowledge as opposed to random assignment. Further, Krawczyk
(2010) shows that individuals are more willing to reduce inequalities in situ-
ations where only luck matters as opposed to situations where the likelihood
of achieving a high outcome can be affected via effort provision. In light of
these results we conjecture that people’s willingness to share risks may also
depend on whether risk exposure is perceived to be an exogenous factor or,
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on the contrary, an individual choice variable.
The experimental set-up consists of two treatments: in the Exogenous Risks
Treatment (EXO) subjects cannot inﬂuence the extent to which they are ex-
posed to risk, while in the Endogenous Risks Treatment (ENDO) the extent
of risk exposure is their own choice. In the ﬁrst part of the ENDO treatment
subjects face ﬁve situations where they choose one of two risky options, that
have the same expected value but differ in their variance σ2. The char-
acteristics of the options are such that choices in this part should reﬂect
individuals’ risk preferences. In the ﬁrst part of the EXO treatment subjects
face exactly the same situations but are assigned one of the options by a ran-
dom mechanism. Thereafter, subjects are paired and one subject in the pair
is randomly selected to choose his/her preferred risk sharing level. Impor-
tantly, the risk sharing decision is made ex-ante, that is before the options’
outcomes are determined. The risk sharing level indicates the percentage
that will be subtracted from each individual’s eventual option outcome. The
pooled amount is then equally redistributed between the two individuals at
the end of the experiment.
We implement the strategy method, which means that participants are asked
to choose a risk sharing level for the case that they are matched with some-
body that chose (has been assigned) the same, or the other option. Using the
strategy method allows us to systematically test how people’s desired level
of risk sharing is related to their own risk exposure and that of the other
individual in the pair. In the last part of the experiment we elicit subjects’
certainty equivalents for a set of lotteries in order to estimate their CRRA
(Constant Relative Risk Aversion) at the individual level.
We ﬁnd that irrespective of their own risk attitude, individuals are on av-
erage less willing to share risk when their risk sharing partner has delib-
erately chosen a high risk option. Support for risk sharing is especially re-
duced among subjects who chose a low risk option instead and highest in the
situations where high risk taking includes the possibility of a zero outcome,
which is the lowest possible outcome among all lotteries. On the contrary,
when risk exposure can not be controlled, risk sharing does not depend on
the option faced by the risk sharing partner.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 5.2 the exper-
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imental design is described in detail. Section 5.3 summarizes theoretical
predictions and hypotheses. Results are presented and discussed in section
5.4. In section 5.5 concluding remarks are drawn.
5.2 Experimental design
The ENDO and EXO treatments essentially differ in whether subjects can
or cannot decide on their exposure to risk. Both treatments consist of three
parts: in what follows we describe each part in detail and point out the treat-
ment differences.
In the risk exposure part all subjects face ﬁve situations in which they are
introduced to two options, R (risky) and S (safe).2 Both options are risky lot-
teries that yield a high outcome, H, with probability p and a low outcome, l,
with probability 1−p. Options only differ in their variance: in all situations,
the expected value is the same but the variance of option S is smaller than
that of option R. Differently said, lottery S always second order stochasti-
cally dominates lottery R and thus we refer to R as the riskier option.
In all ﬁve situations, subjects participating in the ENDO treatment are
asked to make a choice between options R and S. On the contrary, partic-
ipants in the EXO treatment are assigned one of the two options by a com-
puter operated random draw. Options are described on the computer screen
in words and with the use of an intuitive graphical display. All participants
are informed that only one of the ﬁve situations will matter for their ﬁnal
earnings that will be determined at the end of the experiment. It was care-
fully explained to the subjects that each situation is equally likely to be se-
lected for payment. Furthermore, in the ENDO treatment we speciﬁed that
for this reason each choice should be made in isolation from the others.
At the beginning of the risk sharing part subjects are randomly matched
in pairs and in each pair one subject is randomly selected to choose a risk
sharing level s ∈ [0,100], which represents the percentage amount that is
deducted from the lottery outcome of each subject in the pair. Notice that
the risk sharing level has to be chosen ex-ante, that is before the options’
2In the experiment a more neutral wording is employed. Please refer to the Appendix for
the instructions used in the experiment.
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outcomes are known. After lotteries are resolved, the amounts deducted
from the eventual individual outcomes are added at the pair level and then
equally re-distributed to the two individuals. The ﬁnal earnings of a subject
i from the ﬁrst two parts of the experiment are then deﬁned by the following
expression:
Πi = (1−
s
100
) ·Yi+
s
100 · (Yi+Yj)
2
, Y =H, l (5.1)
where Yi is the lottery outcome of i and Yj is the lottery outcome of i’s risk
sharing partner, j. Note that the lottery outcomes of i and j are uncorre-
lated.
The selected subject is asked to choose a sharing level s for each of the ﬁve
situations in the risk exposure part of the experiment. We use the strategy
method which means that for each situation two values of s need to be cho-
sen. One for the case that the other subject in the pair chose the same lottery
option and one for the case that the other subject in the pair chose the al-
ternative lottery option. At the end of the experiment subjects are informed
about the actual lottery chosen by, or assigned to, their risk sharing partner.
Further, the chosen risk sharing level is revealed. Risk is then resolved, the
chosen redistribution is implemented and earnings are determined.
Instructions for the risk exposure and the risk sharing parts are adminis-
tered together at the beginning of the experiment. Hence, in the ENDO
(EXO) treatment subjects choose (are assigned) an option knowing that deci-
sions about risk sharing will be made thereafter. This information structure
was intentionally chosen to make subjects aware that their choices in the
risk exposure part could inﬂuence the earnings of another participant in the
experiment.
Parameters Table 5.1 gives an overview of the options employed in all ﬁve
situations. Probabilities and outcomes are selected in a way that partici-
pants can easily compare the two options. In particular, option R and S are
always equal in one dimension, either with respect to the outcomes’ proba-
bilities or to the value of the lower outcome of the lottery, l. All options have
an expected value of AC6.3 There are essentially two reasons for keeping
3An exception is situation II in which the expected value of option S is AC5.9 in order to
avoid confronting subjects with lottery outcomes that have more than one decimal point.
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the expected value of all options constant. First, within a given situation,
it allows ruling out a potential explanation for risk sharing: sharing risk
may be optimal for a subject in situations where the sharing partner faces
a higher expected value lottery, even though this implies accepting more
risk. Second, keeping expected values constant allows comparing risk shar-
ing behavior across situations in a clean way. The order of appearance of the
situations in the experiment is randomized.
Table 5.1: Situations in the risk exposure part.
situation option p H l σ2
I R 0.2 30 0 144
S 0.5 12 0 36
II R 0.6 10 0 24
S 0.6 6.5 5 0.54
III R 0.2 22 2 64
S 0.2 10 5 4
IV R 0.2 14 4 16
S 0.5 8 4 4
V R 0.5 9 3 9
S 1 6 6 0
Elicitation of risk preferences In this part of the experiment subjects’
risk preferences are elicited with the multiple choice list method (Harrison
and Rustrom, 2008). Participants’ certainty equivalents are elicited for the
ﬁrst nine lotteries in Table 5.1. For each lottery subjects see a screen on the
computer that contains a description of the lottery and a list of 20 equally
spaced sure amounts, ranging from the lottery’s highest to the lowest poten-
tial outcome. In order to facilitate comprehension, likelihoods are expressed
both in percentage points and with the aid of a pie chart. In each row of
the decision screen subjects have to make a choice between the lottery and
the sure amount. Subjects are not allowed to switch back and forth between
the sure amount and the lottery. In other words, a unique switching point
is elicited for each lottery. Certainty equivalents are then calculated as the
However, as shown later, this difference does not critically affect our results.
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arithmetic mean of the smallest sure amount preferred to the lottery and
the consecutive sure amount on the list.
Experimental procedures The experiment was conducted at the Behav-
ioral and Experimental Laboratory (BEELab) at Maastricht University. Sub-
jects were recruited on line with the system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). For
the computerized implementation we used the experimental software Z-tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). A session lasted approximately 1.5 hours and the av-
erage earnings were 18.70 Euro. In total 232 subjects participated in the
experiment, 120 in the ENDO and 112 in the EXO treatment. In order to
increase participants’ understanding of the instructions a set of control ques-
tions was administered before the actual start of the experiment. Before be-
ing paid out and released participants are asked to ﬁll out a questionnaire
that gathers information on subjects’ socio-economic characteristics.
5.3 Theoretical predictions and hypotheses
In the following we present the optimal risk sharing levels predicted by ex-
pected utility theory as well as by models of inequality aversion. Further,
we discuss some hypotheses based on existing empirical ﬁndings.
Expected Utility Consider a subject i that has been selected to choose a
sharing level s and is matched to a subject j. According to expected utility
theory subject i chooses s in order to maximize the expected utility of his
earnings:
max
s
EUi =
4∑
k=1
pk ·U(Πi,k(s)) (5.2)
where pk indicates the probability of the state of the world k, and U(·) is
the utility of i’s ﬁnal earnings in state k, Πi,k. The relevant states of the
world are four: both subjects in the pair win, both lose, i wins and j loses or
j wins and i loses. In order to make quantitative predictions on allocations,
we assume that subjects are characterized by a CRRA utility function for
money, that is U(x)= xα. A risk neutral individual is characterized by α= 1,
a risk averse by 0<α< 1 and a risk loving individual by α> 1. Recall that in
the ﬁrst part of the EXO treatment each subject is randomly assigned either
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option S or the riskier option R: hence, in a pair of subjects four combina-
tions of options are possible. Furthermore, the optimal risk sharing level s∗
depends on whether a subject is risk averse or risk seeking.4 Hence, eight
possible cases need to be considered: Table 5.2 summarizes the predicted
optimal sharing levels for all cases. Notice that predictions are situation
speciﬁc only in the case where a risk averse individual i faces option S and
individual j faces option R.
Table 5.2: Optimal sharing level s∗ of i.
i is risk averse i is risk seeking
i’s option S S R R R R S S
j’s option S R R S R S R S
s∗ of i 100 ]0,50] 100 100 0 0 100 0
Column three and four of Table 5.2 show that for a risk averse subject i full
risk sharing is optimal if assigned a risky option, irrespective of the option
assigned to the other subject in the pair, j. This is because the beneﬁts of
reducing risk exposure predominate even if j faces the riskier option R. If i
is assigned option S, the optimal sharing level is 100% if j was also assigned
option S. On the other hand, if j is assigned option R, the optimal sharing
level is smaller than 50%, but always larger than 0.5 In the latter case the
optimal sharing level for i results from a trade off between reducing risk
exposure and facing j’s riskier option R. For a risk seeking subject i it is only
beneﬁcial to share risk if j faces a riskier option than he does. The optimal
risk sharing level in that case is 100%, and 0 otherwise.
Optimal risk sharing levels are unchanged in the ENDO treatment. How-
ever, Expected Utility Theory also predicts that in the risk exposure part
subjects choose an option consistent with their own risk preferences. Since
option S second order stochastically dominates option R in all situations
a risk averse (seeking) individual should always choose S (R). This is also
4When subject i is risk neutral, there is no uniquely deﬁned s∗. EUi is a linear combi-
nation of outcomes weighted by probabilities, and since all lotteries are characterized by the
same expected value, EUi is constant and independent of s.
5The only exception is situation 5. In this situation, if both subjects are assigned option
S, they receive a sure payment, so the optimal sharing level is not unique.
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true when considering that choices in the ﬁrst part of the experiment can
be strategically motivated. That is, subjects have no incentives to choose an
option that is not in line with their own risk preferences even when they
account for the existence of a successive risk sharing phase. Assume, for
instance, that i is risk averse: in case he will be selected to choose the risk
sharing level, there is clearly no reason why he would choose the option that
gives him the lower expected utility in the risk exposure part. Furthermore,
even if i will not be selected to decide on risk sharing, he cannot beneﬁt
from choosing the riskier option. Indeed, this will at best decrease the part-
ner’s willingness to share risks, which is always suboptimal for a risk averse
subject. The relevant predictions for the ENDO treatment can be found in
column 1-2 and 5-6 of Table 5.2.
Inequality Aversion Experimental research has demonstrated that, in
contrast with the classical assumption of self-interested agents, the deci-
sions of a considerable fraction of individuals are consistent with a concern
for others’ outcomes (Camerer, 2003). Fehr and Schmidt (1999) introduced
other regarding concerns into utility analysis by assuming that an individ-
ual experiences disutility when outcomes are unequal. In particular, for a
given difference in outcomes, an individual may incur a higher disutility in
case he lags behind others. In our context, outcomes are not yet known when
decisions about risk sharing are made. Hence, we assume that an inequality
averse subject maximizes an expected Fehr-Schmidt type of utility function,
where the utility derived from each possible combination of ﬁnal outcomes
is weighted by the outcomes’ probabilities. Thus the expected utility of indi-
vidual i is deﬁned as follows:
max
s
EUi =
4∑
k=1
pk ·[Πi,k−(1−s)(αi ·max
{
Yi,k−Yj,k,0
}
+βi ·max
{
Yj,k−Yi,k,0
}
)]
(5.3)
Where αi measures i’s aversion to disadvantageous inequality and βi mea-
sures i’s aversion to advantageous inequality, with αi ≥ βi and 0 ≤ βi < 1.
The ﬁrst derivative of equation (5.3) with respect to s is strictly positive
for all possible values of α and β, which implies that full risk sharing is al-
ways optimal for inequality averse individuals. Indeed, unless risks are fully
shared, an individual’s disutility from expected inequality is not compen-
sated by the fact that high outcomes may only be partially shared with the
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partner. This follows from the fact that all options have the same expected
value. Hence, the optimal sharing level of an inequality averse individual
is 100%, irrespective of his degree of inequality aversion and of the options
faced by the two risk sharing partners.6
Responsibility for risk taking If subjects maximize their expected util-
ity or a utility function that accounts for aversion to expected inequalities
no difference in risk sharing is predicted between the ENDO and the EXO
treatment. However, the literature reviewed in the introduction suggests
that risk sharing may depend on whether risk exposure is a choice vari-
able or exogenously given. Indeed, it has been observed that individuals are
more willing to reduce inequalities in situations where only luck matters
as opposed to situations where high outcomes can be achieved with effort
provision (see, for instance, Krawczyk 2010). Furthermore, high risk taking
seems to be negatively perceived by low risk takers, and thus reduces their
willingness to reduce inequalities ex-post (see, for instance, Cappelen et al.,
2010). Hence, we hypothesize that in the ENDO treatment individuals who
choose a safe option may dislike a partner’s voluntary high risk exposure and
as a consequence share less risk with him than in the according situation in
the EXO treatment.
5.4 Results
We start by presenting the estimates of subjects’ risk preferences and pro-
ceed showing the relation of the estimates with the options chosen by sub-
jects in the risk exposure part. This constitutes a necessary premise to the
results on risk sharing behavior because, as outlined in Section 5.3, pre-
dictions on sharing levels hinge on individuals’ preferences for risk and on
individuals’ risk exposure. We then analyze risk sharing behavior in the
EXO and ENDO treatment.
6The same result holds for the inequity aversion model in Bolton and Ockenfels (2000),
where individuals are assumed to incur disutility in case their outcome differs from the
average outcome in the pair.
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5.4.1 Risk preferences and risk exposure
The elicited certainty equivalents in the last part of the experiment allow
estimating subjects’ risk preferences at the individual level. We assume a
CRRA utility function for moneyU(x)= xα and estimate the parameter value
of α ∈]0,∞[ for each subject by minimizing the sum of squared distances
(Wakker, 2008 and 2010). That is:
min
α
9∑
i=1
[(pi yαi + (1− pi)z
α
i )
1
α − cei]2
where the ﬁrst term in brackets indicates the theoretically predicted cer-
tainty equivalent for lottery i, and cei is the elicited certainty equivalent of
lottery i = 1, ..9. To correct for heteroscedasticity prospects are normalized
to uniform length. We ﬁnd that the median participant is characterized by
α= 0.91, (s.d α= 0.44, mean α= 0.98). A majority of 62% of the participants
is risk averse, a ﬁnding which is consistent with the existing literature (Holt
and Laury, 2002).
In the ENDO treatment the estimated CRRA is related to the choice behav-
ior in the risk exposure part. Indeed, we observe a positive correlation be-
tween subjects’ α and the number of riskier options they choose (Spearman’s
rho=0.48, p-value=0.00). A large majority of 74% of risk averse subjects
choose the riskier option R in at most two of the ﬁve situations. The choice
behavior of risk seeking subjects appears to be less systematic. Still a slight
majority of 57% choose option R more often than option S. Predictably, in the
EXO treatment we observe no correlation between subjects’ estimated risk
preferences and the number of riskier options R assigned to them (Spear-
man’s rho=-0.08, p=0.39). This is due to the random assignment of options,
which consequently creates cases where an individual is assigned an option
that is not in line with his risk preferences. These cases are less frequent in
the ENDO treatment, but nevertheless important to consider for our anal-
ysis of risk sharing behavior since they reveal a discrepancy between an
individual’s risk preferences and his choice behavior in the risk exposure
part. In the following analysis we use the word (in)consistent to indicate
situations where an individual chose (was assigned) an option which is (not)
in line with his estimated risk preferences.
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5.4.2 Risk sharing
On the aggregate level, the overall average risk sharing level in the EXO
treatment is not statistically signiﬁcantly different from the ENDO treat-
ment (Mann-Whitney test p=0.20). Figure 5.1 shows the distributions of
risk sharing decisions. In both treatments the risk sharing level for which
Figure 5.1: Distribution of risk sharing choices.
the highest frequency is observed is 50%. Also, the frequency of extreme
risk sharing levels of 0% and 100% is considerable. The remaining half of
all risk sharing choices are intermediate values. In the following we analyze
risk sharing behavior taking individuals’ risk preferences, their own risk
exposure and the risk exposure of their sharing partner into account. An
overview of the number of observations for all cases that are covered by our
analysis can be found in the Appendix.
Consistent choices
We start by analyzing the risk sharing behavior of the subjects who chose
(were assigned) an option, consistent with their estimated risk preferences.
Situation V is excluded from the analysis when we consider cases where both
players in a pair face option S. Indeed, in such cases risk sharing choices are
arbitrary since risk is absent.
Since we employ the strategy method in our experiment, we observe an in-
dividual’s sharing behavior in both cases, where the sharing partner faces
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option S and option R. In the following analysis we apply the two-tailed
Wilcoxon signed-rank test for within treatment comparisons.
We ﬁrst consider the behavior of consistent risk averse individuals. In the
ENDO treatment subjects choose an average risk sharing level of 58% when
the other member in the pair also chose option S. On the other hand, when
the other member chose option R, the average risk sharing level is 10 per-
centage points lower. Statistical analysis shows that risk averse individuals
who chose option S share signiﬁcantly less risk if their partner chose option
R compared to if he chose option S (p-value=0.02).7
Irrespective of whether they are in a pair with a subject who was assigned
option S or option R, subjects in the EXO treatment choose on average shar-
ing levels of 55% and 53%, respectively. Statistical tests reveal that these
values are clearly not signiﬁcantly different (p-value=0.86).
Result 5.4.1. Consistent risk averse individuals are less willing to share
risks when matched with somebody exposed to high risks only when high
risk exposure is a deliberate choice.
In order to test the robustness of this result we look at risk sharing behavior
in each situation separately. Figure 5.2 shows the average sharing levels
chosen by risk averse individuals in the ENDO treatment. The dark blue
bars display subject i’s average sharing levels for the cases where both i and
j chose option S, whereas the light blue bars correspond to situations where
j instead chose option R.
We ﬁnd the same patter of behavior in situations I to IV: i’s willingness
to share risk with j is lower when j chose the riskier option, R. This differ-
ence is statistically signiﬁcant in situations I and II (p-value=0.05 and 0.04
respectively). In these situations the low outcome associated with option R is
zero. In particular, in situation I choosing option R over option S goes along
with an increased probability of a zero outcome. In situation II, the choice
of option R introduces the possibility of zero earnings, whereas by choosing
option S this possibility is ruled out. Differently, in situations III and IV the
low outcome of both option S and R is larger than zero.
7Our unit of observation is an individual’s average sharing decision calculated over those
situations where the individual behavior falls into one of the four possibles combinations of
options in a pair.
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Figure 5.2: Average risk sharing of consistent risk averse subjects (%)- ENDO.
Result 5.4.2. Consistent risk averse individuals strongly differentiate their
sharing behavior with respect to their partner’s deliberate risk exposure if
high risk taking includes the possibility of an extremely low outcome.
In the EXO treatment the situation speciﬁc tests do not reveal signiﬁcant
differences and we do not observe any systematic trend in behavior across
situations (p-value at least 0.24).
Given that we only ﬁnd systematic differences in sharing behavior in the
ENDO treatment where risk exposure is a choice variable, our results clearly
suggest that accountability matters for the decision to share risk. Risk
averse individuals who minimized their risk exposure in the ﬁrst part of
the experiment reduce risk sharing when their sharing partner refrained
from doing so. Since expected utility maximization also predicts reduced
risk sharing in that case, the results can also be interpreted from a different
angle. Risk averse individuals might adopt a self-interested attitude only
when risk exposure is endogenous, which thus implies reduced risk sharing
when their partner chose a high risk that could have been avoided. How-
ever, if risks are unswayable, they choose a sharing level that leads to more
ex-post equalization of outcomes, potentially backing up the sharing partner
if his risk materializes in an undesirable way. Irrespective from which angle
one considers the observed behavior, our results speak for the relevance of
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perceived responsibility for risk taking behavior.
We now analyze the behavior of consistent risk seeking individuals. In the
ENDO treatment individuals choose on average a sharing level of 47% in
case their sharing partner also chose option R. Instead, in case the sharing
partner chose option S, the average sharing level is higher, 55%. Statistical
tests reveal that these values are not signiﬁcantly different (p-value=0.23).
However, Figure 5.3 shows that consistent risk seeking subjects in the ENDO
treatment systematically share more risks with subjects who chose the safe
option. Most likely because of the limited number of observations in each
situation differences are not statistically signiﬁcant.
Figure 5.3: Average risk sharing of consistent risk seeking subjects (%)- ENDO.
In the EXO treatment subjects choose on average sharing levels of 55% and
51% when their sharing partner was assigned option R and S respectively.
This difference is clearly not statistically signiﬁcant (p-value=0.98). Fur-
ther, we do not observe any systematic trend in behavior across situations
(p-value at least 0.14).
Result 5.4.3. Individuals who deliberately and consistently chose to expose
themselves to a high risk tend to share more risk with individuals that made
a cautious choice. This result only holds when risk exposure is endogenous.
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The risk sharing behavior of risk seeking individuals displays the same be-
havioral tendency as that of risk averse individuals: facing a high risk taker
as sharing partner reduces the willingness to share risks, irrespective of the
own risk attitude. Therefore, it seems that not only cautious individuals
condition their risk sharing on responsibility for high risk exposure, but also
those that were not cautious themselves. Clearly, the lower the risk sharing
level the more high risk takers have to bear the potentially bad consequences
associated to option R.
Inconsistent choices
In this section we investigate the risk sharing behavior of the individuals
that chose an option that is not in line with their estimated risk preferences.
We begin with analyzing the risk sharing behavior of risk averse individuals
who chose (were assigned) option R.
In the ENDO treatment subjects chose on average a sharing level of 57%
when the other member in the pair was also assigned option R. On the other
hand, when the other member was assigned option S, the average sharing
level is 49%. Risk averse individuals that chose option R share less risk if
their partner chose option S (p-value=0.11). Considering each situation sep-
arately, we ﬁnd that in all situations of the ENDO treatment i shares on av-
erage less risk when j chose the safer option S as compared to when he chose
R. Figure 5.4 shows the average sharing levels in situation I to V. This dif-
ference is statistically signiﬁcant in situation I (p-value=0.05). Differences
in risk sharing levels are probably not statistically signiﬁcant because only
few risk averse subjects did choose option R. In the EXO treatment, average
sharing levels are 58% and 53%: statistical tests reveal that these values
are not signiﬁcantly different (p-value=0.37). We neither observe a system-
atic trend nor statistically signiﬁcant differences at the situation level in the
EXO treatment (p-value at least 0.11).
Result 5.4.4. Risk averse individuals that are exposed to a high risk tend to
share less risk when matched with somebody who chose a low risk exposure,
only if risk exposure is deliberate.
In sum, Result 4 suggests that individuals who deviate from their otherwise
cautious choices prefer to share more risk with individuals who made the
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Figure 5.4: Average risk sharing of inconsistent risk averse subjects (%) - ENDO.
same risky choice as they did.
Lastly, we focus on the behavior of inconsistent risk seeking individuals.
In the ENDO treatment subjects chose on average a sharing level of 44%
when the other member in the pair was also assigned option S. When the
other member was assigned option R, the average sharing level is 45%.
These sharing levels are clearly not statistically signiﬁcantly different (p-
value=0.86). The corresponding sharing levels in the EXO treatment are
57% and 62% and are also not statistically signiﬁcantly different (p-value=0.47).
Result 5.4.5. The risk sharing behavior of risk seeking individuals who
chose (are exposed to) the safer option is neither signiﬁcantly related to the
options assigned to, nor chosen, by the other member in the pair.
The above result is conﬁrmed when investigating risk sharing at the sit-
uation level. Indeed, in both treatments, we neither observe a systematic
trend in behavior across situations nor signiﬁcant differences within situa-
tions. Result 5 suggests that risk seeking individuals do not condition their
risk sharing choices on the partner’s risk exposure if they initially made a
cautious choice.
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5.5 Discussion and conclusions
This study experimentally investigates how individuals’ support for risk
sharing is affected by deliberate versus exogenous risk exposure, by indi-
viduals’ own risk preferences and by the characteristics of the risky situa-
tion. We ﬁnd evidence that individual’s willingness to share risks is neg-
atively affected when other people deliberately expose themselves to high
risk. The observation that low risk takers exhibit this behavior carries im-
portant practical consequences for the viability of voluntary risk sharing
arrangements. Indeed, individuals who avoid habits that increase their risk
margins also contribute more to the sharing pool in expectation than high
risk takers. Hence their presence is fundamental for the efﬁcient functioning
of risk sharing. Our results thus suggest that the support for risk sharing
arrangements by a large majority may demand measures that at least partly
account for risk takers’ higher expected beneﬁts from the system. A popu-
lar measure may be, for instance, the currently debated proposal of raising
smokers’ health insurance premiums, which would partly shift the burden
of smoking related health costs back to the smokers.
Importantly, our results can only be an underestimation of how much the
support for risk sharing decreases as a consequence of high risk taking be-
havior. The riskier options in our set-up are characterized by potential out-
comes that are more extreme in a negative and positive way as compared to
their alternative counterparts. However, all options are equivalent in expec-
tation. Thus, sharing risks with a high risk taker can be attractive, since it
allows to potentially proﬁt from a high outcome. However, habits like smok-
ing, overeating and reckless driving have hardly positive externalities for
society. Taking a high risk can at best only increase the utility of the risk
taker and carry no negative consequences for the group. Hence, the observa-
tion that even in our experimental set-up less risk is shared with high risk
takers can be considered a generalizable result.
An interesting observation in our experiment is that even high risk tak-
ers prefer to share more risks with those who chose a lower risk exposure.
This evidence suggests that responsibility for risk exposure plays an impor-
tant role for sharing behavior even for those subjects that voluntarily expose
themselves to high risks. The comparison of treatments highlights a crucial
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aspect of risk sharing: people’s willingness to share risks is systematically
related to whether risk exposure is perceived to be a deliberate choice. Thus,
our results may offer an explanation why the demand for counter balancing
measures is higher for some health damaging habits than for others. Dif-
ferent than for smokers, many individuals might not judge obese people re-
sponsible for their preference to overeat. It remains an open question why
some preferences are perceived as more legitimate, or less deserving to be
condemned, than others (Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996).
We also observe that individuals who take a high risk, but are generally
cautious, are more willing to share risk with those subjects who also took a
high risk. It might be that in situations where normally risk averse individ-
uals ‘dare’ to take risks, they identify with other high risk takers, and thus
share risks with them. This interpretation is suggested by studies on the
relationship between social identiﬁcation and preferences over redistribu-
tion: the more individuals identify with others the more willing they are to
redistribute income ex-post (see Klor and Shayo, 2010 and Fowler and Kam,
2007). Further investigations are however needed to test the validity of this
interpretation.
5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Instructions of the experiment
The following instructions appeared on participants’ computer screens (ex-
cept from the headlines in squared brackets).
Part 1 [Risk exposure part]
This is a screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to face.
You are not asked to make choices now! Please have a careful look.
In this example, Option A yields 30 Euro with 20% chance and 0 Euro with
80% chance. Option B yields 12 Euro with 50% chance and 0 Euro with 50%
chance. In order to choose between Option A and Option B you will have to
tick one of the boxes surrounded by the red frame.
Assume, for instance, that the decision situation above is selected to be rel-
evant for your payment and also assume that you chose Option B. It follows
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that at the end of the experiment a random draw will determine whether
your outcome is 12 Euro or 0 Euro.
This outcome, together with the other decisions that you will make in this
part of the experiment will determine your ﬁnal earnings. In the following
screens we will explain in detail how your earnings are affected by this out-
come.
Part 1 (continued) [Risk sharing part]
After everyone has made choices between Option A and Option B, you will
be randomly matched with another participant in the room. The two of you
form a group. One person in the group (you or the other participant) will
be randomly selected. For each of the 5 decision situations you faced before,
the selected person has to choose a number between 1 and 100, which deter-
mines the individual outcome’s percentage that each group member deposits
in a group account.
At the end of the experiment, one decision situation will be randomly se-
lected and the outcomes of the chosen options will be determined. Conse-
quently, the amount in the group account will be calculated and equally di-
vided between the two persons in the group. Notice that the selected person
is asked to choose the percentage before the outcomes of the chosen options
are known.
Assume, for instance, that you are selected to choose the percentages. In
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a given decision situation, you will have to make a choice before you know
the outcome of the option you chose and before you know the outcome of the
option chosen by the other person in the group.
Also notice that the selected person has to choose percentages for each of the
5 decision situations because the decision situation relevant for payment is
only determined at the end of the experiment. Therefore, each choice has
to be considered in isolation from the others, as if it were the one which is
relevant for payment.
On the following screen the determination of earnings is illustrated with the
help of examples.
Part 1 (continued)
Imagine now that you have been selected to choose the percentage.
Example 1. Assume that both you and the other person in the group have
chosen Option A, which in the preceding example yields 30 Euro with 20%
chance and 0 Euro with 80% chance. Let’s say that you choose the percent-
age value 40%. At the end of the experiment the uncertainty concerning
your earnings is resolved; assume that Option A eventually yields 30 Euro
to you and 0 Euro to the other person. It follows that:
- The group account consists of 12 Euro (that is, 0.4*30+0.4*0=12+0).
- Your return from the group account is 6 (=12/2) Euro.
- Your earnings are 24 Euro (=30-12+6).
- The earnings of the other person in the group are 6 Euro (=0-0+6).
Example 2. Assume now that in the same decision situation you have cho-
sen Option A, which yields 30 Euro with 20% chance and 0 Euro with 80%
chance, and that the other person chose Option B, which yields 12 Euro with
50% chance and 0 Euro with 50% chance. Let’s say that you choose the per-
centage value 70%. At the end of the experiment the uncertainty concerning
your earnings is resolved. If Option A eventually yields 30 Euro to you and
Option B yields 12 Euro to the other person. It follows that:
- The group account consists of 29.4 Euro (that is, 0.7*30+0.7*12=21+8.4).
- Your return from the group account is 14.7 (=29.4/2) Euro.
- Your earnings are 23.7 Euro (=30-21+14.7).
- The earnings of the other person in the group are 18.3 Euro (=12-8.4+14.7).
This is a screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to face.
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You are not asked to make choices now! Please have a careful look.
In case you are selected to choose the percentages, you are asked to do this
twice for each decision situation. First, for the case that the other person
in your group chose Option A (red circle) and second for the case that the
other person in your group chose Option B (red square). When choosing
the percentages you will not be informed about the actual option chosen by
the other person in your group. At the end of the experiment the percent-
age associated to the actual choice of the other person in your group will be
implemented. In other words, you will choose percentages for two possible
scenarios. Since you do not know which one will be relevant for your pay-
ment, you have to make each choice in isolation and with the same accuracy.
Notice that your outcome may be different from that of the other person in
your group even if both chose the same option.
Also notice that if you choose a percentage of 0 your earnings and the earn-
ings of the other person in the group will exclusively depend on the individ-
ual outcome of the option that each of you chose. Conversely, if you choose a
percentage of 100 your earnings and the earnings of the other person in the
group will be equal to each other, as they will be the sum of your outcomes
divided by 2.
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Part 2 [Elicitation of risk preferences]
You are now going to make a series of decisions. These decisions will not
inﬂuence your earnings from the ﬁrst part of the experiment, nor will the
decisions you made in the ﬁrst parts of the experiment inﬂuence the earn-
ings from this part. Furthermore, the decisions you are going to make will
only inﬂuence your own earnings.
You will be confronted with 9 decision situations. All these decision situa-
tions are completely independent of each other. Each decision situation is
displayed on a screen. The screen consists of 20 rows. You have to decide for
every row whether you prefer Option A or Option B. Option A is the same
for every row in a given decision situation, while Option B takes 20 different
values, one for each row.
Note that within a decision screen you can only switch once from Option B
to Option A: if you switch more than once a warning message will appear on
the screen and you will be asked to change your decisions.
This is a screen shot of a typical decision situation that you are going to face.
You are not asked to make choices now! Please have a careful look.
Determination of earnings
At the end of the experiment one of the 9 decision situations will be randomly
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selected with equal probability. Once the decision situation is selected, one
of the 20 rows in this decision situation will be randomly selected. The choice
you have made in this speciﬁc row will determine your earnings.
Consider, for instance, the ﬁrst screen shot that you have seen. Option A
gives you a 50% chance to earn 12.- Euro and a 50% chance to earn nothing.
Option B is always a sure amount that ranges from 12.- Euro in the ﬁrst
row, to 0.6 Euro in the 20th row. Suppose that the 12th row is randomly
selected. If you would have selected Option B, you would receive 5.4 Euro.
If, instead, you would have selected option A, the outcome of the lottery de-
termines your earnings. At the end of the experiment the lottery outcome
will be determined by the computer.
Please note that each decision situation has the same likelihood to be the
one that is relevant for your earnings. Therefore, you should view each de-
cision independently and consider all your choices carefully.
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5.6.2 Number of observations
Table 5.3: EXO treatment-Choices in Risk Exposure Part.
Participant i Participant j
Risk averse Risk seeking Risk averse Risk seeking
Chosen option S R S R S R S S
Situation 1 22 18 8 8 16 14 18 8
Situation 2 19 21 8 8 11 19 10 16
Situation 3 16 24 7 9 18 12 14 12
Situation 4 16 24 5 11 17 13 17 9
Situation 5 21 19 8 8 10 20 11 15
Table 5.4: ENDO treatment-Choices in Risk Exposure Part.
Participant i Participant j
Risk averse Risk seeking Risk averse Risk seeking
Chosen option S R S R S R S R
Situation 1 22 14 13 11 25 12 9 14
Situation 2 22 14 16 8 26 11 14 9
Situation 3 22 14 6 18 22 15 10 13
Situation 4 19 17 8 16 19 18 5 18
Situation 5 28 8 16 8 31 6 13 10
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